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“Parece-me gente de tal inocência que, se nós entendêssemos a sua fala e eles a nossa,
seriam logo cristãos, visto que não têm nem entendem crença alguma, segundo as
aparências. ... E desta maneira dou aqui a Vossa Alteza conta do que nesta Vossa terra
vi. E se a um pouco alonguei, Ela me perdoe. Porque o desejo que tinha de Vos tudo
dizer, mo fez pôr assim pelo miúdo.
Deste Porto Seguro ... primeiro dia de maio de 1500
Pero Vaz de Caminha”1
1 Carta a El Rei D. Manuel, Dominus : São Paulo, 1963. The letter sent to the king of Portugal after the
encounter of Brazil in 1500 by Pero Vaz de Caminha.
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järjestelmän kulttuurienvälisestä vuorovaikutuksesta. Tutkimus keskittyy vallan, tiedon ja kulttuurin merkitysten
esille tuomiseen käyttämällä teoreettisena viitekehyksenä tätä pro gradua varten hahmoteltua ”kulttuurienvälisen
vuorovaikutuksen teoriaa”. Tutkimuksessa yhdistellään ja sovelletaan Pierre Bourdieun, Michel Foucaultin ja
Greg Urbanin teorioita kulttuurin, vallan ja tiedon – ihmisten - toimintatavoista ja liikkeistä poikki ajan ja läpi
tilan.
Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan Veracel Celulose S.A.:n ja MST:n sosiaalisia, taloudellisia ja poliittisia
ulottuvuuksia, symbolista pääomaa, valtaa ja kulttuurisia kohtaamisia Brasilian Bahian kontekstissa.
Tutkimusmenetelminä käytetään poikkitieteisesti diskurssianalyysia, taloustieteitä, etnografiaa, politiikan
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politiikkaa, valtaa ja diskursseja.
Tutkielmassa havaitaan, että Veracelin ja MST:n kohtaamisessa on kyse kahden erilaisen symbolisen
järjestelmän kohtaamisesta. Kyseessä on dispositiivi kahden tieto/valtajärjestelmän välillä, Michel Foucaultin
termein. Tutkimuksen teoreettiselta kannalta katsottuna, MST:n ja Veracelin dispositiivissa merkittävin
neuvottelun alla oleva käsitys on ihmisen ja maan välinen suhde. Käy myös ilmi, että historiallisesti Brasilian
kontekstissa tämä käsitys on ollut aiemminkin neuvottelun alla. MST:n haltuunottaessa/vallatessa 25 hehtaaria
Veracelin eukalyptustaimikkoa huhtikuussa 2004, kyseessä ei ollut vain fyysinen kohtaaminen. Tämä tutkimus
osoittaa, että kyseessä oli myös kulttuurien kohtaaminen, jossa MST käytti symbolisen keinoja vaikuttaakseen
maan ja eukalyptuksen arvoihin ja vallitseviin yhteiskunnallisiin käsityksiin. Symbolisen keinoin MST pyrki
saavuttamaan myös taloudellista, rakenteellista ja poliittista pääomaa.
Fyysinen kohtaaminen mahdollisti MST:n ja Veracelin kulttuurien tarkastelun. Tärkeimmät tutkimustulokset
osoittavat, että Veracelille kulttuuri muodostuu kansainvälisen liiketoiminnan kentälle sekä brasilialaiselle
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kautta, vaan myös johtuen yhtiön suhteesta eli kulttuurisesta kulkuväylästä Stora Ensoon ja Suomeen. MST:n
symbolinen järjestelmä taasen on vaihtoehto Brasilian ”valtakentän” symboliselle järjestelmälle,
bourdieulaisittain. Sille ominaisia kulttuurisia elementtejä ovat ennen kaikkea Leonardo Boffilainen
Vapautuksen Teologia sekä Paulo Freireläinen sorrettujen pedagogiikka. Nämä elementit tulevat ilmi
kansanliikkeen praxiksen (käytäntöjen) ja rituaalien kuten Místicon kautta.
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Abstract
”The Intercultural Encounter between the Brazilian Landless Workers Movement (MST) and Veracel Celulose:
A Power Analysis” – study’s aim was to transdisciplinarily analyze the encounter between MST and Veracel.
The working hypothesis was that the encounter was, besides its physical nature - also an intercultural encounter
between two symbolic systems. The research focused on bringing forwards the meanings and interplay of
power, knowledge and culture in such an encounter by using as a theoretical framework a “theory of
intercultural encounters”, which was crafted particularly for this thesis. In this, Pierre Bourdieu’s, Michel
Foucault’s and Greg Urban’s theories on culture’s, power’s and knowledge’s – on human being’s – habits and
motions through time and across space were applied.
Veracel Celulose SA’s and MST’s social, economic and political dimensions, symbolic capital, power and
intercultural encounters in the context of Brazilian Bahia were analyzed in this research. Research methodology
consisted transdisciplinarily of discourse analysis, economics, ethnography, political sciences and of some of the
ways in which the three above mentioned authors have analyzed culture, economy, politics, power and
discourses.
In the research was found that the encounter between Veracel and MST was an encounter between two different
symbolic systems. It was a dispositive of two power/knowledge formations, in foucauldian terms. From the
point of view of the thesis’ theoretical framework, in this dispositive the most important conception under
negotiation was human-land relationship. Furthermore, it was found that also historically the conception of
human-land relationship has been under negotiation in the Brazilian context. It was not only a physical
encounter, when MST occupied/invaded 25 hectares of Veracel’s eucalyptus plantation in April 2004. This
study demonstrates the way in which it was also an intercultural encounter, in which MST used symbolic means
in order to affect lands’ and eucalyptus’ values and general social conceptualizations and this way gain also
economic, structural and political capital.
The physical encounter resulted in the materialization of the cultural elements pertinent to both MST and
Veracel, thus the immaterial, the cultural could be analyzed. The most important research results demonstrated
that the symbolic system particular to Veracel is marked by the international business field and by the Brazilian
Positivist management culture. Transformation is taking place within Veracel not only through the pathways,
using Greg Urban’s terms, which connect it to these, but moreover through the pathway which is set between
Veracel, Stora Enso and Finland. On the other hand, the symbolic system of MST is an alternative to the
“Brazilian” power field’s symbolic system, in bourdiean terms. Cultural elements pertinent to it are, primarily,
the Liberation Theology conceptualized by Leonardo Boff and the pedagogy of the oppressed by Paulo Freire.
These elements are manifested in the practices (praxis ) of the social movement and in its rituals like the
Místico.
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61. Introduction
MST, O Movimento dos Sem Terra, the Landless Workers Movement, is a social mass
movement whose objective is to occupy “unproductive” land in Brazil and populate these
lands. The movement was founded officially in 1984 and has about 120 thousand families
in 650 camps around Brazil.2 In total, MST had about one million members in 2002
(Wright & Wolford 2003). Members of MST are current or future small scale farmers. In
1992 these owned 12% of the Brazilian land. Their considerable economic importance is
highlighted, for example, by the fact that they produce 80% of the country’s food supply
(Laakkonen 1992: 209). Due to its reformist attitude and, in a historical comparison
heterodox approach to solving land reform, MST divides opinions.
Veracel Celulose is a company in the forest industry with strong financial and business
relations to the Finnish forest cluster, not only due to the 50% ownership of the Veracel
Celulose project by the Swedish-Finnish Stora Enso, but also due to the massive Finnish
machine and equipment deliveries and export credits. The Veracel investment opens one of
the biggest pulp mills in the world in 2005 in the Southern part of the Brazilian state of
Bahia, close to the city of Eunápolis. Finnish power in South America is present in this
investment via various dimensions; it is an investment highly similar to the Finnish Metsä-
Botnia SA’s plan to construct a massive pulp mill in Uruguay. Both Veracel SA and Botnia
SA belong to the same political, cultural and economic model of development. Material for
the pulp production in both of the cases will be eucalyptus, mainly from the companies vast
land holdings. 50% of the pulp produced by Veracel will be taken and marketed by Aracruz
Celulose, chiefly for the production of first-class hygienic paper in USA. Stora Enso does
not produce hygienic paper; it transports its 50% share of the produced pulp to its paper
plant in Oulu, Finland. The Veracel Celulose project is the biggest single investment in the
term of the government of President Lula Da Silva in Brazil, totalling an estimated 1 billion
euros if measured by orthodox economics.
2 Caverni, Alexandre 2004 (Written Sources)
7In the 4th of April 2004, in the State of Bahia, MST did an occupation/invasion of 25
hectares of eucalyptus plantation which was in possession of Veracel Celulose. The
massive 12000 MST-people mobilising occupation/invasion gained widespread media
attention, as the land occupied was deemed as productive by the law of Brazil and the act
was, thus, illegal. According to the MST the occupation was a symbolic attack against the
private holding of vast tracts of land by individuals and multinationals in a country where
millions strive daily for their bread and dignity.3 In addition, for MST the occupation was
an important part in its series of new land occupations that were to take place in April 2004,
after the government of Lula had failed to fulfil their promises of seeing through a peaceful
though hastened land reform. The peaceful (no blood shed) and symbolic (no direct
economic importance) occupation of Veracel’s eucalyptus plantation was an example of
this, as it was resolved with the power of mass demonstration, negotiation and “high
politics”; not with arms. The response to and the results of the occupation were swift, as the
Brazilian government promised in the rapidly initiated retaliation talks to buy land for the
occupying families from the latifundiarios (big land owners) of the region, 15-25 hectares
for each family, along with other promises pleasing the leaders of MST. As a result, MST
withdrew from the area.
***
The social significance, to which this study aims, is to make contributions to the debates
around MST, Veracel, agrarian reform and eucalyptus-based pulp industry in Brazil.
On the other hand, the key academic argument made by this whole thesis’ structure, is that
phenomena such as the MST/Veracel encounter, have to be studied transdisciplinarily,
merging together political science, economics, sociology, cultural studies and so forth.
These spheres define to great extent each other, and to study mono-disciplinarily just
through one of them a phenomenon would give a weak – even false – picture of the
phenomenon.
3 Interview with Waldemar Estrela, 6/2006, Eunápolis. In the negotiation table for power in the MST/Veracel
encounter, MST tried to use the symbolic capital inherent to the other partner in order to get a better seat on
the table, more attention for their cause, by showing the encounter in which they are in relation to the other
party which has much more economic and symbolic capital internationally.
8Particularly, this research integrates, for the purposes of intercultural encounters research,
the power theories by Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucault and Greg Urban – which are in
themselves quite transdisciplinary in many senses. This is an analysis of power in its
economic, political, social, cultural and symbolic senses; an integration of power analysis
to the core of intercultural studies.
The philosophical tradition, on which this research starts to build on, is that of ethnography.
In this, humans have different approaches on objects. For one, eucalyptus is the manna
from heaven; for another, it is the seed of evil stealing for light from down below. As a
researcher in the ethnographic tradition, one’s role is to assess and describe the cultural
discourses on eucalyptus. In the intercultural encounters approach, besides this also the
dynamics played by the different discourses when encountering inter-culturally are under
scrutiny. For a researcher of cultures, it cannot be the principal focus of research to judge
whether some human approaches to a phenomenon are “good” or “bad”. However, when
transdisciplinarity is the word, when also administrative disciplines such as business
studies, economics and political science are included, some easing from this ethnographic
tradition can take place in the course of analysis.
***
The direct communication between Veracel and MST had never taken place in any form,
and in the occupation of April 2004 this was to prevail. Each of the parties considers and
sees the other one as an enemy.4 However, some arbitrary comments have also been voiced
within the entities, for example, by the Veracel executive Vitor Costa, who pledged that the
relations between the parties were harmonious.5 In sum, both of the parties have,
supposedly, their subjective viewpoint on the question: Who stepped and on whose land?
The usage of the Brazilian land where the encounter took place is of key importance in the
analysis. Furthermore, wide participation of the forest cluster in the geographical areas’
4 On the part of MST: interview with Waldemar Estrela, regional co-ordinator of MST in the Extreme South
of Bahia, 8.6.2004. On the part of Veracel: “Note of Clarification” by Cícero Antônio Lima, the General
manager for the Environment and Institutional Relations.
5 See Written Sources, Caverni (interview with Costa by Reuters).
9social relations puts the analysis of land/forest politics into a central role. Along with the
MST and Veracel Celulose, non-governmental organisations (NGO’s), media, syndicates,
The State of Brazil and many individuals throughout the world have expressed their points
of view about the occupation of land by MST and plantation of eucalyptus by Veracel
Celulose.
Initially, when I was observing these actors in Brazil during the occupation/invasion, the
MST/Veracel encounter appeared as an encounter where the parties had considerable
differences in their values, beliefs and ways to understand the world. Briefly put, “the
orthodox view”6 (that of Veracel) appeared to be that eucalyptus is “good” for Bahia’s
socio-economic and ecologic state. The heterodox discourse (that of MST’s) seemed to be
that it is “bad”. Furthermore, the (assumed) orthodox discourse stated that the usage of land
for the monoculture of eucalyptus is “good,” whereas the heterodox discourses of MST and
NGO’s said that this is bad, and suggested alternative model for the land usage in their
politics. In the April 2004 MST/Veracel conflict these opposing conceptions of land and
eucalyptus were discussed more strongly than ever before or after (in 2004) the occupation.
MST has said that the encounter had a strongly symbolic significance.7 Thus I started to
study it as an intercultural encounter where values, views of the world and ideologies, i.e.
sources of power in foucauldian terms, were in relation (Foucault 1994; 1998). Thus, I
formed the working hypothesis that in the foreplay to the encounter there was an encounter
between two symbolic systems, in Pierre Bourdieu’s terms. In this encounter objectified
symbolic capital (eucalyptus and land),8 had their significances under revaluation by the
encountering parties, and by the society at large. Even though both eucalyptus and land are
highly economic forms of capital in the common sense of the word, the hypothesis holds
that they are not only economic capital, but also symbolic capital. Thus, their efficacy as
both objectified symbolic and economic capital owes to cultural values, worldviews,
ideologies and understandings: meanings perceived by different people. If the culturally
6 In terms of Pierre Bourdieu, this term can be used to describe the standpoint and discourse of that actor
which currently occupies a better position - more capital i.e. power - in a given field.
7 Interview with Waldemar Estrela, 8.6.2004.
8 Objectified symbolic capital is Pierre Bourdieu’s terminology (1991: 160-170). It can be understood as a
synonym to “cultural boundary markers”, which is a more traditional term in ethnography.
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constructed conceptions of land and eucalyptus would transform, these transformations
would reflect in the changing of the economic, calculable values of land and eucalyptus. It
will be analysed if the hypothesis holds true. As a result, it might be more appropriate to
say – after the analysis within this framework is done – that the encounter between MST
and Veracel was not intercultural but taking place within one symbolic system, shared by
both of them. In this case, the actors would share not only interests (for example interest to
owning the piece of land in question) but moreover, have quite-similar conceptions of their
interests, of human-land relationship, eucalyptus, and thus they would act within one
cultural field. In this case the encounter could not be called intercultural.
An intercultural encounter can also be considered a conflict in which the parties’ relations
polarize, or one in which one or more of the parties does not even subjectively consider
itself as a party in the conflict. In fact, such was the case of Veracel and Stora Enso: their
view, at least on executive level, was that they were not parties at all in the encounter: it
was the Brazilian State MST was attacking and not them, in the discourse of Veracel.9
Nevertheless, even though Veracel actively denied its participation in the encounter of
April 2004, it will be transdisciplinarily argued that the symbolic system inherent in the
culture of Veracel is in encounter all the time with the symbolic system of MST, as they are
both political powers acting in the same domain.
Research on MST and Veracel
Earlier research on the encounter of MST and Veracel in 4/2004 has not taken place,
understandably, in any form, or within any science. Thus, the second chapter focuses on
analyzing this specific encounter. The organizational cultures of Veracel or Stora Enso
have not been studied either academically. Stora Enso’s culture, however, has been
indirectly studied in relation to the other stakeholders in the Finnish forest politics.
Eeva Hellström has studied the conflict culture in Finnish forest politics, in which Stora
Enso certainly has a participative role (Hellström 2002).
9 In the encounter of cultures there are different strategies and tactics and one of the most typical tactics of the
orthodox discourse is actually to fight for the non-existence of the debate, the attempt to deny the existence of
a conflict between orthodox and heterodox.
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Thus, even though the organizational cultures of Stora Enso or Veracel (their internal
culture) have not been studied by an ethnographer, the culture of Stora Enso, in the wider
sense of the word, has been studied in there where this encounters with its significant
“others”. On the other hand, the “culture” of Veracel, neither in its internal nor wider
(including external, intercultural relations) sense has been studied. Thereafter, this research
is the first attempt to approach the “culture” of Veracel. In the third chapter the analysis on
it had to be started from the scratch, but soon it was discovered that the culture of Veracel
is not so different from other business cultures, which are global, that it could not be
studied via the studies made on this. The chapter four which studies the “culture” of MST,
could from the beginning rely more on the already existing research on MST, with due
precincts, as the theoretical framework of this paper was applied to MST.
The theoretical framework of this study, where Pierre Bourdieu’s, Greg Urban’s and
Michel Foucault’s theories are aimed to be integrated and applied, is also a trial which has
not taken place before in this way within the field of social / cultural studies. Also other
theories different from these three authors mentioned above, are presented. In a “conflict
culture” approach, like that of Hellström’s, it is assumed that it is the cultural area which
creates certain types of conflict from above, and thus, as Veracel is operating in the
Brazilian realm, the “Brazilian conflict culture” analysis should be used in order to explain
the nature of the conflicts into which Veracel runs into in Brazil.  Thereafter, it is not
appropriate to use Eeva Hellström’s account on the “Finnish forest politics conflict
culture”10 to explain the conflict that took place in Brazil (even though one of the actors -
10 The “conflict culture” in Finland has had an international and national geographic scope (Hellström 2002:
77). Hellström has also found that the form in which conflicts in the forest politics have appeared in Finland
have been physical encounters and radical campaigns. Furthermore, Hellström found that the conflicts in
Finland were intense, as they took place often, physically, and on the spot as protests (2002: 79). The relations
between the different parties in Finland can be described as intense also because they were polarized. This
polarization was most apparent in the field of values. There is a polarization between the ecological and the
socio-economical values in the Finnish forest politics, says Hellström (2002: 80).
These differences in values have affected the way in which different political actors are encountering each
other. They have accounted to a “clash between environmental and community values” in the Finnish forest
politics, according to Hellström’s empirical data, which was collected from interviews between 1984 and
1995. Moreover, the relation and communication between the parties was indirect, as the clash of values
impeded direct communication. Thus, the communication of values was directed to the public, not directly to
the other conflict parties. Hellström’s research results demonstrate that the Finnish forest politics conflict
culture is intensively producing conflicts and disputes (ibid.: 84).
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Veracel - was owned partly by a somewhat “Finnish” enterprise). In the end of chapter two
there is a special small section dedicated to the “conflict culture” approach.
Quite a lot of research has been made on MST: in Brazil there has been anthropological
research focusing on the cultural side of the movement (For example: Chaves 2000) and a
geographical study emphasizing the usage of different “space” (political, geographic,
economic) by the movement (Fernandes 1996). Also the leaders of the movement have
written on it (For example: Stédile 1996; Bogo 2000, 2003). Outside of Brazil the academic
community has also been interested in MST (for example, Harnecker 2002; Wright &
Wolford 2003). Marta Harnecker (2002), from a research unit in Cuba, and Wright &
Wolford have published their study as part of the Food First campaign. Thereafter, these
studies can be argued to have been biased in favor of MST (as they actually say), thus not
perhaps producing very critical accounts on the sides of the movement which might be
easily perceived as “negative”. All of the abovementioned studies belong to the school of
thought in which MST is seen as a social actor which has to be defended due to its weak
position. Nevertheless, both Harnecker’s, Angus Wright’s & Wendy Wolford’s researches
on MST are strictly academic, easily reachable books, covering a wide range of issues
important for understanding MST and the Brazilian society and culture. Angus Wright is
specialized in environmental studies and Wendy Wolford in geography: their book on MST
does not focus on the culture of MST from a strictly ethnographic point of view.
In addition, many articles have been published on specific issues related to MST
worldwide, quite a lot of them in the United States. For example, John L. Hammond has
studied the relation of MST with the Brazilian media, arriving to the conclusion that the
“demonization frame” is the most commonly ascribed viewpoint on MST in Brazil, even
though considerable variety exists in the way MST is framed in the media (Hammond
2004). There is thus still space for doing research on MST, especially in terms of its
symbolic system, which has not been analyzed. Eucalyptus, furthermore, is not covered in
these studies as a specific object whose value MST would characterize: thus I had to gather
together the perception of eucalyptus by MST from the first hand data published a bit
before or after the 4/2004 encounter and during the field observations on the spot.
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However, some of also these issues regarding MST Bahia’s relation with Veracel have been
studied by Lennart Kjörling (2004).
Normally such issues as the value of eucalyptus and land have been considered mainly by
sciences such as economics or biology. Eucalyptus has been studied by genomics, in order
to create an economically more efficient eucalyptus, i.e. a plant that grows faster.11 Also
ecologists have studied eucalyptus, more specifically its impact on the environment. Some
results demonstrate that the plant uses a lot of water, thus having already caused many
rivers to drain in Brazil and fertile land to turn arid (for example: Soares & Overbeek 2003;
World Rainforest Movement 200412). Within Brazilian researches and NGO’s, as well as
individuals, there is considerable criticism on eucalyptus as a plant would not allow for
other plants to live nearby it and as a plant that uses too much water in comparison to
others. Veracel Celulose does not deny these allegations on their web-site – rather they
focus on stating that they have received an ISO 14000 certification for their eucalyptus
operations and that they are operating in total concordance with the law. Importantly, the
heterodox accounts made on eucalyptus as a plant do not focus on its harmful ecologic
impacts (even though representing them) but on its socio-ecologic impacts when cultivated
in large-scale monoculture.
Due to the non-coverage of the earlier academic research on the subject, the MST/Veracel
encounter of April 2004 was an open research question. Furthermore, there appeared to be a
need for a focused and more out-of-the-box research on the conception of human-land
relationships in Brazil in general. The orthodox economic theory (such as that of Stora
Enso), as well as the heterodox viewpoint (such as that of MST’s), when exercised in
estimating the values of eucalyptus and land at the present time in Bahia, are highly biased
politically. Both the orthodox and heterodox value measurements leave out of the
calculations many elements which actually should be integrated, but which are overseen as
they would not be in line with the culture of measuring the economic value of a given
object in the given culture of measurement. For example, Veracel and Stora Enso do not
11 See for example a Brazilian genomics research: Grattapaglia 2004.
12 “Brazil: A categorical demonstration against the green desert and in favour of life”
http://www.wrm.org.uy/bulletin/82/Brazil.html [14.2.2005]
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account for the possible long-run negative ecologic impacts of eucalyptus monoculture on
land – an issue which might well prove to be costly economically for the companies in the
next 20 years if it turns out that the land suffers ecological damage after extensive
cultivation of the plant, as is brought up in many critiques, such as Mång Andersson’s &
Örjan Bartholdson’s (2005) report.
It has to be remembered that there does not exist one specific universal “economic value”
for things, as such a value is always a cultural construction in itself (what is valuable..?).
Finally, economic value is never equally distributed – not only because of inequality and
power hierarchy – but also due to the perceived importance of a specific economic capital
in different cultures – i.e. differences in the objectified symbolic capital valuations. Thus, a
deconstruction of land and eucalyptus is necessary; there exists a need for research.
Macro-, National- and Micro-levels of Analysis
It is important to start first from the macro-level, go then to the national level and finally
arrive to MST/Veracel encounter specific issues when assessing that entity which
encountered with Veracel and that encountered with MST in 4/2004. In this way the more
structural, geopolitical, global dimensions of the encounter are understood: the
MST/Veracel encounter did not take place just on the local level, but was a phenomenon
that gained its character from a far wider group of dimensions.
The macro-level comparative analysis used for MST is that of global agrarian reform
models, mainly the difference between the United States type “Green Revolution” model
and the beginning of the 20th century European style agrarian reform where big land
ownership or large-scale are not promoted. For Veracel, to assess its place within the global
paper & pulp industry and the Finnish forest cluster works as macro-level analysis.
National level analysis spans both for MST and Veracel from the interplay of these with the
“Brazilian management culture” to their actor-specific interplay with the media, the State
and the legal environment in Brazil.
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On the micro-level, or the level of the particular encounter between MST and Veracel, a
discourse analysis is done on the way in which Veracel frames MST. The historical
connotations and other specific elements like the Theology of Liberation, which MST
carries as cultural elements within its “symbolic system”, are also analysed to be of
importance in the way MST encountered Veracel – and vice versa due to the fact that these
elements represented something quite different for Veracel’s eyes. Through analysis of
these three different levels with a transdisciplinary methodology, the research aims towards
a Geertzian “thick description” (Geertz 1973) of the MST/Veracel encounter.
Research Material and Working Methods
The period of collecting research material was the years 2004 and 2005. Ethnographic field
research was commenced within MST for three weeks firstly in the state of Rio de Janeiro,
in assentamento São Domingos13. During that time also many roadside camps,
acampamentos like that of Zé Pureza, were studied. In these the landless workers have been
waiting for land appropriations for years and have developed a culture quite different from
that of the assentamentos. 8 months were spent in Rio de Janeiro, during which time I had
the possibility to interview and witness various manifestations and marches by the MST
read the existing research material on MST, visit their offices and stay well informed on
what was happening around the country on the field of agrarian reform. Thus, I received
early the news of the occupation/invasion of Veracel’s plantation, and travelled to the state
of Bahia to study more in depth the case. As I already was studying the culture of MST (on
which I was about to write articles and an ethnographic study as no information exists in
Finland on the movement), it was obvious that I focused more in detail into the encounter
with Veracel as it was a joint venture of a Finnish company. There came along thus two
weeks spent in Salvador, interviewing and getting to know the MST Bahia’s state-level
leadership body. There I had the possibility to amass a great variety of first-hand literary
and video sources by the movement on the Veracel occupation/invasion. After getting
research and visit permits to the camps nearby Veracel, off I went to Eunápolis to the
16
Southern Bahia. There I was greeted well by the local MST leaders, who showed me
around the camps next to eucalyptus plantations of Veracel.
Also the local NGO’s such as CEPEDES and FASE welcomed me. I talked with the local
people, observed the situation. I also tried to visit Veracel. However, it appeared to be the
case in Eunápolis that if one wants to have the attention of Veracel’s leaders, one has to get
the message through the Stora Enso level in Finland. Thus, as the research was done on the
spot on an ad hoc basis, I had to return to Finland and get the entrance to the joint venture
via the channels of Stora Enso. In the end, a variety of personal / role specific responses to
the encounter with MST by Veracel from the point of Stora Enso were gathered. And
besides this there were massive amounts of material by the companies on Veracel printed
and in the internet. The material pool to be used as a basis for power and discourse analysis
was sufficient thus to perform analysis also on Veracel.
From this research material, specific data for a more systematic discourse analysis was
selected. Ultimately one data was selected for a detailed analysis, due to page limitations:
rest of the collected data (and already partly analysed) was left for possible future
publications. These pieces of data were selected as the patterns revealed in them can be
hold to indicate knowledge which is shared by the specialists creating symbolic meanings
within the respective cultures. The selection of data is justified because the spokesmen
behind them have been analyzed by using Bourdieu’s and Foucault’s theories to possess a
place on fields of symbolic power which have impact on the entities under scrutiny. Some
of these pieces of data that are under critical discourse analysis will be presented as
translations to English. Moreover, the data will be contextualized; background information
will be provided for the reader.
As this is also an ethnographic research, it is attempted that the research will take a form of
total analysis in which it can be said that everything the researcher has observed forms part
of the data. The discourse analysis in here is conducted thus as part of a larger ethnographic
13 Assentamento is a settlement. São Domingos is almost 20 years old and has had a crucial role in the
creation of MST in the state of Rio de Janeiro, even though has nowadays a relatively independent status in
relation with MST.
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study. Especially chapter two will rely heavily on ethnographic total analysis, whereas the
latter specific chapters will employ discourse analysis, economics, political sciences,
history and geography in a transdisciplinary way.
Research Philosophy
This research uses post-structural, post-functional and certainly post-positivist Clifford
Geertz type assumption of cultures, whose research philosophy is that “societies, like lives,
contain their own interpretations” (Geertz 1973: 453). More specifically, the philosophical
suggestion of this study is to try to look at cultures through an “intercultural encounters”
perspective. In this, cultures should be studied rather as systems of interaction, than as
entities separate from each other. Cultures are seen as sums of all the relations they have –
not as entities which gain their particularity from within their essence, but as entities which
are created and defined by all the contexts and relations in which they encounter with
“others”. In the case of a specific entity such as Veracel or MST, thus, one steers to study
them through their relations to the outside actors with which they have encountered and do
encounter with. As there are obviously many significant relations that define a culture’s
direction of transformation on a given time, it would be out of the scope of this study to
perform a thorough scan on all the arguably most significant relations14 that MST and
Veracel have. The focus is, rather, to outline the nature and importance of the relation
between MST and Veracel. Can it be stated that this is actually an intercultural relation – or
is to be accepted that their relation is but a non-cultural one, taking place inside one
culture?15
Thus, the research philosophical proposition is: that which is here, is defined in an
important way by that which is somewhere else. No entity gains its identity from itself or in
14 The most important cultural relations change-wise can be outlined by looking at the exchange relations of
symbolic capital in which the entity is involved in. The relations, which have the most inherent power within
them open up to the research as the most relevant ones. Many have found (such as Pierre Bourdieu and
Michel Foucault) that the most important defining relation is the one which the field/entity has with its
“power field”. More theorizing on this issue will follow in the next chapter.
15 If this was the case, there would not exist any significant differences in the entity-specific ways of
communication, talking about sociality or talking about personhood, for example. (See Carbaugh, Donal 1989
Fifty Terms for Talk. 93-120.)
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a vacuum; identity is created in significant relations to second and third parties. No entity
has an essence: it is in its various relations where an entity actually resides in: a culture
does not reside in a basket or box.
Thereafter, it is believed that cultures are in a constant state of change and flux, and thus to
study the elements which “preserve” them would be to create a false image of stability
there where there least exists stability. Thus, the direction, the movement in which the
culture is, becomes the focus of research. The intercultural encounters research actually
becomes part of the movement – it cannot be in any other way – as the research always
suggests and pinpoints some relations to the entities. Thus, the research tempts to go in the
flow of some possible direction of development (as there are always many available), for
example in order to turn the nature of the relation into a dialogue.
That how we encounter with others is inevitably in relation to that how we comprehend
ourselves to be like. This philosophical underpinning highly influences the research
methods. For example, by asking the parties in encounter to talk in their own words about
how they experienced the interpersonal encounters with the representants of the other party,
one can get to know the culture-specific valuations and, furthermore, open up space for a
dialogue. Cultural renovation and understanding is achievable through giving a value to the
other instead of disregarding the other one as worthless. Thereafter, the giving of value is a
negotiation between that what the other one is, and that how one valuates the other one.16
There are methods which could be made use of in bettering the attitudes of the parties in the
socioeconomic development of the region of Southern Bahia.17
16 Between these two approaches there is a significant difference: in the other one the person is not aware
totally of his inter-relational role in defining also himself as he describes how the other is. In there where one
ponders consciously on how he actually valuates the other, he is offering a reflection to his approach where he
defines how the other one essentially is.
17 For example, specific questions promoting self-reflection could be asked from Stora Enso and MST. For
example, it would be instrumental to ask from their members that “if you could make one wish to the other
party, what it would be?” Or to ask the person to describe some interpersonal encounter he/she has had with
“the other”, to tell about their feelings in that encounter. More work and research should be done on these
respects, to alleviate the relations between the parties – now the few conversations had in these respects with
the parties as part of this research just scratched the surface of the relation.
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Applying Theories and Shaping the Working Hypothesis
The formulation of the working hypothesis took place step by step, by methodologically
applying different theories which seemed to give more tools in understanding the
encounter. As more data and information was gathered, the borderlines of the cultures of
MST and Veracel, respectively and in relation to each other, started to acquire shape.  By
applying theories it became possible to sketch out the systematic and patterned cultural
elements within these entities, such as communication style, conceptions of personhood
(Carbaugh 1989), particular symbolic power ascriptions and pathways which these
elements had traveled.
According to Edgar H. Schein (1987: 78-79) it is particularly rewarding to study the
reactions of organizations on “bad news” or information that appears to threat the survival
of the organization in its own eyes. Organizations, which are often under perceived crisis
have their own ”style” of reacting onto crisis. The more severe the perceived threat is
within the organization, the more likely is that their reaction will reflect the deepest,
implicit characteristics of their culture. This is, because only through contemplating the
deepest levels through reacting, the elements which are closely related to the internal
integrity of the organization can be adjusted to the challenges posed by the threat. (ibid.) To
focus on situations of crisis offers, thus, perhaps the best opportunity to reveal
characteristics of a culture. Furthermore, if ones aim is to administrate, manage an
organization, these moments of crisis/reaction are the most fruitful for transformation
through contemplation. Thereafter, to focus on the MST/Veracel encounter, for example by
doing discourse analysis on the reaction of Veracel on the MST’s invasion, in Veracel’s
words (words, which demonstrates that the situation was perceived by Veracel as a crisis
that was possibly threatening its deepest integrity), is highly justified in order to study
MST’s and Veracel’s “cultures”.
Especially I was looking for the sources of the cultures of these entities, through their most
important relations, and the task became thus to find out where do their cultural traits and
objectives surge from.
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On the location in Eunápolis it appeared to me that the real ideologists and shapers behind
the culture of Veracel Celulose – people able to give responses to my questions – were not
residing in Brazil, but in Finland within the mother company of Stora Enso. In Finland,
then, it became clear to me that the connection between Stora Enso and the Finnish State is
as strong - or even stronger - as it could be expected to be due to the 40 per cent ownership
of Stora Enso by the Finnish State. Nevertheless, it became clear that there is a far higher
level than the Finnish State where the cultural ideology particular to Veracel surges from.
This original field of specialists in the business world creates the most organization-specific
goals for Stora Enso – that of excelling in profits maximization. Luckily, I found
conversations by the company (Stora Enso) with various instances, such as with the field of
specialists in the business culture: the “Big Five” investments banks. This communication
served as a research material par excellence to be used in intercultural research. The
dynamics of communication apparent from the context and style of communication taking
place between Stora Enso and the “Big Five” representant demonstrated an attitude of
admiration and subordination by Stora Enso, a will to please the hearer in general. No sign
of the type of non-dialogue communication used by the company with such instances as
MST was present when it communicated with the “Big Five”. The relation gave an
impression when observing the word tones and selection that it was a typical “teacher-
student” type of relation where the student wants to show good results to the teacher who is
strict and wants in no way to fall in favoring a specific student.18
On the other hand, as I was studying MST, it started to appear to me that the ideology
driving it was the Theology of Liberation particular to MST. Its most important preacher
appeared to be Leonardo Boff. Thus, I read his books and these served as an “interview”
with the ideologist behind MST’s culture. Later on in the fall of 2004 when I was studying
the theories of Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu, I found that these could be applied
extremely well to explain better the MST/Veracel encounter and the particular cultures.
18 This discourse analysis can be obtained from the author by request: it is not included in this research due to
page and research scope & scale limitations.
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The hypothesis that the encounter of Veracel and MST in 4/2004 was an intercultural
encounter is thus defended by approaching the encounter by applying different theoretical
frameworks. One of these is Michel Foucault’s dispositive; the other one Pierre Bourdieu’s
theory on symbolic systems. In this theory, in the central part in intercultural encounters is
the negotiating process upon the significance of a set of objectified symbolical capital. As
such, I have analyzed to function in the MST/Veracel encounter eucalyptus and land. The
land and eucalyptus as objectified symbolic capital have intrinsic values. These are cultural
creations and, thus, subjectively perceived by only the ones who share the understanding of
the system of symbols particular to a given culture.
Secondly, the fact that the encountering of these parties took the form of a physical conflict
and a prolonged dispute, raises the question that why did this escalation of problems into
the confrontation level take place? The world is full of examples where different cultures
can live together without arriving into problematic conflicts. It can be asked thus that why
did MST and Veracel encounter in this way and not in a more pacific way? To get answers
for this question, I analyzed in depth the cultures of Veracel and MST in the context of
Bahia/Brazil.
When researching the cultural roots of the Veracel Celulose Company, my background in
international business, finance and economics studies within the Helsinki School of
Economics proved to be useful. A brief analysis on the economical impacts of Veracel in
Brazil, and the financial relations, can be found in the third chapter. Furthermore, by using
Greg Urban’s cultural motion theory, I traced the ideology of Veracel to come from the
highest levels of the international business culture. It was spotted out that Veracel’s culture
is defined greatly by the international business elite’s culture; however, in this research this
culture was not studied ethnographically due to page limitations, but should be naturally
included a more in depth study on the culture of Veracel.
The highest level, as in any culture, proved to be the field of power. In these terms of Pierre
Bourdieu (1991), power to shape a particular field (in here: culture) is there where most of
the economic and symbolic capital has been gathered.  In the contemporary business
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culture, most of the symbolic and economic capital has been accumulating for years for the
shareholders of companies, and especially for those entities, which provide information on
where to invest. Thus, the biggest investment companies of the world, the so-called “Big
five”, proved to be the source of Veracel Celulose’s existence and cultural particularity.
The pressure of the investment companies travels through different layers and results in
company practices. The message travels within the channels of the international business
field, from the field of power (investment companies) to its sub-fields (companies). In this,
the existence of layers through which message travels results in some acculturation upon
the original cultural message.
Thus, the message coming from above is originally to generate the greatest increase in
value and profits for the economic capital invested by the shareholders into the Veracel
project. However, the layer of the Finnish forest industry cluster has had a considerable
impact in the creation process of Veracel. This is due to the fact that Veracel investment
was not a typical transnational investment in which national borders are indifferent, but a
more traditional international investment between two countries.
Veracel’s “conflict culture”, in Eeva Hellström’s (2002) terms, seems to be highly similar
to the Finnish forest politics. The way in which Veracel reacts into conflicts such as that of
the encounter with MST is highly similar to the way in which forest-related disputes are
handled in Finland. In the Finnish forest politics, typical are physical confrontations and
polarized value-based differences between the parties (Hellström 2002): such has been the
case also with the forest/land politics in Bahia. Is there a connection? The impact of the
“Finnish forest politics conflict culture” could seem obvious in - at least partly - generating
the physical nature conflict of MST and Veracel. Nevertheless, also the culture of MST and
the context of Bahia proved to have impacted onto the nature of the encounter as a physical
conflict. Importantly, historically, also some earlier disputes in the land/forest politics of
Bahia have had physical and polarized, non-cooperative nature. Also the positivism
inherent to the Brazilian power field has been prone to react in a confrontational manner to
its resistance (Mueller 2000).
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To name but just the biggest disputes, the ex-slaves Quilombos communities’ existence as
culturally radically different entities in the geographical area, such as that of Palmares19
(Alencar et al. 1994: 34), were not tolerated by the Brazilian power field of the 17th century.
Neither were the ideals of Beato Conselheiro in the end of the 19th century long bared (Facó
1976), as the setting up of a radically dissimilar power/knowledge formation seemed to put
into danger the power-fields ideological apparatus, if analyzed in foucauldian terms. It
seems as if the power-field presently in the dominating position within the geographical
area of Bahia would have felt threatened the symbolic system created and disseminated by
it for the whole of the regions inhabitants by the mere existence of “the oppositely Other”
culture. This “Other” had in its discourse and existence – not in its practice20 - to obliterate
the ideals and symbolic system of the power field, in order to let its own conception of the
world be real.
The historical construction of the socioeconomic state of affairs of Bahia, such as the tenure
of economic capital (land) by small elite chiefly via latifundiarismo, cannot be held to be
producing physical and polarized confrontations in the area. Physical confrontations have
been an exception rather than a rule in Bahia. Most of the time the regions inhabitants have
been either kept unvoiced not to produce counter-discourses (as in the times of slavery and
dictatorship), or then they have remained hushed due to cultural reasons. For example, the
Portuguese/African legacy in Bahia seems to promote a strong atmosphere of conformism
and pacifism through such practices as the “Jeito Brasileiro”.21
Thus, socioeconomic conditions do not explain the surge of counter-discourses, such as
those of Palmares in the 17th century, Canudos in the end of the 19th century, or MST in the
1980’s. They only function as a background. What has been out of the ordinary in all these
new types of ideals for people to follow has been the appearance of a fresh knowledge that
has legitimated a new-fangled symbolic power.
19 Palmares was a community founded by escaped slaves. There were also “westerners” of alternative life-
style living in the area, such as prostitutes, criminals and so forth. The logic of expansion of Palmares was
that every slave that had been freed by the people in Palmares (which often did rescue-trips to slave colonies),
had to free another slave in order to gain his freedom in Palmares from its “king”.
20 Palmares and Canudos had no real material/structural/political power to threat in practice the power field.
21 To see more on Jeito Brasileiro, see, for example, Ojala 2004.
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In the case of MST culture, it was found that this knowledge is the highly Latin American
ideological product called “The Theology of Liberation”. It has truly served as the midwife
for MST. The Theology of Liberation agitates people to energetically fight a class-fight for
their own salvation.22 The result of this symbolic system, espoused within MST, has thus
strongly impinged on the encounter of MST and Veracel in such a way that it had a
polarized and physical nature.
The MST/Veracel encounter was made possible – not created - by the contemporary
socioeconomic and environmental conditions in the area. If there would not exist
“inequality” in land holding in Brazil (in MST’s point of view), MST would not exist. And
if there would not exist worlds best environmental conditions for the plantation of
eucalyptus, along with favorable political/economic atmosphere in Bahia (in the eyes of
Stora Enso), Veracel Celulose would not exist.
The encounter between these parties would not exist, most importantly, if there would not
had existed a political vacuum for it to take place in April 2004. It has to be remembered
that also all the earlier similar disputes in Bahia, such as the existence of Palmares and
Canudos, took place when there did exist a political rupture. In other words, in all of these
cases, the power field that dominated the symbolic and economic production within the
whole of Brazil was under negotiation. It was under negotiation that what will be the power
field, which affects all the sub-fields within its power.
The power/knowledge formations scuffles in situations such as the MST/Veracel encounter
can be theoretically approached from the point of view of Michel Foucault’s conception of
dispositive. A dispositive is a strategic situation in a given social time and context, where
different knowledge’s are struggling for power. In practice, when such a dispositive is
“open”, as one can interpret this Foucauldian concept, the symbolic systems are particularly
22 To see literary products of the Theology of Liberation particular to MST see, for example see the written
sources Cerioli & Broili 2003; Boff 1993; Bogo 2000, 2003. The references in this research are divided into
written sources, interviews & field research sources and to bibliographical references.
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vulnerable to transformations.23 Furthermore, my interpretation is that methodologically it
is the society, the response of the “public”, on which research focus has to be laid in order
to assess whether a dispositive is “open” or not.
In the MST/Veracel encounter, a thorough analysis on the responses of the “society” on the
encounter in April 2004 – not only in Brazil but also in Finland and more internationally –
would be required and was planned for this study, but to include this proved to beyond the
scale & scope required/ allowed for a master’s thesis. However, based on the analysis
which was already started the media, the State representatives, and citizens, NGO’s: all
these seemed to take the encounter seriously as they reacted and expressed an opinion on it,
as they gave a voice for it. In general the themes which were represented in the
MST/Veracel encounter – such as land ownership or eucalyptus - do not gain such an
attention in the Brazilian media. Numerous are the encounters similar to the MST/Veracel
about which the Brazilian society does not worry anything about.24 Moreover, the responses
were of the type in which a person appears to be clearing up not only to the other, but
mainly to him that why does he think this way on the issue. Such a personal discourse is
apparent only in situations when ones world-view, ideology, grid of intelligibility, symbolic
system, culture (a loved child has many names!) gets under serious questioning. Thus, the
result seems to be that the strategic battle of knowledge’s or grids of intelligibilities in the
MST/Veracel encounter was an “open”dispositive – it affected symbolically the society,
while its purely and directly economic results were quite inexistent.
As the MST/Veracel encounter was an “open” Foucauldian dispositive, there existed the
possibility within the society that it would change its conception on the objectified
symbolic capital under negotiation. Following this, it was possible that the parties
connected to those capitals would gain or lose power, power to function and exist in the
society by the symbolic value attached to their objectified capital. Transformations in the
meanings of the objectified symbolic capital can be very instrumental in changing public’s
23 For example, a situation could be interpreted to be an “open”dispositive, if during a long period of time,
such as one year, there is a shorter period of increased consciousness regarding the problems and themes of
the situation.
24 For example, the MST produces an incessant flow of occupations, most quickly forgotten.
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verdict on the entities linked to the capital. Was land usage or eucalyptus instrumental
during the year 2004 in changing public’s verdict on the cultures of MST or Veracel? Did
the significances of eucalyptus or land usage in Bahia change in the encounter or its
aftermath? These two interrelated questions were brood over, by using Foucault, Bourdieu
and Eeva Hellström’s (2002) theory on when the state of the environment actually becomes
a social problem.
As a result, it was found that the society’s whelming interest into the significances of land
and eucalyptus in Bahia in 4/2004 remained an exception. The rest of the year 2004 did not
gain attention by the society at large on the politics of land and eucalyptus in Bahia: neither
did the public hear the voices of MST or Veracel. However, the pathways on which the
impacts of the occupation/invasion traveled were international and resulted during the end
of 2004 and 2005 in many new openings for the debate on socioeconomic development in
the region, on eucalyptus’s and Veracel’s role, and on MST’s cause. For example, Stora
Enso appointed UNDP to do a thorough analysis of the socioeconomic impacts of its
Brazilian joint venture company, and eucalyptus and land questions related to MST gained
attention in Sweden and Finland.
2. Intercultural Encounter between MST and
Veracel?
Introduction to the Area of Encounter
The encounter took place in the Brazilian state of Bahia, in its extreme south, near the cities
of Eunápolis and Porto Seguro. Below is a map of the region, which is presented in the
web-pages of Veracel:
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Even though the King of Portugal divided the Southern Bahian area to belong to a certain
captain, this Bahian land - of which between the 16th and 19th centuries majority was still
coastal Atlantic rainforest - remained largely non-occupied until the wake of the 20th
Century. In the 20th century there came first small scale farmers, making a living of
subsistence economy to the area (Laakkonen 1992: 206). Also a few latifundiarios came:
there was land for everyone. Simo Laakkonen has found that the mutual life of
latifundiarios, indigenous and the rest was peaceful in Bahia, until the area was connected
via roads into the rest of the world and particularly into the world markets. After the
connection of the lands into the world system in terms of Immanuel Wallerstein (1974),
more entities interested in the “promising” lands and forest capital moved to Bahia. Within
the world system, the social actors of the region were turned into competing interest groups
in terms of their relations to land and each others. The newcomers included landless
workers, latifundiarios seeking for extra land, land brokers and forest companies. (ibid.).
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In this process, the initial small scale farmers who had lived already for years peacefully in
the lands, not to speak of the indigenous, who had been there for ages, were renamed by the
later 20th century newcomers as illegal land invaders and thus driven away from the lands
by the more powerful ones. The forests covering the lands were cut down and the
newcomers continued deeper into the Southern Bahian rainforests (ibid: 207).
In the beginning of the 1980’s, there appears to have started a new kind of phase in the
struggle for land in Southern Bahia. Forests have been mainly cut down already: extensive
monocultures such as pasture for large-scale cattle ranching and eucalyptus plantation have
since the 80’s had the key role in the struggle for land in Southern Bahia and Espirito
Santo. The focal social actor’s role for the development of Brazil was given to the large-
scale export agronegocios by the dictatorship of Brazil (ibid.). The 1964-1984 governments
had preferential politics in relation to foreign capital and latifundiarios: these were given
massive financial subsidiaries, gathered from the taxes paid by small-scale farmers and by
borrowing from abroad (Wrigth & Wolford 2003; Harnecker 2002). In the name of
modernisation, the Brazilian government sold for cheap the rural lands for large-scale
private investors. Financial support was denied from the landless and small-scale farmers,
who produced most of the food for Brazilians (Laakkonen 1992: 208). These land politics
resulted in the current geographical status of the area where the encounter took place.
***
The hypothesis is that the MST/Veracel encounter was a truly intercultural encounter. For
an encounter to be intercultural, it is required that at least two different cultures are taking
part in it. “Intercultural” requires, thus, as any ethnographic research, acknowledging
differences. If in the research process it becomes clear that to find a sound difference
between these two cultures would be erroneous, the working hypothesis that the encounter
was an intercultural encounter, has to be rejected. Such a rejection would lead to the search
for an alternative hypothesis that would better explain that why the encounter took place as
it took. In this chapter the very encounter between MST and Veracel is analyzed by
applying different theories, which the author considers as highly applicable in the field of
intercultural encounters studies.
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And what can be said about how the encounter then took place? The responses to the
encounter were of a highly arbitrary and differentiated nature. It seemed as if there would
be no truth about what happened. Why did it happen? The encounter had a highly political
nature; it was an encounter of powers, a struggle for authority. Thus, I chose to use Pierre
Bourdieu’s and Michel Foucault’s theories on political and symbolic power to better
understand the encounter.
Michel Foucault’s “Power/Knowledge Dispositive”
Friedrich Nietzsche presented that truths and values are born from an encounter between
different wills to power (Nietzsche 1968: 366-382). This idea was developed further by
Michel Foucault. According to him, power is always accompanied by a particular
knowledge (Foucault 1994: 235-236). Furthermore, power is always linked to one position
and relation in a strategic network, setting or situation. Power is the possibility or
impossibility of the subjects’ action: it makes action either possible or impossible. (Helén
1998: 501.)
The first manifestation of a power is its search for a legitimization. Such is the nature of a
power as, except in some extremely rare cases, power does not want to appear as arbitrary
or violent. Power has to have rationality by which to be executed, represented and justified.
On the way to its legitimization, a power, thus, tries to provide for the rationality by which
it is executed, represented and justified. A power supports its intrinsic rationality by
creating different discourses. By these, a power suggests the society, the public, to accept
its rationality as legitimate. As there are normally many discourses, a power seeks for
acknowledgement from one or various perspectives. These perspectives/discourses create
specific knowledge, which ultimately, when widely taken as truth, creates the possibility
for a power to be executed. However, for Foucault power is not in itself violence that would
know how to hide itself by discourses. Rather, power and its exercise is a joint of actions
over and against other possible actions. (Foucault 1994: 235-236.)
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According to Foucault, power cannot be theorized; only the different formations,
connections and transformations of power situations in a given time/space can be analysed.
For this purpose Foucault created his dispositive, which is a situation; a network of
combats, quarrels and power aspirations. (Helén 1998: 499-500.) With the concept of
dispositive Foucault wanted to crystallize the idea that power relations can only exist as a
function of the many resistance points, which represent in the power relation roles of door
handle, opponent, goal or an invasion (1998: 71).
The dispositive, an omnipresent strategic situation of different knowledge/power
combinations transforms its form all the time (ibid.). Dispositive’s essential feature is that it
constitutes the possibilities of knowing, acting and experiencing in a given culture or
society. Methodologically, when applying the concept of dispositive for intercultural
encounters, the assessing of available a) knowledge and b) practices of knowing is essential
in understanding a given culture and this in an intercultural encounter.
There is a clear connection between Foucault’s and Bourdieu’s theories. The way in which
a particular knowledge is being generated has been studied in depth also by Pierre
Bourdieu. Foucault said that the social order is created by a random combination of micro-
mechanisms and positions (Foucault 1998: 71-72). With this Foucault says almost exactly
the same as Bourdieu, only with different words. Bourdieu would say that the social order
is created by the positioning and action of habituses in different fields.
Bourdieu has studied especially that how in the complex society there exists specialized
fields for the production of ideologies that are inherent in symbolic systems. For example,
the clergy of a religion produces an ideology, a truth, which becomes or does not become
accepted by a greater human group. If the ideology becomes accepted, it is clear that it has
gained a legitimization. Moreover, if such is the situation, the ideology has gained power,
and this power is maintained by the religion’s field-specific cultural boundary markers.
These cultural boundary markers, in the case of a possibly “nascent ethnic group”25 such as
25 It would be interesting to study in depth whether MST is a phenomenon of ethnogenesis, whose product
could be a new ethnic group. This could be possible as discursively and in new practices the direction of
MST’s culture seems to be to generate an all the time more particular symbolic system, as will be analysed in
the last chapter. In here, “ethnic group” can be practically any group which possesses its own cultural
elements, distinct from the significant “others” with whom it is in chief relations.
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the MST, for example, are in Bourdieu’s terms “objectified symbolic capital”. The most
important of these for MST is the land and their flag, to name just two.26
These objectified symbolic capitals maintain the power inherent to MST. If their
significance transforms, this means that the knowledge, by which the ideology behind the
movement is created, has changed. Always when the significances of these cultural
boundary markers transforms, it is a case of new power allocation. This is, as power
intrinsic to a particular “ethnic group” “resides” in its objectified symbolic capitals. Thus,
as knowledge possibly shapes the meaning of these, if it gains legitimization, it is important
to study knowledge in its surge and advance, by genealogical discourse analysis, as
Foucault did. Even more important it is to understand that power and knowledge
formations, or ethnic groups / fields only exist in relation to each other. Thus, an
intercultural encounters approach is required to be able to methodologically use Foucault’s
dispositive.
Pierre Bourdieu’s “Symbolic Systems”
The most dominant feature of Pierre Bourdieu’s wide production has been to study the
changing forms of authority and the everyday symbolic battle for power (Mäkelä 1994:
244). Pierre Bourdieu differentiated separate forms of capital and, respectively, powers,
which correspond to these capitals. In this differentiation he enhanced and redirected
Marx’s analysis of power, which was, according to Bourdieu, far too limited, focusing
solely on the analysis of economic capital and power. (Bourdieu 1991: 163-170.)
Bourdieu sees the social world as a construction of different fields, whose control and
resources are fought for by the actors of the fields (Bourdieu 1998: 15-24). In the fields,
investments are made in order to maximize ones preferred capital. Bourdieu’s capital is a
resource, a characteristic and a relation (Mäkelä 1994: 256). That, which type of capital one
26 Based on authors observations and conversations with the MST people in 2004; see also any publication of
the movement to notice the pattern that the conception of land and MST flag are always visibly apparent in
these.
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prefers, depends on ones position on the field, of his habitus, which Bourdieu has shortly
described as socialized subjectivity (Bourdieu 1998: 20-23).
There is, firstly, economic capital and, secondly, symbolic capital. They are in an
oppositional relation to each other, and the quantitative relative division of these creates the
social topology of a given field. Economic capital signifies the classical capital in
economics and is easily understood, whereas symbolic capital has to be divided, according
to Bourdieu, into social capital and cultural capital. Social capital means the amount of the
very social relations that a given person/group/habitus enjoys in a specific field / context.
Cultural capital, on the other hand, can be either inbuilt cultural capital, such as know-how
and education, or symbolic cultural capital, such as moral leadership, which one gets when
he possesses the ability to define cultural, artistic and symbolical values. (Bourdieu 1998:
10-50).
In general, symbolic power/capital is more invisible than economic power/capital; actually
it “can be exercised only with the complicity of those who do not want to know that they
are subject to it or even that they themselves exercise it” (Bourdieu 1991: 164). Following
this definition Bourdieu makes a sophisticated analysis of the functioning of symbolic
power, particularly on the field of politics, in his book Language and Symbolic Power.
Firstly Bourdieu distinguishes two “symbolic systems”: one that is “produced and thereby
appropriated by the group as a whole” and another in which specialists or, more precisely,
“a relatively autonomous field of production and circulation” creates the symbolic system
(Bourdieu 1991:168). These symbolic systems are closely related to the concept of doxa.
Doxa implies that a society is immersed with what remains undiscussed and only with that:
there is no struggle between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. Only the existence of a specialized
field creates the possibility of the orthodox and heterodox discourses to exist (Bourdieu
1991: 277). Furthermore, orthodoxy is dubbed symbolic violence, and there are many ways
in which (and instruments by which) this violence contributes to the greater political
violence (Bourdieu 1991: 165, see graph).
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For Bourdieu there exists, on the other hand, an objective structure in all societies and, on
the other hand, a subjective way in which the society sees itself organized. If these two do
not have an arbitrage between each other, the social world in such a society is “given”, as
people have a strong belief that things could not be in any other way: this presumption he
calls doxa. Bourdieu argues that the more fixed the objective structures are, the more firm
and broad is doxa. Only competing discourses can make the doxa, or that what should be
apparent, visible. (Bourdieu 1998: 20-30.)
After a part of the doxa transforms into heterodoxy/orthodoxy, when the doxa turns
discussed instead of remaining undiscussed, those who Bourdieu nominates as controlled
parties will want to show the artificiality of the social sphere, while those in control try to
maintain the doxa. They create the discourse of orthodoxy to replace doxa by which they
consciously and rationally quest for the innocence of doxa. (Mäkelä 1994: 244; 246.) 27
MST tries to consciously break from doxa, to frame it as orthodoxy, artificiality and
generator of symbolic, cultural violence. There are attempts to create an own type of system
of education, form of agricultural production, and organisation of work into cooperatives
within MST.
In Bourdieu-style field analysis, one has to define the relation of a given field with the field
of power. The strongest and most dominating field in every society is the field of power.
Thus, the field of power affects the structure of the other fields; it is the source of
hierarchical power relations. (Mäkelä 1994: 246.) In other words, there are structural
homologies between different fields (Bourdieu 1991: 169). This unfolds in the shifting of
socialized subjectivities (habitus) and practices from one field to another.
27 However, as the orthodoxy has to defend the natural against the heterodoxy that has brought forwards other
possibilities, it can be argued that orthodoxy admits by its own action that it is no longer the obvious truth.
Those who have the least capital on a given field purport to reverse the situation after doxa has broken,
embracing the heterodox strategy and aiming to force those in control out of their silence to defend their
orthodox discourse. After the breakdown of doxa, the heterodox discourse becomes a threat and unmoral; it
becomes an unbearable issue to even hint about the possibility of the non-innocence of doxa in front of the
orthodox discourse. Before the breakdown, of course, there exists no heterodoxy: at least it is not recognised
as such a discourse.
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Bourdieu’s model of society is composed of fields that are intertwined with each other. In
this theory, classes are categories of people who hold similar positions on fields that are
uniform or close to each other. The closer the status of persons is the more possible is that
their habitus is identical; this makes it possible to create a class consciousness, for
example, by the heterodox discourse of “all the proletariats of the world: join together”
(Bourdieu 1991: 160-180). Ethnic groups can be virtually anything, and cultural boundary
markers can be drawn to give significance for these groups in any way and on any contents.
For example, it could easily be argued that in Brazil the difference between different
football team fans are more ethnically marking than, say, religious adherence of persons.
When studying MST as a field within the Brazilian society first has to be acknowledged
that “the field of MST” is a field existing under the dominion of the Brazilian power field.
The Brazilian power field has its very special, historically constructed structure.28 The
hierarchical structure, when in relation with the field of MST, thus, affects power
distribution and political hierarchy within the MST.
An essential feature of the fields is the conversion of diverse capital into other types. This
takes place through field-specific game rules. Every player pursues to capitalize in the best
possible way his goals, in order to differentiate with style and taste from the others on his
field. According to Bourdieu, this differentiation and capitalization of goals creates cultural
variances. (Bourdieu 1984.)
In some cases the most appreciated fields of a given society are not open for all. In such a
situation, the outsiders are either forced to adopt a taste which finds good those things that
are available for the outsiders, or then to create their own “outsider-taste” and habits to
consciously fight for the own group identity.
28 The field of power in Brazil can be seen actually up to some extent as a loose ethnic group, which is
composed by the Brazilian “elites”. These have the historically gathered symbolic cultural capital to be able to
determine that what is good culture in Brazil and that what is not. They have also better access to strive for
inbuilt symbolic cultural capital such as education. Furthermore, the elites have normally a lot of economic
capital, and both the economic and symbolic capital abundance gives them excellent opportunities to
transform their capital into other forms of capital, such as, social capital.  This results in well-being and
dominance also in the field of politics in Brazil for the members of “elite”.
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This can lead into making an opposition with the field’s taste in which the outsiders cannot
contribute. If other political, economic, social and perhaps geographic elements are there to
support, this variation in taste can lead to setting up a new symbolic system, as shall be
analysed in this research later on, in the chapter on MST.
Specialists behind Ideologies
It appears that both the fields of MST and Veracel have a separated, relatively autonomous
field for the creation of symbolic system, in comparison to having a “traditional” type
symbolic system. This is apparent for example by noting that there are different titles for
different hierarchical level leaders within these entities. These structural differentiations do
not however signify automatically that a structural position would bring with it symbolic
power. The dynamics of symbolic power and exchange have a life of their own, which only
partly and in some cases interrelates with structural power positions. Next is analyzed that
in which way there exists fields of symbolic power with specialists creating the ideologies
within MST and Veracel.
Bourdieu argues that in order to understand better ideologies, we should not merely note
the often-existing homology in the interests between representatives and their group, as that
homology is actually in his opinion a by-product. The functions performed by the delegates
for the non-specialists are by-products because their main functions focus on “competing
for a monopoly over the competence under consideration (religious, artistic, etc)”. Bourdieu
thus states that ideologies, as specialists create them, owe their most specific character to
three determining impacts. Firstly, ideologies are shaped by the interests of the groups they
express and “present”. Secondly, ideologies owe to “the specific interests of those who
produce them”, and thirdly, to “the specific logic of the field of production”. (Bourdieu
1991: 169.)
In the case of Veracel, it can be alleged that the specialists creating the ideology, which
Veracel obeys in practice, are competing for a monopoly over the competence in
economical efficiency, i.e. profit maximization. Adam Smith (1904 [1776])) can be seen as
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the great-grandfather of the ideologists who now possess the symbolic capital to determine
the sound objectives in companies, such as Veracel.
The ideal of profit maximization, apparent in the field of economics and market-determined
economies in general, goes far beyond, is much stronger than other ideals. This can be
observed from the fact that habituses, which adorn this ideology, even if they would
possess millions in economic capital, still grave for more and even flee of taxation to tax
paradises. However, the field of specialists creating the profit-maximization ideology, the
ethos of capitalism in Weberian terms (Weber 1967), cannot be said to be products of
Veracel or Stora Enso: no, one should look for the specialists in the field of market-
economies symbolic system creation in far higher levels. The top 10 investment banks of
the world as the major stock owners would not be very far from being determined as the
ideologists behind also Stora Enso’s will to strive for profit maximization.
The ideology of profit maximization, which would best serve really the specialists interests
as shareholders, is transformed as it travels through different layers of organizations
(businesses); these are sub-fields of the field of specialists but still have their own internal
field of specialists within their company structure (the board). Depending on the company-
specific field for determining the organizational culture29, there may exist even great
variations from the cultural message. The pressure coming from above on the board,
however, has to be remembered; thus most businesses, especially stock-listed ones, see as
their role profit-maximization.
The impact of the “Big Five” symbolic power field on Veracel becomes very apparent
when analyzing how the internal culture of Stora Enso should, more logically be strongly
affected by the values and ideology of its board, and within it by its main shareholder,
which is the Finnish State, whose values are those of a Nordic welfare state. In reality the
company obeys more strongly the ideology coming from the specialists calling for profit-
maximization, instead of following the cultural messages that should logically be coming
from the direction of the major shareholder. Along with profit-maximization, of course in
29 The layer which the cultural message encounters when in contact with the sub-field of the symbolic system
which has created this message.
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Stora Enso and in Veracel there can be seen also tracts of the ideology of quality which
aims to preserve the environment and do business ethically (in contrast to, for example,
Aracruz Celulose’s business in Brazil during the past decades). However, to see tracts of
the ideology apparent to a Nordic welfare state in the Veracel project is, as will be argued, a
position inherent to orthodox discourse (those strongly defending Veracel) in the debate
over Veracel’s impact on the regions socioeconomic development.
The ideology created by specialists that have symbolic power over Veracel Celulose does
not only go through different layers (those of Stora Enso and Aracruz Celulose as major
shareholders), but there exists more than one ideology, which is distracting Veracel to get
attention to itself in the social conditions where the enterprise functions. These are the
heterodox discourses (those of MST and NGO’s), and discourses that are orthodox to a
lesser extent than profit maximization, such as the ideology of quality. Thus, various
symbolic power fields have an impact both on Veracel and MST, but especially on Veracel
due to its international dimensions and lesser ethnic integrity in terms of shared culture
within its personnel.
Has the relation of Veracel with Stora Enso, or in urbanian terms the cultural pathway
between them, impacted the culture of Veracel, and if so, up to what extent? To
immediately give an answer to this question, it appears to be the case (as will be shown
through discourse analysis in the next chapter) that the communication style and culture of
Veracel has not been really transformed by its international institutional relations with Stora
Enso. There are hardly any signs of the Stora Enso culture visible in Veracel, if the
principle object of maximizing profit and running some sustainability programs designed
by Stora Enso are not considered. The symbolic capital field within Veracel is specialized
and limited for the executive level positivist leaders, which is actually explicitly brought
forwards by the company on their “Code of Ethics and Conduct”, point “3.7. Political,
religious and philosophical positions”30:
30 www.veracel.com.br Sustainability. Code of Ethics. [4.5.2005]
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“Employees are prohibited from meeting or mobilizing co-workers inside Veracel’s facilities to act
against the company’s instructions or to run political, religious or philosophical campaigns or
campaigns that represent a conflict of interests with its activities or businesses.”
Thus, there is a monopoly of cultural creation within Veracel. The interviews that were
made within Stora Enso in Finland31 demonstrated that Stora Enso does not have – cannot
have due to lack of cultural expertise thus far – knowledge on what does, for example, a
“philosophical campaign” mean in the abovementioned texts socio-cultural Brazilian
context. Practically, it renders to the executives the authority to accuse the other workers
basically on any rights, as anything can be considered to be “philosophical campaign” in
Brazil.32
Even though the workers and middle-management of Veracel must submit under the
symbolic authority of their leaders not to express any particular religious point of view (as
representants of the company), the leaders of Veracel are allowed – as representants of their
institution – to draw ties between Veracel and religious sects. For example, Veracel’s
President Vitor Costa – as a representant of Veracel – took part in, sponsored and
emphasized the importance of the 505th year celebration of the first Christian mass in
Brazil.33 There is thus a clear economic and symbolic power distance, hierarchy, operating
in the internal (workers – executives) and external (in-group - out-group) practice and
discourse of Veracel Celulose.
In the case of MST, it is easier to see the driving ideology behind it, and the vested interests
of the clergy preaching this ideology to the greater field of MST. It can be seen that there
exists a homology in interests between the delegates in MST and those who give them the
power to represent themselves.34 In the field of MST, those who possess symbolic capital
and the power that is intrinsic to it, are the MST’s clergy, their political representatives, the
delegates of the movement whose discourse has a highly religious sound; that of the MST-
type Theology of Liberation.
31 Interview with a worker of Stora Enso (wishes to remain unnamed) by the author
32 As various Brazilian informants have informed to the author
33 www.veracel.com.br Press Room. Celebration of the 505th anniversary of Brazil’s first mass - 4/28/05.
[4.5.2005]
34 Authors observations from field research within MST in 2004; see also publications by the movement, such
as: Bogo 2000; 2003, Cerioli & Broilo 2003.
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In the case of MST it is easier thus to spot the origin of its ideology and name its
representative specialists, as MST has surged just recently. MST has possibly come to exist
through a process of ethnogenesis –at least to some extent, and in that genesis its greatest
ideological creators have been the clergy preaching for Theology of Liberation, namely
Leonardo Boff, whom MST actually calls their “great teacher”.35 Thus, as the movement
explicitly and directly names the entity it admires36, one can analyze this relation. The
Theology of Liberation by Leonardo Boff has been the ideology that has served as the
instrument for the creation of a symbolic system within MST.37 MST fights a Marxist-style
class struggle, and for that goal the Theology of Liberation serves perfectly as it is in
homology with that struggle.
Encountering
How should, then, the occupation/invasion of Veracel’s plantation by MST be judged in
these respects? Now, there exists these two systems of symbolic power, whose ideological
topologies have been briefly presented above, which encountered in the occupation. The
working hypothesis is that the encounter in itself had a highly symbolic nature: to occupy/
lose the control over the piece of land had no immediate and direct meaningful economic
consequences on the parties. The hypothesis was that the MST/Veracel encounter was
intercultural and took place between two symbolic systems.
Bourdieu writes: “symbolic systems owe their distinctive power to the fact that the relations
of power expressed through them are manifested in the misrecognizable form of relations
of meaning (displacement)” (Bourdieu 1991:170).
35 See the religion schoolbook of the movement, “Ocupando a Biblia” by Cerioli & Broilo 2003.
36 That actually is more than often the case when looking at a symbolic power relationship between an
authority and one who sees the cultural message coming from him/her as salient to himself. Thus, often the
sources, the birth-givers of an ideology are not hidden by those affected by them, but voiced pointed in
discourses of the parties following the ideology-giver.
37 Also other persons have been prominent in creating the MST-culture, for example Ademar Bogo and other
leaders inside the movement. However, their impact has been only latter to that of the Theology of Liberation
and they can be analysed by discourse analysis to be in a “cultural sub-relation” to Leonardo Boff.
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Accordingly, the occupation of Veracel’s lands was extremely arbitrarily perceived by
different persons / habituses.38 This misrecognizable character of the encounter supports the
hypothesis that it was an encounter where symbolic systems were in a Foucauldian
dispositive. Meanings were given on the encounter in the most striking controversy to each
other: the media, NGO’s, the States, MST itself, and Veracel: all reacted arbitrarily to the
occupation. As a response to the occupation, there surged both orthodox and heterodox
discourses on the occupation. Inside the Brazilian state, for example, some ministers were
in favor of it and others against, as well as in the Veracel where the executive shared in a
way his sympathy with MST and some other leaders judged the act more daringly.
In Bourdieu’s words, symbolic power is “an almost magical power which enables one to
obtain the equivalent of what is obtained through force (whether physical or economic)”.
Symbolic power only exists if it mobilizes people, if it is being recognized, that is,
“misrecognized as arbitrary” (ibid.). Theoretically for an encounter to be intercultural, it
has to be misrecognizable, symbolically arbitrary, says Bourdieu. By this he means that
different social actors have to understand the object under mutual inspection symbolically
in a different manner, when compared to the point of views of the others.
The object, through which an intercultural encounter takes place, materializes, becomes the
focus of study as it represents the arbitrary approaches, symbolizations of the actors. All the
concerned parties in the encounter have to construct of it a unique situation through their
responses, through the discourses which try to classify, rationalize and put into its right
place the encounter. Intercultural encounter has to be a dispositive; the symbolic meanings
attached to the encountering parties’ roles, and to the legitimizations of those roles, have to
be unfixed for an encounter to be considered intercultural.
38 Within Veracel, observe the difference in discourse tone and style in the given responses to the encounter
with MST by different staff members. For example, Cícero Antônio Lima, the General manager for the
Environment and Institutional Relations of Veracel Celulose, said that “The invaders have already
destroyed nearly 25 hectares of eucalyptus trees and continue removing wood for building shacks at the
invasion site“in the “Declaration” made official after the encounter. Compare this with the fact that the
president of Veracel, Vitor Costa, said in an interview on 7.4.2004 with Jornal do Comercio do Rio de Janeiro
that “Veracel and MST have always had a good living together.”
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In a central role in the Veracel/MST encounter were two specific symbolic capitals: those
of eucalyptus and land. Bourdieu treats clothes and scepter, for example, as a joint of their
function as material goods and as symbols of power, which are at the same time economic
objects and objectified symbolic capital, having their efficacy subject to the cultural
conditions remaining the same (Bourdieu 1991: 277).39 In this master’s thesis it is argued
that in intercultural encounters there has to be always some arbitrary objectified symbolic
capital involved, as the transculturation process can only take place through concrete
objects whose value is ambiguous for different parties in the process. Thus, the meaning of
objects has to be disputable in some way in an intercultural encounter.
Eucalyptus should also thus be treated as an a joint of objectified symbolic capital and
economic capital because it owes its economic efficacy to a greater ideological apparatus,
which makes it efficient and a legitimate object to be used for the ideological goals within
the culture that finds it useful, i.e. the entities impacted by the orthodox market-led
discourse. An important aspect of objectified symbolic capital is that it lays its efficacy on
belief. Environmentalist NGO’s have taken a heterodox approach to eucalyptus against it
being a suitable and acceptable object, as they find that eucalyptus would dry the land and
rivers out of water.40 The orthodox discourse, however, says the contrary: that eucalyptus is
an extremely ecologically sound plant, having been approved to fulfill the environmental
quality standards of ISO 14000, for example.41
Importantly, a discourse is never just an extra (as is often being hinted when the orthodox
economics discourse users talk about “ideology”); it is a part of a given economic action
itself. Bourdieu maintains, thereafter, that from a methodological point of view religious
and economic functions should not be differentiated from each other. The practicing of
economic functions is always made possible only by symbolizations. (Bourdieu 1998: 185-
186.)
39 If the valuation of clothes or scepter by a given culture would disappear, they would not have anymore even
the economic value as goods in the trade within that culture, for example.
40 See, for example, Soares & Winfried 2003.
41 See: Stora Enso 2003 Sustainability Report. Helsinki: Stora Enso.
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It is thus obvious that eucalyptus is a joint of economic and objectified symbolic capital, as
approaches to it derive from ideological, symbolic system differences. And following these
lines of logic, if the heterodox view on eucalyptus was to gain more power, eucalyptus
could not be stated to be anymore the most efficient plant to produce pulp on the planet, as
is now stated by the orthodox discourse. The symbolic power would shift to the heterodox
side and, thus, the heterodox view that eucalyptus is “bad” and not “good” would in turn
become the orthodox view. And all the related fields to eucalyptus would have to accept
this transformation or face the consequences that the public, state and investor opinions
play on the rebel, on the heterodox discourse. The transformations of power in a dispositive
take place through the changes in knowledge. Thereafter, to understand the importance of
symbolic power that an object carries is more crucial to business enterprises and social
movement alike, than they might currently acknowledge if focusing too compactly only on
objects as having their value determined by purely economic measures.42
Furthermore, land was also a joint of economic and objectified symbolic capital in the
encounter of MST and Veracel. The proper usage of the land in the Bahian region was
under dispute. The lands objectified symbolic significance was negotiated; the land’s value
in the context of Bahia came under a more wide-spread, social, some might say democratic
dispute. This dispute still continues, as land as an objectified symbolic capital is the
hallmark of all the disputes for MST, and the negotiation of its value has historical roots in
Brazil, whereas eucalyptus is a newcomer in the negotiation table of values in Brazil.
The “Conflict Culture” Approach
Encounters and conflicts have been tried to explain also through “conflict cultures”. In this
approach, it is assumed that a particular cultural area (more than often a national state in
these types of studies) would be producing specific type of conflicts. It is analyzed in these
42 In the case of MST/Veracel encounter, as already noted, the symbolization of eucalyptus makes it possible
that it is used economically arbitrarily. Some use it for pulp; others would like to use it for constructing
settlements, and so on. If there would only exist one type of objective and “purely economic” use for
eucalyptus, other kinds of economic uses of it would not raise vexation in erstwhile parties. The case of
MST/Veracel conflict, thus, appears to work as a strong argument defending Bourdieu’s theory on the
unitedness of economic and symbolic functions.
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studies that what are the dynamics of each “conflict culture”. The presupposition that is
taken in “conflict culture” research is that every culture has a tendency to produce certain
types of conflicts, and also an inclination to react into these in a certain manner (Hellström
2002: 75-76). For example, some conflict cultures are seeking conflicts and tend to solve
them with physical violence, whereas other conflict cultures are trying to avoid them. Eeva
Hellström has approached conflicts proper to forest politics by seeing them as cultural
products of a given country. Her approach is a part of the international comparative conflict
research; a field on which only very few research has been done according to her. (ibid.)43
The more typical point of view in conflict studies would be to study the cultures of the
encountering parties, not a conflict culture that a country has, according to Eeva Hellström.
All the analysis up to this point in this research on the MST/Veracel encounter has been of
this sort. However, as this kind of approach may be able to generate extra explanation
power, next will be briefly studied if the MST/Veracel encounter could have been (also?) a
product of some sort of “conflict culture”.
The common Brazilian expression “você sabe com quem está falando?” or “do you know
with whom you are talking?” that Roberto DaMatta brings forth (DaMatta 1979: 159),
demonstrates up to some extent (taking in account possibilities for considerable regional
and individual differences) the dynamics of conflict culture in Brazil. A “Jeitinho”, such as
“Você sabe” expresses the tension between two cultural codes in Brazil, modernism and
traditionalism (and, respectively, individualism and personalism), and tries to
metaphorically limit the advance of individualism by putting everyone on their right place
in the society. (Barbosa 1992: 84.) In this theory belongs also the hypothesis that there does
not exist hegemony by neither of these visions in Brazil. The key guideline in navigating
between these two codes in Brazil is to follow the classic saying: “For friends all, for
enemies the law”, which means that a person (friend) can get anything (even illegal partial
services), whereas for the enemies is given “the law”. And this is not just any law: anyone
who knows at least a little bit the law of Brazil as it is practiced, with its bureaucratic
labyrinths and its inhumanity, knows that to give the enemy the law is really the worst
43 However, even though Hellström claims that there are not many studies on this academic field, there exists
a long and strong tradition of studying “conflict culture” at least in Brazil – based mainly on the research
made by Roberto DaMatta and Livia Barbosa.
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possible thing one can do for the other. According to Miguel Pedro Cardoso, in Brazil laws
and regulations are enacted upon the assumption that a substantial percentage will be
disobeyed (2000: 21-27). Bluntly put, the laws of the jungle are still in power in a particular
way within the Brazilian social sphere; land is controlled by that that has the power and will
to exercise it. The controlling hand of the state does not reach one in Brazil efficiently; this
allows for more actor specific freedom to define the rules of appropriate sociality; the cost
of this freedom being the inability of the weak to act and a general feeling of insecurity
within the class most in need of the state, i.e. the relatively small Brazilian middle class.
The MST/Veracel encounter can also be identified to have been marked by the “Brazilian
conflict culture of Jeitinho”. “Jeitinho” can be understood as a conflict culture, as it is a
cultural model which creates the framework for conciliation and acting in a proper manner
in a conflictive situation in Brazil. When MST decided to occupy/invade the lands of
Veracel that were deemed productive by the Brazilian law, this can be claimed to have
been, in addition, an attack by the personalist, traditional code against the modernist, law-
based positivist code. The message was that this modernist code does not apply for MST.44
The manifestation of MST was an attempt to question and attack against the code of
individualism and the conception of private property of land. It was a “Jeitinho” where
MST asked metaphorically from Veracel “Do you know with whom you are talking?” and
tried in this way to get Veracel into the same level with it, on a level where equality would
be equality of fact guaranteed by the human condition of a person, not guaranteed by law of
the positivist authorities, on front of which people are not actually equal, at least not in
Brazil, as the existence of a dual code demonstrates.
3. Veracel and its Cultural Dimensions
This chapter will focus firstly more in detail on Veracel’s surge from within the global and
Brazilian paper & pulp industries. Then in this transdisciplinary research of the
MST/Veracel encounter the disciplinary point of view of economics is immersed into the
44 MST did not consider their act as “illegal” or wrong. For example, one of the leading figures in MST, João
Pedro Stédile, has said, regarding laws, that “no human being is obliged to obey unjust laws” (1993: 54).
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disciplinary research body. A transdisciplinary look from the point of view of Brazil is
taken on the Veracel investment, in order to analyse the investment as surging inside the
structural tumults of the Brazilian economy. In this, the interplay of Veracel with the
Brazilian political and economic spheres is analysed.
After this, the Finnish dimensions of the Veracel’s encounter with MST are studied more in
depth. After all, this is a research made within a Finnish University, and its contribution to
the debate internationally (and particularly in Brazil) around the Veracel investment and
MST can thus be to bring into the knowledge of non-Finnish persons the connection of
Veracel to Finland through Stora Enso and vice versa. This also makes this research
socially relevant in Finland, which should be a preference in doing research in Finnish
universities, according to many Finnish politicians and academics in power. This research
can, thus, be socially justified, as it brings not only to the knowledge of Brazilians the
Finnish dimension, but to the knowledge of the Finnish the Brazilian dimension. As
relations and encounters between Finland and Brazil keep on increasing in the globalizing
world, the research can demonstrate that why it is increasingly important to focus attention,
to understand the culture and society of Latin America also in Finland – and vice versa.
After focusing to Veracel’s Finnish dimensions, lastly in this chapter Veracel’s symbolic
system is studied by focusing on the discursive relationship in which Veracel is with its
significant “others”. Particularly, the relation of Veracel to MST is studied, as it has to be
remembered that culture is always relationally created rather than essential.
Global Forest Cluster and Veracel
Veracel Celulose S.A. is a joint venture, where alongside Stora Enso, owner is Aracruz
Celulose. Aracruz is the world’s largest producer of bleached eucalyptus pulp, with an
output of 2.4 million tons per year. It is a joint venture of Erling Lorentzen, Safra Group
and Votorantim Group (28% of shares each), and of the BNDES, Brazil’s National
Economic and Social Development Bank (holding 12.5% of the shares). Votorantim is
owned by a Brazilian investor family and Lorenzen is a Norwegian multi-millionaire, who
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has close blood ties to the Norwegian king. The Safra Group is an international network of
companies controlled by the Safra family. Of these, Votorantim is constantly in conflicts
with MST in Brazil, especially in the state of São Paulo where MST is occupying/invading
on a regular basis its eucalyptus plantations.
Profit maximization is certainly not primary in all business enterprises value base; nor can
capitalism in general or business in particular be claimed to products of an “ideology”. For
many of the so-called capitalist enterprises and phenomenon are products of universal
cultural elements particular to the human beings all around the world. Some Marxist and
socialist critique of capitalism are thereafter up to a considerable extent based on a
misconception of the phenomenon itself. However, in some cases the value of profit
maximization can actually turn into an overall ideology which creates cultural particularity.
Interestingly, it is not any difficulty in finding out if this is the case: the enterprises
adorning this point of view normally display it in grand letters in their discourses. Has this
been the case for Veracel or for some of the entities of which it is compiled via ownership?
And what consequences would it carry for the study on the “symbolic system” to which
Veracel belongs if that would be the case? And, most importantly, if the symbolic system
pertinent to Veracel was to be found to possess up to great extent an ideology of profit
maximization, what would be the meaning of this for the encounter with MST’s symbolic
system, for the physical encounter between these two social actors?
Safra Group has a self-centring discourse on its web-pages: “Built on solid foundations and
conservative principles, the Group has earned global recognition for its philosophy of
protecting client’s wealth while affording impressive returns. No other priority takes
precedence over its commitment to clients.”45 Thus, the culture of Safra, well depicted in
the above discourse by the company – appears to have as its culture indeed the profit
maximization ideal. It is thus possible that this cultural element has travelled and taken a
visible form also in the joint venture Aracruz Celulose SA.
45 Safra Group. “About Safra”: http://www.safra.com.br/ingles/index.asp [6.6.2004]
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According to various NGO’s (Cepedes, CDDH, World Rainforest Movement: see the
sources), Aracruz is practically having the State of Espirito Santo in Brazil as its big private
eucalyptus plantation, a state of affairs for which the state’s politicians were and continue
to be bribed for. The participation of BNDES in financing a company such as Aracruz has
been widely criticized. NGO’s and indigenous have black-listed Aracruz for causing
environmental catastrophes and violating the rights of the indigenous peoples. Stora Enso,
as Aracruz’s joint venture partner in Veracel, when asked about their business relation with
Aracruz, said that they are not responsible of the actions of Aracruz in any way, and will
not comment them. The fact that BNDES is financing Aracruz can be explained through a
look on the sectoral transformations of the global and Brazilian paper & pulp industries.
The “ethnogenesis” of business enterprises takes place through financing, and thereafter the
financing of Veracel can help to understand the principal reasons for its birth. As it will be
argued, the surge of Veracel in Brazil owes to the State policies of the Brazilian and
Finnish States paper & pulp sectors in the new global market situation which started in the
beginning of the 1990’s.
When reaching the end of the 20th century, the Nordic forest cluster was not doing so well.
According to the Economist:46 “European paper firms, whose returns on capital have not
exceeded 10% in recent years, have also done badly. Paper firms everywhere have been
46 As a source critique in using the Economist, the following has to be noted. The magazine is representing the
views and political goals of the biggest shareholders, bosses and investment banks of the world. Thus, it is a
very good, and very important, example of the current opinion of the “markets”, i.e. of those persons’ views
that can be argued to have the most leverage over the markets. The Economist is considered to be the most
influential magazine in the world, and that assumption can be proved to be right also in the case of Veracel,
when looking at the articles that were written on it beforehand, and then at the outcomes.
However, one has to be quite source-critical when reading the Economist. Even though it would like
to show an image of itself as objective media, it is not at all that and its stories are quite ethnocentric and even
biased politically, economically and culturally. A through discourse analysis could easily show how the line
of the magazine has an implicit ethnocentrism, resulting in mocking comments on the third world country
cultures, for example.
The magazine is also one of the grandest media institutions that at the same time wants to keep the
maintain the idea of “national sovereignty”, whilst at the same time promoting the international objectives of
the few rich, such as the will of controlling national governments through political instruments such as the
IMF. In sum, the Economist can be kept directly responsible for the growing economism and decrease in
democracy in the global relations (for more information on economism, see Teivainen 2003). Thus, in an
analysis of the economistic machine in itself, having a look from the inside, from the standpoint of the
Economist, is of great use.
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destroying reams of shareholder capital.”47 The Economist explains why the paper giants
face problems nowadays: “Yet it is not the arrival of the digital age and the “paperless”
office that is to blame for the industry’s troubles. They arise from a classic old-economy
problem: global overcapacity [… ] Even the biggest firms usually lack the market power to
nudge prices upward” (ibid). Thus, when the paper & pulp industry has not been able to
raise the prices, what followed was that the enterprises within it started to seek for lowering
their costs. This was due to the ideology pertinent to the Weberian “ethos of capitalism”
where profit is seen as the greatest virtue, which has to be furthermore constantly sought for
due to an air of responsibility, such as that surging from the “spirit of Protestantism”
(1967). Due to these cultural elements but also technical and economic, political causes, the
trend in the paper industry has been since the 1990’s to construct more and more efficient
factories, such as that of Veracel’s pulp mill. This way, actors within the industry want to
warrant themselves having the leading profit margins; and thus, for example, the utmost
capacity to control the prices on the markets by reducing or increasing output temporarily.
The logic of the paper & pulp markets creates the internal logic of its actors, denominating
thus also greatly the “culture” of these actors to share certain characteristics.
In the late industry-specific transformations, the world’s principal paper & pulp companies
have merged. The Economist brings forward the main powerhouses in the industry. These
are behind the paper & pulp companies and the particular contribution that each of these
actors brings to the sector has thereafter also importance in the shaping of the logic and
culture of paper & pulp companies:
“Why is this traditionally sleepy industry consolidating now? After all, many of the forces that made
it so parochial are still at work. ... Families, from America’s Weyerhaeusers and Meads to Ireland’s
Smurfits and Finland’s Myllykoskis, have always been very powerful in the paper business.
Governments, keen to guard the national patrimony, have also obstructed change.”
As can be noted, the Economist is not only demonstrating the powerhouses, but making a
metacultural judgement on them, hoping them to change to a more neoliberal and less
parochial direction. The role which the Economist has as the voice of the worlds’ biggest
investment companies (“The Big Five”) culture-specific, economic and political interests, is
thereafter manifested in this piece of discourse. The message is clear: neoliberal
47 Beaten to a pulp, May 18th 2000, From The Economist print edition.
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effectiveness must be sought also in the paper & pulp sector, as such is the hegemonic
ideology of the contemporary global economy. The weight of this hegemony explains why,
for example did Enso with major ownership by the Finnish State merge with the Stora in
Sweden, whose major owner is the Wallenberg family. The Economist also explains the
functioning of this framework through the merging of actors’ interests on the sector: “The
bosses of the big paper companies explain the merger wave with visionary strategic
statements. ...bosses say their home markets of North America or Europe are mature, and
that acquisitions grease the way into growth markets. Others again see deals as a way to
lock in vast quantities of inexpensive feedstock in such places as Brazil” (ibid).
Hence, it emerges as the reason behind the existence of Veracel Celulose as a joint venture
of the merged giant Stora Enso, that together these companies were better capable to “lock
in vast quantities of inexpensive feedstock in such places as Brazil” – in practice by
creating the Veracel Celulose.48
However, if looking strictly from the point of view of the shareholders as only shareholders
and not as members of a macroeconomy, they have gained more dividends and value
through the increased profitability of companies such as Stora Enso since the end of the
1990s. As reasons for this increased profitability, Stora Enso sees the following, according
48 The creators of Veracel should be the shareholders behind it, biggest of them being the Finnish State, i.e.
the Finnish citizens. However, it can be questioned whether the biggest shareholders have had a significant
word to say on the merger or on the new investments like Veracel. Thereafter, understandably, the goals of
the shareholders seem quite arbitrary with the late developments on the paper & pulp sector, as is depicted for
example through the article by the Economist: “Andersen Consulting insists that shareholders, fed up with
low returns, will punish firms that try to expand by adding capacity in an already glutted market.” On this
discourse, the Economist uses the hegemonic attempt to put logic into the minds of the shareholders, to
present all the worlds “shareholders” as a homogenic group whose shared goal would be to avoid “low
returns.”
However, returns on stocks can hardly be the main objective of the Finnish State as a shareholder, for
example, if thought in classical macroeconomic turns and not through the hegemonic logic of the “quartile
economy.” In Finland, due to the sought increases in share returns, Stora Enso is downsizing. In the current
debate around the internationalization of the formerly Finnish paper & pulp industry’s production base, many
have voiced doubts about the macroeconomic results of this development for the actual shareholders, i.e.
Finnish citizens. It seems likely to many – and also in here taking in consideration the impact of the
hegemony - that when the company has new factories and mills functioning in South America and other
places, even more rundowns of production facilities are due in Finland. Now, how would this serve the
shareholders, the Finnish citizens, for example? The demand for the highest profits, in organisations that have
this ideal as their locomotive, will show its macroeconomic weaknesses inevitably in comparison to
organisations that exist for the well-being of their members. More considerations on the Finnish dimensions
of Veracel following later on.
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to the Economist article: “Esko Makelainen, senior executive vice-president of Stora Enso,
the world’s second-largest paper producer: ‘Today we are much more disciplined and more
focused on creating stable returns.’ And more global ... 90% of [Stora Enso’s] turnover is
outside Finland.”
Thus, there has been a thorough transformation in the functioning of Stora Enso in the
beginning of the 21st century, according to its leaders (now Stora Enso is “more focused on
creating stable returns”). The creation of Veracel Celulose is the result of this new
discourse of “discipline”, discourse of creating the highest possible profits for the
shareholders in the “quartile economy”. The pulp produced from eucalyptus in South
America signifies half costs of production in comparison to Finland.
Next, is analyzed the surge of Veracel from the point of view of transformations within the
domestic Brazilian paper & pulp sector in the 1990’s. Peter Kingstone has studied the
transformations in the economy-politics relations in the 1990’s Brazil, which led into the
adaptation of a neoliberal reform (1999). Brazil was just turning from the ISI-corporatist
model into neoliberalism, and thereafter many of its business sectors faced enormous
pressures to have to compete with the global markets (Kingstone 1999: 240). Brazilian pulp
& paper industry was also impacted in this macroeconomic transformation process, as is
analysed in the Kingstone’s economic treatise. What was interesting about the pulp & paper
sector in Brazil in the 1990 was that it was “amongst the most competitive sectors in the
global economy” (Kingstone 1999: 234-235). Thus, to transform it or to invest into it
seemed of little macroeconomic importance to the Brazilian government (or to the Brazilian
paper & pulp companies) in comparison to financing other sectors of the Brazilian
economy, which were not so competitive in the new global, open economy.
According to Kingstone, the Brazilian paper & pulp industry was never threatened by
neoliberal reforms. In spite of this, Brazilian paper & pulp industry joined together to attack
against the neoliberal reforms of Fernando Collor’s government in the beginning of the
1990’s. BRACELPA (Brazilian Pulp and Paper Association), a sectoral association was
crafted as a coalition to devote “much effort to lobbying for improved financing from the
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BNDES, which it secured in 1992 and the again in 1996.” In the wake of the new neoliberal
world economy, Brazilian paper & pulp industrialists were not pleased to the support they
got from the State: they demanded – and succeeded – in gaining promises from the State to
defend the private sector in the world economy through public investments. (ibid.) Also
Veracel came to benefit from the financing promises and political partiality which the
Brazilian coalition of the paper & pulp industrialists had gained in the ever-so positivist
climate in which high level and dominating sectoral corporations are being trusted the role
of developing the country. In total, BRACELPA and BNDES jointly estimated that US $13
billion was required to be invested between 1996 and 2005 for the paper & pulp sector: an
estimate which the State agreed upon to fulfil (ibid). Veracel became, thus, to enjoy of the
earlier financing policies (13 billion) lobbed by the BRACELPA in Brazil, as it gained the
US $495 million financing from BNDES. Following the security which the corporatist and
private pulp & paper sector gained from the Brazilian State, the sector has never been again
opposing neoliberal reforms (ibid). With the almost unlimited backing of the Brazilian
State, the countries pulp industry has offered good incentives also for foreigners to invest
onto the sector. The pulp industry has had a colourful history; there has been for example
the floating pulp mill (the Jari project) that Daniel Ludwig constructed for the Amazon, but
which never paid back itself and was scrutinized by all. To describe the history and context
of Brazilian pulp industry more in detail would be interesting here, but has to left for future
research
In the new global economic climate, Brazilian firms felt themselves facing significant
challenges, and did not only start to lobby their government for financing, but also sought
for foreign partners. Even though the foreign exchange surplus generated for Brazil has
increased since the 1980’s in this development, a factor which is not often considered or
pinpointed in the late development is the rapid shift in ownership. Through outright
acquisition by a foreign firm, mergers and joint ventures, the ownership of Brazilian firms
is turning all the time less domestic. (ibid: 237.) For example, BNDES did not buy into
Veracel through shareholding: instead of ownership it decided to just finance the new
company; however with such an enormous sum which would had endorsed also for a
significant portion as a shareholder in the company. The macroeconomic consequences of
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these two different choices of investing can be argued upon; if looked from the point of
view of the hegemonic neoliberal policies, however, it is certain that State ownership is not
promoted due to the big investments companies’ (like Safra’s) conflicting interests as
entities reaching for ownership.
When studied from the point of view of economics and business studies, Veracel Celulose
S.A. has been a product of the Brazilian macroeconomic transformation and of the
structural challenges within the global paper & pulp industry in the 1990’s.
Veracel within the Brazilian Economy and Politics
Veracel has been marketed in the Brazilian media as a significant producer of GDP growth,
jobs and tax revenues: wealth and prosperity in general. Next is briefly analysed which are
the impacts of Veracel through the GDP growth on the region’s and Brazil’s democracy
and economy. The positive results of the abovementioned have been enthusiastically
promoted and brought forwards in Brazil than internationally or in Finland:49 after all,
Brazil is the place where most of the hearts have to be won for Veracel as its surge takes
place there. Certainly, there must be also some economic benefits, at least if looked from
the point of view of some of the actors and citizens in Brazil. The aim of this research is not
to deny that, but to bring into the skewed discussion surrounding the economic impacts –
through argumented critique – new points of views.
Estimates on how many jobs are created through Veracel have varied between 300 and
20000 created jobs. The most pinpointed issue legitimizing attempts of the investment for
the eyes of Brazilians has been the large-scale generation of work. However, others than
Brazilians, for example the president of Stora Enso, Jukka Härmälä, has said himself that
the pulp plant in itself will give work to some 300 people (see sources). On the other hand,
different Brazilian entities have increased the forecasted number of jobs created by Veracel
– very likely according to their own political goals. For example, the government of Lula
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has felt it as important for its own legitimization that it presses the investment as
economically sound and wealth-generating.
Often the optimists have forgotten to mention that the majority of the created jobs are
actually indirect, i.e. forecasts are based on rigid models that economists use in order to
know roughly how many jobs would a certain amount of money put into one place as an
investment create in laboratory conditions. The functioning of these economic models that
have been created for developed economies, with an impressing number of “ceteris paribus
modelling”50, has to be strongly contested in the Brazilian context, as it is a totally different
society and economy than that of the economically developed societies. To study this
reveals some critical factors in assessing both the created jobs and the results of the GDP
growth to other variables. In the whole of Latin America, the reliance in GDP as a
measuring technique for economic growth has to be brood over.
Adam Smith (1904 [1776]) affirmed that the wealth of a nation can be read from its
production per capita, a conception that is accepted widely still nowadays. Currently, this
conception is in high currency in the minds of economic policy makers and the authorities
of State, it has a value that cannot be explained anymore only in economic terms. For
example, in Brazil the investment of Veracel Celulose will sum up 1.25 billion US dollars,
a sum which will directly be counted for the increase in GDP. To give an idea of the scale
of the investment, in short comparison, there are an estimated 45 billion US dollars that
belong to Brazilian companies outside the country in tax paradises such as Virgin Islands –
the Veracel-investment is thus not as massive as it appears to be in economical terms.
49 A discourse analysis of the way in which the Brazilian State and media has framed Veracel in Brazil was
carried out as a part of this research. However, this analysis will not be included to this thesis due to page
limitations. This study can be obtained from the author, however, if desired in the future.
50 “Ceteris paribus modeling” is a normal method of analysis in economics. In it, many variables are
nominated as non-necessary in the analysis as they cannot be either measured or, more commonly, because
the model would not function if that parameter (like cross-societal cultural differences) would be included in
the model. A common claim in the economics is that a model of forecasting is not wrong if it does not
generate correct results. It is the society that does not represent the model in such a case; the orthodox
economics model shows the ideal way of things.
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The basic course in economics already teaches that GDP is a measure with immense
problems in representing the actual state of the society and economy. And yet, it is being
relied on extremely heavily within the international business and orthodox economics. Even
though GDP would be of a relative usage in the Western economies in which and for which
it has been created, the dynamics which GDP growth plays in the Latin American context
have to be contemplated. Various studies show that GDP’s impact to the economy and
society are culture-specific: in different societies with variances between the social
structure and politico-cultural atmosphere GDP per capita should be used and relied on
culture-sensitively and not universally as is done through economics nowadays. Particularly
this has to be acknowledged when analyzing the created jobs by an applied economic
model or investment.51
There are also important differences between the state legislations regarding the eucalyptus
plantation / large pulp mill business within the The Federative Republic of Brazil. For
example, in the state of Minas Gerais all plantation work, forestry, is considered to be
included into the core business of pulp companies. Thereafter, according to the Brazilian
constitution, it cannot be outsourced; the foresters have to be hired directly by the same
company which produces pulp. However, both Aracruz and Veracel are located not in the
state of Minas Gerais, but in its neighbouring states Espirito Santo and Bahia, where the
political climate appears to be for one or another reason quite positive for the maximization
of profits through outsourcing for the pulp companies.
GDP per capita should not be used rigidly in Latin America, even though it can depict in
some way the development in the macro-economy. For example, Scott Mainwaring’s and
Aníbal Pérez-Liñán’s (2004) quantitative research studying the impacts, which different
variables have on democracy in Latin American countries, shows that the correlation
between GDP growth and democracy is surprisingly negative (the orthodox belief is that
GDP growth increases democracy).
51 For the case of Veracel and Aracruz, for a more in depth point of view and critique on the creation of jobs
by these companies please see the written source De’Nadai, Overbeek & Soares 2005.
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When GDP increases in Latin American countries, this means that democracy suffers,
according to Mainwaring’s and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán’s (2004: 35-45) research results. This
becomes understandable, if one acknowledges that the income distribution and structural
division of the Latin American societies makes the increase in GDP to be distributed in a
skewed manner. The increases in GDP gather only to the 1-5% of the population in the
region (Valdes et al. 2005; Kuczynski & Williamson 2003). However, when the society-
specific structural divisions of income distribution and economic sectors is taken into
consideration, the usage of GDP as a measurement technique becomes more reliable on
demonstrating the economic development in Latin America. For example, the World Bank
has started lately to acknowledge and adapt these critiques to its analyses, as shall be
demonstrated soon, even though a lot remains still to be done on the level of implementing
plans.
Due to the arbitrariness of the per capita element in the “GDP per capita” coefficient, this
coefficient is a deeply political, ethnocentric and erroneous measurement technique when
applied for measuring Latin America economical success. Not only is it inappropriate for
economical analysis: it is an invalid measurement technique to depict positive development
in Latin America due to the consequences which it has, according to the quantitative
analysis in Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán (2004: 35-45), to democracy within the countries.
Increase in the “GDP per capita” variable has predicted democratic breakdown in Latin
America (analysis period: 1946-99) with 30-40 percents certainty (correlation of 0.3 - 0.4;
significant at .05 level) (2004: 45). In sum, the economists and political scientists studying
the region have found that: “in a wide income band, Latin American countries with a higher
level of development [economic, measured by GDP] were less likely to be democratic”
(Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán 2004: 27). Thereafter, when investments increase GDP per
capita on paper as they flow to Brazil, for example through the Veracel investment, the
result regionally is weakening in democracy, implies Mainwaring’s & Pérez-Liñán’s study.
The reasons for this region-specific GDP dynamics in relation to democracy are various.
One of the most imperative explanations lays in the fact that business in a market economy
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has structural and political power (Kingston 1999: 242). For the Latin American market
economies this matter of affairs is even more pressing than for the “Western” economies, as
democratically elected politicians depend on growth in GDP to be understood as having
succeeded in Latin America than in, say, Europe. They require demonstrating to a wide
array of powerful interest groups that their nations are making results to gain the
legitimizations of these often foreign powers. This pressure makes it possible for
businesspeople to extract concessions from politicians on a routine basis and in an
inequitable way (ibid: 243). Furthermore, businesses have extensive lobbying and
economic powers in comparison to other social actors (ibid).
This becomes apparent also when considering the resources of an economic powerhouse
such as a Stora Enso in relation to the local Bahian state - particularly in relation to the
persons occupying political positions with democratic decision power. It has been proven in
various ways and cases how - since the beginning of 1990’s implementation of the
Washington Concensus suggestions in a Latin American way - the results have been a
massive increase in the private economical wealth of Latin American elected politicians
(Kuczynski & Williamson 2003). Particularly this increase has taken place due to the
privatization process, where multinational companies have acquired considerable new
political power through economism. 52 To deny that Veracel, Aracruz and Stora Enso would
not have political power in Brazil – that they would just be economical actors - would be an
attempt to hide the power, thus.
The impact of Veracel in Bahia and Brazil has, according to the abovementioned studies on
the political-economic dynamics of Brazil, decreased local democracy. The various NGO’s
and MST in the region of Bahia voiced their opinions also in favour of this analysis, by
stating that their relative say on the way the economy is currently developed in the region
of Eunápolis has decreased after Veracel came into the field of local economic and political
players. Particularly, the local sem-terras see their realistic opportunities in acquiring an
appropriated piece of land as diminished as the land prices have nudged considerably
upwards after Veracel started to stock in vast tracts of land in the region. The bullish
52 For more studies on economism, please see, for example, Teivainen 2002.
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development in land prices of the region definitely limits government’s chances buying
land in the region to succeed in its agrarian reform plan.
Considering macro-economically the creation of jobs, Veracel cannot be considered to be a
major creator of them, firstly as its operations are extremely automated and secondly
because there would exist many other forms of creating more jobs in the region, for
example if the State would had used the US $495 millions into a regional development
package including agrarian reform and not to finance the Veracel pulp mill. Not only would
the quantitative amount of created jobs in that kind of package be greater, according to the
statistics of FAO and INCRA (Wright & Wolford 2003; Kowarick 2002: 246); also the
qualitative impacts on general welfare creation would be much higher if focusing on small-
scale than large-scale, family rather than patronal establishments (ibid).
The World Bank and the Economist Magazine - two enterprises, which cannot be labelled
to be “left-wing” politically - have also taken the Brazilian land reform on their agenda in
the February of 2005. The Economist, for example, acknowledged the fact that the State of
Brazil has been used by domestic corporate industrialists in order to gain partial treatment:
“The rural economy is worth fostering, especially given that many of the poorest Latin Americans
live in the countryside. …  Policies towards agriculture have too often centred on subsidies to richer
farmers and tariff protection.”53
The World Bank, which has carried out a thorough economical analysis regarding the rural
areas contribution to the overall economy in Latin American countries, posits that the effect
of rural natural resource activities (primary agriculture, forestry and fisheries) on national
growth and poverty reduction is about twice as large as its GDP share (Valdes et al. 2005:
Table 1.4). Thus, the rural small-scale production sector ought to be valued more than it has
been valued, if greater economic growth and well-being is the goal. That would also be
more just as now there is a flow of economic capital from the small-scale rural sector to the
urban and large-scale institutional sector.54 However, the government of Brazil has had
positivist policies, as they have been favouring big institutional players like multinationals
53 The Economist Print Edition, February 19th – 25th 2005. “The Countryside in Latin America: Down on the
Farm.” Page 48.
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like Veracel and state agencies like BNDES,55 instead of leaving more space for the
development of the economy from the below, criticize the World Bank and the Economist.
In sum, the World Bank blames governments in Latin American and rich western countries
of subsidising the wrong entities of their economies:
"…  the composition of rural public expenditures is the real problem. This is because a substantial
part of rural spending is in the form of subsidies to specific producer groups [sectors like paper &
pulp industry] rather than investments in the provision of public goods, such as rural education,
health and social protection, rural infrastructure, research and development, environmental protection
and targeted antipoverty programs. …  countries need to put in place programs to support the
restructuring of small domestic producers in importing sectors that are unable to compete even with a
reduction of subsidies in rich countries. Ideally, these programs should combine temporary income
transfers with technical support and better access to credit and services." 56
Thus, the World Bank adopts the same political framework as is outlined in the agenda of
MST. The World Bank even suggests “temporary income transfers”, which are considered
by the Western governments in relation to the internal policies of Latin American countries
and orthodox economics normally as upright “communist” policies. Thereafter the World
Bank’s recommendations for the welfare of Brazil are against the primary objectives –
increasing shareholder value - of the Veracel investments shareholders, such as Safra,
Votorantim, Lorenzen, Stora Enso and the Finnish State.
There are already institutions for the implementations of the State policies regarding the
economic policy suggested by the World Bank in order to develop the economic welfare.
What is needed is to reconsider the objects of financing, as portrayed by the World Bank.
For example, if considering the agrarian reform, all the sem-terra organizations which in
the end already have a functioning grass-root level implementation and surveillance body
regarding the creation of jobs, depend to a great extent on the 1999 founded new Brazilian
Ministry of Agrarian Development. The ministry focuses, particularly through its institute
INCRA (National Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform) on execution and
coordination of family agriculture policies (Kowarick 2002: 246). Through this ministry
54 “Most LAC countries (of the ten that were studied) allocate to rural areas about half the amount of the total
expenditure that would be justified by agriculture's contribution to national development.” (Valdes et al.2005:
Table 1.13)
55 "Between 1985 and 2000, more than 54 percent of total rural expenditures were allocated to mostly
medium-size and large producers through subsidies rather than the provision of public services for the rural
population."(Ibid.: Table 1.9)
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and its institute, the federal government should be – at least discursively - using “exclusive
power and constitutional resources to implement policies of land expropriation and rural
credit” (ibid). In 1999 the Brazilian government found this new Ministry in order to make
faster the agrarian reform, which was shown to be of key role in increasing the economic
productivity in the country. The total income per hectare/year for family establishments is
2-2.5 times higher than for patronal establishments according to the research made by
INCRA and FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) (ibid: 250). In
comparison to planting eucalyptus by patronal establishments, family establishments could
make economically more significant contribution to the Brazilian economy.
As said, there have been many doubts voiced by NGO´s, MST and locals regarding the
actual generation of wealth to the local economy through Veracel. MST, for example, has
used the very data of INCRA/FAO to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of eucalyptus-
plantation in creating economic welfare and particularly jobs in the region:
“According to the data of federal government, in order to settle this year 115 thousand families will
cost R$ 2900 millions. Furthermore in conformance with the data of the same government, with this
investment 500 thousand direct jobs and more than one million indirect jobs will be created. The
Veracel, with an investment of R$ 4000 millions, almost two times bigger, will create only 4500
jobs, although the major part of these are temporary. “
Furthermore, as said, according to the Veracel Celulose S.A., Brazil’s National Economic
and Social Development Bank (BNDES) finances it with US $495 million. To sum up the
above research results, this financing is quite arbitrary with the own statistics of the
Brazilian government regarding the economic and social development that demonstrate the
enormous difference in outcomes if the 495 millions were used for agrarian reform instead
of buying a pulp mill and expensive machines from foreign companies.
Furthermore, tax revenue creation for the Brazilian government by Veracel is not at all as
high as has been discursively argued by the media and the State.  “The Kandir’s law” says
that a company of whose production over 95% is exported does not have to pay the
majority of the taxes in Brazil. The law of Kandir is in place in most of the countries of the
world currently, as it makes foreign investing into another country more attractive for the
56 The World Bank. News Release No:2005/321/LAC.
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companies. From the production of Veracel, almost 100% is exported, and the product, i.e.
pulp, is being then taxed in the country where it is being imported to, thus.
However, when observed from the point of view of the Brazilian State, even though the law
of Kandir diminishes tax revenues, shareholders are mainly foreigners, democracy suffers,
and more jobs could be created by financing the agrarian reform, the States favouring of the
export-oriented pulp industry since the 1990’s becomes understandable through the next
passage of The Economist: “[Brazil] badly needs dollars to finance a growing trade
deficit”57. In this situation the Economist sees the foreign investors as persons who come to
help Brazil, by stating that “foreign investors look willing to oblige, especially now that the
country’s economic reforms have put an end to three decades of chronic inflation and the
government has liberalised trade.” This is also the viewpoint of Stora Enso. Importantly, if
considered from the economic point of view where maintaining a low inflation and a
positive trade balance is seen as a primary macroeconomic goal, the hopes that exports of
pulp increase in the future even by US $500 millions the foreign exchange reserves of
Brazil justify to some extent the investment. Nevertheless, the winners in this scheme are
not democracy, long-term economic development of regional economy and society in
Southern Bahia, environmentalists or sem-terras.
For the Brazilian political life a 1.25 billion dollar investment bears great value because it
counts towards a greater growth percentage in GDP, which will be counted for the sitting
government’s party’s “product”. As the biggest private investment during the government
of president Lula Da Silva (even though almost half of this comes from the very
government itself through BNDES), the non-considerable increase in production per capita
brought by Veracel investment will, thus, carry much greater value than its nominal value
in global investors’ eyes. What countries most seek after nowadays is increase in their
GDP, to gain more investments in their “race to the bottom”.
The inauguration of investments is highly a political issue, as should have become clear
through the above studied researches. For all political parties it would be hard not to accept
such a direct boost on their credibility that Veracel investment poses in GDP terms. In Latin
57 “Let the party begin.” Apr 24th 1997 | SAO PAULO, From The Economist print edition
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American countries the appreciation of increase in GDP by governments favours non-
Keynesian, non-long-term economic planning: short-sightedness. If the governments would
invest in a more sustainable manner, for example by using the economic models of
Keynesianism, whose benefits normally start to be visible only after some five years, they
would be favouring always the next government. For this reason the Brazilian politicians
have not been enthusiastic to apply long-term planning; after the ideology of nationalism -
the promotion of a common Brazilian good by politicians - in Brazil is not so strong as to
overcome actor specific goals. From monarchy to republic to dictatorship the elite in Brazil
has known how to guard its privileges. This orientation and attitude has resulted in rather
cunning practices, such as Positivism and neo-liberal privatisations, as will be studied later
on when focusing on the Brazilian management culture.
Also the existence and functioning of Veracel in Brazil is only possible through the usage
of deeply political means, such as giving money to the local politicians, policemen and so
on. Veracel gave in year 2003 half a million Euros for Brazilian political parties election
campaign funding, and they gave money not only to the “right wing” parties, but to all
parties, according to the Brazilian informants of this study who hoped to remain unnamed.
A proven fact by the company itself is that Veracel has constructed new federal police
barracks next to its factory area and donated cars and funding for the police’s operations,
such as for stopping “an accumulation of people” next to Veracel.58 These political
operations and means would be unacceptable for a business enterprise in the Finnish
political climate.
The social impacts of Veracel as a large-scale investment in Bahia have been many. For
example, the Veracel investment caused many people to move to Eunápolis in hope of a
job, provoking more crime and poverty in the region, according to NGO´s.59 Recently there
has arrived thousands of immigrants eking out a living in the region of Eunápolis, as they
have heard that a massive new factory is under construction there. In Brazil, a wave of
58 “Veracel donated barracks and police cars to Military Police”3/9/04, www.veracel.com.br. Press Room.
59 “CARTA PÚBLICA em repúdio à CERTIFICAÇÃO CERFLOR DA VERACEL CELULOSE SA NO
EXTREMO SUL DA BAHIA” 15.2.2005 CDDH – Centro de Defesa dos Direitos Humanos;
CEPEDES – Centro de Estudos e Pesquisas para o Desenvolvimento do Extremo Sul/Ba;
Espaço Cultural da Paz – Tx de Freitas/Ba. See Appendix for the full open letter.
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immigration takes place every time a new major investment is being inaugurated. All the
industries investing to Brazil should, thus, take this into consideration, and the late response
of Veracel to fund the police to stop the “accumulation of people” shows that Veracel was
not really prepared to this. As immigration is a fact, investing companies should draft
already in the planning phase solutions and funding for taking care of the pressures created
by the immigration both to the immigrants as to the locals – as well as for the investing
companies.
Nowadays the situation is even worse in Bahia, as the immigrants cannot be given entrance
to MST in Bahia, as MST has problems to find land even for the youngsters of the now-
MST families.60 Often those who have no other option in the modernizing and globalizing
economy of Brazil have at least had the possibility of joining the social movements. After
all, social movements are the last instances, which have to take care of all the persons who
could not have been helped by the government or the private sector. This is also one
fundamental reason for their success in the last twenty years in creating national
alternatives to the power field-led politics.
In the case of Brazil it cannot be said that Veracel would be beneficial for all Brazilians.
Firstly, this cannot be the case as there does not exist any one Brazil in the same way as
there exists “Finland”: there are various Brazils. The Brazil of the elites, the Brazil of
Landless, the Brazil of the Indigenous, the Brazil of those living in the south part of the
country, to name just some Brazils. To consider that there would exist one Brazil and to
speak of oneself as representant of such an entity is a grand utopia. Thereafter, the benefits
of Veracel investment go mainly to one or few Brazils’: to other Brazils’ its impacts can be
even negative. Perhaps this has not been understood by the Finnish state officials when
considering the Veracel investment.
The Finnish Dimensions of Veracel
60 Interview with Waldemar Estrela, 8.6.2004
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The Veracel case is interesting as it displays a more traditional framework of globalization
where principally two national states are in encounter. It is a bilateral investment between
Finland and Brazil; it is so largely created by the state authorities that it could be easily
denominated as rather a public sector than as a private sector investment. The majority of
the financing comes from the Brazilian, Finnish and European Union managed investment
banks, as well as the political support. In this cooperation, both countries representatives
hope to win something for themselves. In the case of Finland the benefits of Veracel
investment for the Finnish economy and citizens are quite obvious: the selling of machines
produced in Finland to some other place in the world creates work and welfare to different
regions in Finland where these are constructed. It also created foreign exchange surplus for
the state reserves.
The model of creating large-scale pulp mills can actually be analyzed to be greatly
modified, justified and to be taking form in the relations, which paper & pulp companies
have with other enterprises relatable to the Finnish forest cluster. The consulting company
Jaakko Pöyry and the Finnish State create the master-plans, smooth the road into new
markets, and create relations between the Finnish companies within the forest cluster.
Metso produces the most expensive single machinery, i.e. the mill with all the required
components. The chemical industry of not only Finland but also Sweden and other
European Union countries is also greatly involved currently in the model. In sum, the pulp
mill investments to South America generate most (some four fifths) of the economic well-
being for countries such as Finland, and only a minor part of the investment amount ends to
enriching the local South American economies. Thereafter, it is quite misleading to speak
that Brazil would gain 1 billion euros as investment money or that the investment would be
beneficial for the whole country.
However, many of The Finnish State representatives, politicians like Paavo Lipponen voice
that the principal purpose of the state is to always think first the benefits of Finland.
Thereafter, it is possible that investments to other countries are approved by the politicians,
even though they would mean negative impacts to some social sectors in other countries, if
they just create benefits to Finland. Also some of the Finnish citizens still think that the
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Finnish government’s principal and only real purpose of existence is to generate the
maximum benefits for the Finnish citizens, even though the majority would like to raise the
development aid, for example.
The conception of the relation between the state and its citizens in Finland has however
been different historically: the conceptions of in-group and out-group, which greatly impact
State policies, have transformed across time and through space. In the 1850’s,
J.V.Snellman, the “founding father” of the Finnish State, considered it to be totally against
the essence of the Finnish government to give subsidies for the poor of the Northern part of
Finland. However, nowadays it is consider as normal and obvious to include also the
citizens in the north of Finland to have the same rights and benefits as citizens in the other
parts of the country. Today the limitation of who is eligible to be eligible for the benefits
diffused by the State in Finland is in coherence with the geographical borders – with a
growing tendency to become part of a greater European Union system. In comparison to its
neighbour Sweden, the Finnish State’s practice of including ethnically non-Finnish persons
within its developmental objectives, is still reflecting a non-including culture.
The Finnish state owns 11% of the shares of Stora Enso and 24% of its voting rights. In
addition, Finland’s state-run Social Insurance Institution holds three percent (3%) of the
company’s shares, and 9.7% of its voting rights, which means that Finland has considerable
say in decisions regarding the company’s management. Sweden’s Wallenberg family is the
second-largest owner of Stora Enso stock. 61 When understanding the Finnish State as
following the culture where a line between “us” and “them” is drawn geographically, the
support given by the Finnish State to the Veracel investments becomes more
understandable.
The political ties created between the Finnish and Brazilian governments in order to create
Veracel also become understandable when understanding the state of Finland as a major
shareholder and the Brazilian states new economic policies. As already demonstrated, the
logic and incentive driving the Brazilian State to support Veracel has been the policy to
61 Ownership statistics from The Helsinki Stock Exchange, 18.6.2004.
65
produce economical growth through, and also mainly for, large-scale institutional players
(Valdes et al. 2005).
The goal of the Finnish State is to get as high profits and increase in the value for their
shares in their companies as possible. 62 The role of the Finnish Parliament in having a word
to say in the manner in which state owned companies are being managed, especially having
to do with the big issues such as mergers and selling of shares and big investment projects,
has been under discussion in Finland lately. It has been questioned that how well does the
ideal of profit maximization function with the ideals of maintaining the values of a welfare
state. However, it has not been widely discussed whether it would be impossible to merge
these two ideals into one organization. Furthermore, Stora Enso has also not been the focus
of this discussion, not even when Stora Enso made the decision to construct the new pulp
mill of Veracel.
There could be even more debate in the Finnish society regarding Veracel, as it is in
connection to the Nordic country via many dimensions. For example, the Finnish forest
cluster participates very actively in the making of Veracel Celulose. Jaakko Pöyry
Tecnología Ltda made a deal of 14 million Euros with the company, in order to help the
owners in the fulfilment of the pulp plant project by supplying services for its planning,
project management, installation and construction supervision. Thus, they can be held
directly responsible for the activity in the construction phase in Veracel. The business deal
with Veracel was the most important new project for Jaakko Pöyry in 2003,63 and highly
important it was also for Metso Paper, another largely state owned Finnish company, who
made a 25 million euros deal with Veracel to supply the whole wood processing machinery
and lines for the plant.64
When interviewing the MST, locals and Cepedes in Eunápolis in 6/2004, in Bahia, they
argued that the Veracel construction site is being guarded by eight walls with armed guards.
62 Kansliapäällikkö Virtasen pääkirjoitus Omistaja & Sijoittaja –lehden kevään 2002 numerossa
63 JAAKKO PÖYRY GROUP OYJ, LEHDISTÖTIEDOTE. 10.02.2004. TILINPÄÄTÖSTIEDOTE
VUODELTA 2003.
64 Lehdistötiedote. Metso toimittaa puunkäsittelylaitoksen Veracelille Brasiliaan, 23.07.2003.
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If considering that Veracel also puts barbed wire around its eucalyptus plantations, it
appears to be an interesting example of transnational space, where a particular culture
creates physical borders, like walls and spaces just for its in-group members. The fact that
Veracel reserves and borders physical space for itself promotes thus the hypothesis that
Veracel would have an own symbolic system and culture. This culture appears to be
transnational, not respecting or following the official national political frontiers.
According to those interviewed, most of the construction workers are sacked before the
initial period of three months is fulfilled, and new workers are being contracted, so that
Veracel company would not have to pay the full salary and benefits that a labourer on a
fixed contract would be eligible for. All the movements to organize the workforce into
labour unions are banned in the Veracel Celulose and its other owner, Aracruz Celulose,
claim the interviewed. The salary of a normal construction worker is the minimum salary
paid in Brazil: R$ 270, which is about 70 euros per month; 65 almost all of these are
subcontracted through outsourcing, and do not work thereafter officially for Veracel or
Stora Enso. Stora Enso claims that it offers exactly the same benefits for its workers in
Brazil as in Finland, which is likely to be true: the Finnish companies normally offer a bit
higher salaries to their workers in Brazil than the domestic ones. However, the conditions
of the outsourced workers are horrible, according to the informants, 66 who “are forced to
sleep in the area and can only get a leave once in the weekend” and “are also in other ways
being treated as slaves”. There was a strike organized by CUT in the end of 2004 that lasted
for many days in the construction site of Veracel pulp mill, in which the workers demanded
for working safety, higher salaries and better daily food packages, for example.
Veracel Celulose is a materialisation of a continuous cultural phenomenon, which is under
amendment at the very moment. The criticism towards Veracel and Stora Enso must have
impacts on their way of doing business. The sustainability agendas laid by the companies
themselves, the strong ethical guidelines which they proclaim to follow, can be a basis for
65 According to the interviewed workers in 6/2004 by the author in Eunapolis. They wish to remain unnamed
due to fear of losing their jobs.
66 Interview with Waldemar Estrela, regional co-ordinator of MST in the Extreme South of Bahia, 8.6.2004
and CEPEDES, a regional NGO.
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development. Development and sustainability cannot be in the global neoliberal world
anymore an affair of the state, as its powers are being eaten by structural transformations all
the time; thus, also private enterprises have seen - at least discursively but also to some
extent in practice - as in their interests to join the efforts in creating a good environment
and society to live in for all the stakeholders. For example, Stora Enso increasingly wants
to bring forwards its ethicality, as its shareholders, stakeholder and clients are becoming
more aware of such issues as their own image as investors and ultimate accountable actors
behind the company has transformed lately. This demonstrates that a knowledge different
from the “profit-maximization” has got a hold in the discourse of the companies. This
adaptation of the ideology of quality in the discourse implies that the knowledge could
transform into practice. In this, however, both external critique and internal will to
transform – due to economic reasons, which are in the end in the cultural core of companies
– is required.
Stora Enso says: “The basis for all action is co-operation with the local people. Good
results can be reached through mutual support.”67 and “The [Veracel] project is intended to
set a benchmark for the competitive and sustainable production of pulp.” When these
statements did not correlate with the reality, as was doubted already strongly in 2003 by
NGO’s around the world, and highlighted by the media after the MST’s
invasion/occupation of Veracel’s plantation in 2004, something had to be done. Firstly, in
2003, Veracel launched some programs labelled as “sustainable development” and
“community aid”. However, the role of these was and continues to be very minimal
considering the scale of problems directly caused by the company. Many critics called these
policies by Stora Enso and Veracel as “greenwashing” and “jobwashing”68, window-
dressing in order to just “appear as ethical”.
What makes the encounter between Veracel and MST special is that both of the partners
have been using the symbolic capital of each other in order to pursue for their own strategic
goals. Veracel is trying to fish sympathy points from the public opinion in Europe by
67 http://www.storaenso.com/CDAvgn/main/0,,1_-2415-2093-,00.html
68 De’Nadai, Overbeek & Soares (2005) have studied that how Veracel Celulose uses “jobwashing” to appear
to be producing more jobs than it actually does. This it does to gain more legitimacy in a country where a job
is the most sought after commodity.
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stating that “The basis for all action is co-operation with the local people”, thus using the
symbolic capital and power that the local people like landless peasants may have in the
minds of the citizens in Finland, for example. MST, on the other hand, could never have
gotten such a good deal from the Brazilian government if they had not “stolen” Veracel’s
symbolic power as something coming from the North for the negotiation table.
Thus, in one limited and contradictious way the landless in the region of Southern Bahia
have been “blessed” by the appearance of Veracel in their region: in other regions in Brazil,
where there does not exist this kind of symbolic power to be used as a weight in strategic
power battles, it is far harder for the landless to get their voice heard in the Government.
There is some potential also for MST and local NGO’s (as they have actually achieved
financing from Finland, for example) in the new Finnish dimension that has taken place
through Veracel in Bahia. However, it has to be noted that the benefits that MST, for
example, obtained after they left the plantation of Veracel, were not granted to them by the
goodwill of Veracel or the State: these had to be taken. Naturally, the culture of Veracel is
under much more diverse transformation than depicted in here, and a more detailed study in
these respects would be required.
The Brazilian Management Culture
Leadership has an altered signification in different cultures, as a comparison between the
examples on leadership in primitive cultures with modern leadership, for example, reveals
(Clastres 1978). There are many faces to authority, management and leadership: political,
economic, cultural, symbolic and so on. Leadership in Brazil has to be studied bit by bit, as
normally authority is interplay of different spheres of human and structural position
interaction. Particularly, management culture is always relational, context and relation-
specific – not essential – and thereafter the management culture of the State of Brazil,
Veracel and MST have to be studied in relation to those which are managed by them. Next,
management culture is studied in the substance area of this study.
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Riordan Roett (1999) has studied the dynamics of political decision making in Brazil.
Brazil is a patrimonial state, according to Roett: this works as “an invisible barrier to the
introduction of fundamental reforms”, such as the agrarian reform. The elites obstruct
transformation because “the current system of power favors their interests”, says Roett.
Furthermore, Roett finds that the current system weakens “popular participation and the
involvement of the ordinary citizen in the affairs of the state.” (Roett 1999: xvi.)
Within both MST and Veracel, as organizations in Brazil, it could be expected that
management is of this Brazilian nature. However, considerable differences exist between
these two in the power distance and methods of management, for example. Within MST,
anyone can approach a leader as he would approach a normal person: the distance is
limited. Also the methods of managing are considerably different than within a business
enterprise. These particularities of MST are analysed in the next chapter, whereas in here
will be drawn an analysis of the impacts under which both MST’s and Veracel’s cultures
are due to their existence in the Brazilian cultural context.
The leaders of these two organisations are administrating their entities within a Brazilian
cultural framework, in which the topology of the power field particular to MST thereafter,
following Bourdieu, casts its impact upon all the social actors under it. There can be
resistance to create a specific type of leadership culture, but this requires considerable
efforts, particularly, it requires a creation of a whole alternative symbolic system that
functions, as will be brought forwards in the next chapter on MST. The administrative
cultures of MST and Brazil are both to a high extent compilations of the logic and
contextual values in administrating the Brazilian society. These have been studied by many,
for example by the Brazilian anthropologist Miguel Cardoso (2000: 26) and by the better
known Geert Hofstede (1980).
According to these researchers, it has to be acknowledged that in Brazilian entities there
exists considerable difference between the discourse and the practice in management. This
study supports these findings. For example, Veracel Celulose proclaims on its web-pages
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and interim reports about having “an integrated administration system” (Veracel 2002),69 as
well as MST would like to maintain a horizontal image of its leadership, but in reality the
practice of administration and leadership in both MST and Veracel can be argued to be to
some extent of a more Brazilian nature.70 That is, they are highly hierarchical organisations
(Hofstede 1980). Power gathers on the top in Brazilian organisations (Hofstede 1980: 77,
122, 158, 189; Cardoso 2000: 38).
Also the dynamics of creating authority and legitimizing it are different in Brazil than in
other places, as Roberto DaMatta has studied. In Brazil, when there exists will by a small
group or some person to create an institution of whatever type, these key persons try to
gather a critical mass behind them in order to legitimise their institution. If the
institutionalization succeeds, the key persons within the movement, after a while,
disconnect themselves from the masses that they used to legitimate their power. After that
the institution continues to exist more as a private enterprise whose purpose is actually to
produce power or wealth to its key members, even though in theory and discursively the
enterprise exists still for the benefit of all of its members. (DaMatta 1979.)
Furthermore, in Brazil the time-span between the moments when people come to
understand the non-representing nature of the organisations they were legitimising and
which they still believe are “working for them” still, is very long. Often this moment of
revelation never takes place. When the masses finally notice that they have been falsely led
by their leaders, they either lack the means to question the legitimacy of the institution, or
do not simply care to take action due to structural barriers to take action (such as the
Brazilian law). (DaMatta 1979.)
69 Even though Veracel is partly of foreign origin, its leadership corpus consists mainly of Brazilians that have
a long history of administration within Brazilian business enterprises. Due to the contemporary discursive
currents within the field of international business in relation to “good governance”, Veracel is discursively
demonstrating an image of its organisational culture where quality management systems would be strongly
incorporated.
70 Within MST, hierarchy runs from the local level up to state level, with various middle levels, as well as the
information and decision making, but still MST wants to communicate that it is a joint of locally democratic
groups of people without land.
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Moreover, in Brazil it is structurally possible and culturally acceptable that the leader, O
Senhor, gets astronomical economic benefits in comparison with his subordinates (Cardoso
2000: 30). Veracel is no exception in this sense. Also some MST leaders have joined the
political elite in Brasília; when they have been offered high salaries in the state
government, the temptation has been strong to forget the ideology, in Bourdieu’s terms, to
transform aspirations from cultural capital to economic capital.
Furthermore, a great part of the Brazilian companies treat their clients as if they would be
doing a service for them, and their employees as enemies (Campos 1992: 23-25; Cardoso
2000: 52). This research has got no data in order to analyse Veracel in these respects; and
the relationships of Veracel with their clients and workers are not the focus of this research.
The high valuation of the decision power of the managers inherent to Brazil surges,
according to Geert Hofstede (1980), from the high inequality in prestige, richness and
power between the leader and subordinate, of the non-acknowledgement and denial of the
potential of the subordinate. Others have called this same phenomenon with the particular
cultural term appropriate for it: as Positivism. For example, Anthony P. Mueller (2000) has
put Brazilian management into its cultural context by defining Brazilian Positivism
(“Ordem e Progreso”, please see the flag of Brazil in which these words are written) in the
following way:
“Positivism says that scientism is the trademark of modernity and that in order to accomplish
progress, a special technocratic or military class of people is needed who are cognizant of the laws of
society and who establish order and promote this progress. The prevalent ideology of a large part of
the ruling elite [of Brazil] stands in sharp contrast to the traditions held by the common people. As in
most parts of Latin America, Brazil's popular culture is deeply marked by the Catholic-scholastic
tradition, with its skepticism toward modernity and progress and its more spiritual-religious
orientation, which rejects the linear concept of time as a progressive movement in favor of a circular
eternal vision of life.”
Due to this relational cultural aspect of the Brazilian society, this search for “Order and
Progress” inherent still nowadays in the Brazilian “national” management culture, the
ideologists behind MST would like to transform MST into a more socialist and democratic
organisation (Bogo 2000; 2003). Within Veracel, there are pathways coming from Europe
and other places into which the field of international business extends. Through these
pathways, cultural elements diffused by the current ideologists of the “Western culture”,
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travel. There is speak about quality systems, of enhancing the socio-ecological dimensions
of business, and so on (Cardoso 2000). These discourses have identified Brazilian
Positivism as a negative issue, barrier in front of reforms, just like MST. In the case of
Veracel, perhaps this metacultural judgement (Urban 2001: 30-45) is due to the conception,
which has lately surged as a “novidade” within the Brazilian business field:  the conception
that ideologists behind the current environmental and ethical requisites put on companies
would be representatives of the collective voices of the consumers and the markets
(Cardoso 2000). Definitely, when interviewing Stora Enso in spring 2005, it became
obvious that it has strongly acculturated into all its rhetoric and discourse this conception,
and has diffused it into Veracel as well, as the already the interim report of 2002 by Veracel
shows.
Theoretically, it has been framed that the aspects of the management culture that
organisations are trying to change, face difficulties depending on the weight of these
aspects in the administrative culture of the society in which these organisations are situated
(Cardoso 2000: 26). Thereafter, the fact that Veracel Celulose is situated in Brazil and
made of the members of the Brazilian culture which have been born in Brazil, which have
learned the culture via existential inertia of culture, in Greg Urban’s terms (2001: 1-20),
makes it a real challenge for Veracel to transform or fulfil the “Western” frames into which
it has been imagined by its architects. In Urban’s terms, an accelerative cultural effort
would be required to make a real transformation: the other option would be to make a
habitual inertial transformation, which would be only a surface, discursive transformation,
such as learning a new language with a strong accent and not as a native (2001: 3-25).
Thereafter, to incorporate into Veracel the valuation of a modern individualistic society, the
increase in ecological conscience or the normalization of the negative excesses of
capitalistic companies, is for the eyes of a cultural researcher a path which faces such
pitfalls that cannot be won by simple rhetoric, consultation or practices. Veracel Celulose,
the daughter of Stora Enso, still continues to be an incarnation of the late 19th century
Positivism, due to the Positivism that is still incorporated in the Brazilian cultural context.
The extent of this incorporation is under continuous debate by academics, as the following
interpretation of Brazilian clientilism by Anthony P. Mueller (2000) shows:
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“Under the cover of apparent modernity and science, the established clientilistic network of the
"lords of power"continues to rule the country. In due course, this class has achieved a level of
privileges similar to those that were enjoyed by the nomenclature in the Soviet Union compared to
the rest of the population, who have resorted to their peculiar ways--called jeitinho, a kind of
chutzpah--as their own method of survival.”
It is this Soviet Union style leadership, which MST wishes to challenge – to a greater extent
than Veracel, due to the latter’s business interest in perhaps maintaining these conditions in
Brazil. MST, in its search for a life characterized by Christian values, faces this
“nomenclature” as a relentless weather, as a strong tempest, whereas the ideologists behind
Veracel Celulose in Europe can actually benefit in practice from these Brazilian conditions
in their business, even though discursively – even culturally – they would be against the
Brazilian Positivist management culture.
Veracel’s Relation to MST as a Discourse
Stora Enso is one of the main architects behind Veracel Celulose, through the 50 %
economic involvement in the joint venture. However, as showed above, this 50% does not
mean that half of the speciality of Veracel would come from Stora Enso (or from the
Nordic culture). It was acclaimed that the management culture of Veracel is positivist
above. Next, through a discourse analytical research on the communication by Veracel, this
argument will be defended. It is altogether sensible to expect that the culture of Veracel in
comparison to Stora Enso’s culture (in Finland) is different, as these two entities operate in
two different areas. Furthermore, it is very likely – looking from ethnographers point of
view – that the Finnish and Stora Enso (in Finland) does not understand the full meaning of
the communication which the Veracel executives use in Brazil.
In a discourse analysis approach, pieces of communication can be used as data (Urban
2001). MST, individuals and NGO’s that were interviewed in Eunápolis for this research
said that the communication of Stora Enso or Veracel has not been based on a dialogue,
even though the sustainability part of their web-sites alleges that such would be the case.
The communication strategy of Veracel has been to show that their actions are legal and
that their operations have environmental quality certificates. In this, Veracel takes for
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granted that “legal” means the same as “correct” or “right”, and that quality certificates
would be a real and total demonstration of the impacts of eucalyptus, for example, on the
nature and on the other stakeholders.71
Furthermore, that what appeared to a discourse analyst as odd in this data, in this Veracel’s
response to MST’s occupation/invasion, was the total absence of “we” usage (Urban 2001:
1-20). Why was there such an abstaining to use the “we” form by the company? What were
the contextual and cultural causes, whose consequence may have been the passive form
from behalf of Veracel in this conflict situation? Please find the discourse analysis in the
following footnotes, respectively.
The following “Note of Clarification”72 (originally in English) was published in the internet
and international media’s soon after the occupation / invasion. It has been signed by Cícero
Antônio Lima, the General Manager for the Environment and Institutional Relations of
Veracel Celulose:
“During the predawn hours of April 4 [2004], members of the Landless Peasants Movement73 (MST)
initiated the invasion74 of Fazenda Água Fria, one of Veracel's properties75, located near the access
intersection at Trancoso, in Santa Cruz Cabrália. The invaders76 have already destroyed77 nearly 25
71 As an extra remark, the ISO standards have been shown not to mean the same thing in Brazil as in other
countries as these are always acculturated culture-specifically. For example, Cardoso (2000) has found that in
Brazil an ISO standard can be bought by money as there exists far-spread corruption in the society. This leads
into the vanishing of the real value of the ISO standard in Brazil, making it impossible to compare an ISO
received in Brazil to an ISO received, say, in the European Union.
72 The headline demonstrates that the company is clearing the facts which have possibly been distorted – not
voicing its opinion.
73 MST is created as a separate group of active persons, as a ”they”.
74 In the word ”invasion” there is a highly negative connotation, and to use the word “occupation” would be
more appropriate if friendliness or dialogue with the other was sought.
75 In here one would expect, due to footnotes 1 and 2, that the company would use ”we” form and say ”one of
our properties”. Interestingly, this rhetoric does not take place. Instead, it is the property, which is framed as
being attacked against. Thus, Veracel’s manager wants to point that under the attack there would not be
exactly, or at all, their company, “them”, but instead a general universal value of “property”. This becomes
clear also in the following notes.
76 Here Veracel tries to further alienate the other party in the encounter (the landless) from the reader of the
text, by calling them simply as “invaders”.
77 This verb form selection creates an image of the action as something brutal and uncontrollable.
Furthermore, an image is created where it is expected that the action will continue and lead to, expectably,
higher levels of damage.
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hectares of eucalyptus trees and continue removing wood for building shacks78 at the invasion site.
The MST's action is contrary to a previous legal decision in view of the fact that last year the same
plantation had been invaded by the movement, at which time the courts determined that it was an
illegal action, granting an injunction in favor of Veracel ensuring the company wood keep possession
of its property.79
A company that is fully constituted according to legal requirements, Veracel deplores80 the
occurrence because the area invaded, which belongs to the Inhaíba Project, is a productive property,
licensed and cultivated in conformance with strict technical and environmental criteria81. The
growing of eucalyptus trees is a fundamental activity for the existence of the future Veracel pulp
mill, a project that is currently responsible82 for the generation of nearly 8,000 direct and indirect
78 This word selection is also important, as the word is a pejorative. The “invaders” are those people who live
in the “shacks” is the image which the company wants to pass on. To use the word “housing”, for example,
would had been quite controversial on part of the company, as it would had created the idea of decent, honest
persons (only they live in “houses” in the Brazilian cultural context). That could have rendered the landless as
more approachable for the member’s of the greater society. The public could have felt sympathy for those
who are living in houses – or wanting to live in houses – like they themselves. Now the landless are simply
imagined and framed on part of the company as a bunch of shack-dwellers.
79 In this phrase it is most explicitly shown that in the point of view of Veracel, MST is actually attacking
against a ”court’s legal decision” – not against the company. Positivism is apparent (order & progress). Thus,
the company does not see itself as a participant in the encounter at all: it is just a matter between the MST and
the local officials. If Veracel is involved in any way in the encounter, that is just due to the “property” which
is being destroyed, and happens to be in Veracel’s possession.
80 This is the first occasion where the writer of the text introduces the party he is representing as an active
actor (note the verb “deplores”). This takes place in the passive, and pinpoints the fact that “we company” are
“fully constituted according to legal requirements”, thus wanting to create a striking moral differentiation
between the MST (which has been shown to be in all the earlier phrases as something immoral) and Veracel
(morally virtuous). The positivist nature of Brazilian culture must be also remembered here to understand the
culturally tied message. Veracel makes part of the positivist governing elite, whereas MST does not have
access to this elite’s cultural code, i.e. to Brazilian laws, which are however put also on top of them.
81 The reference to a ”technical criteria” is in the Brazilian cultural context a very strong statement: in Brazil
the value of a ”technician” is much higher than in the USA or Europe, for example. This is due to the small
amount of persons who could be labelled as “technicians” (certainly none of MST-people are included in this
high-level category). Secondly, the culture of governance in Brazil has been marked by extreme Positivism
(“Order and Progress”) since the end of the 19th century. In Positivism the highest authority is given to those
who appear to have most knowledge and authority on “technical” issues. In the Positivist world-view, thus,
MST is put in an indirect subordinate relation with Veracel: and the company just wonders why the one, who
should be listening to orders of the “technical” authority, is in rebellion. In this, as well as the earlier note,
“order” is highlighted as a cultural element important to Veracel: this highlighting is intended for creating an
image of the “other”, i.e. MST as something which has “no order”.
82 In here, passive is used again: what is under attack is now ”the project” – not the writer of the text or his
entity. Furthermore, for the first time it is brought forwards for what the “project” is “responsible” for. This is
a response to the dialectics of MST, in which they were blaming the company to be “responsible” for things
such as destroying the nature and taking all the land in the area, thus impoverishing the locals (see the
appendix for this). Now, “responsibility” is admitted only to such things as “the improvement in the quality of
life for thousands of families”: a lofty goal for which only the very few top Positivist corporate hierarchical
authorities are assumed to be entitled to and apt for in the Brazilian power culture framework. Thus, in here
the writer wants to enlarge the group of people / entities against which MST would be attacking. The message
is, thereafter, addressed obviously to the widest possible public, as the writer already assumes to have the
Positivist legitimacy from the widest possible audience. However, the rhetoric of demonstrating the Veracel
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jobs in the region, which contribute to the improvement in the quality of life for thousands of
families. Veracel, making use of its rights under law83, registered a complaint at the Tourist
Protection Police Station (Deltur) in Porto Seguro, and the Circumscriptional Police Station in Santa
Cruz Cabrália, under registration number nº 85820040000252. The company has requested the
judiciary84 to analyze the case - which is being done - and will respect the decision of the courts85.”
This communication by Veracel is likely to be understood in Finland in a totally different
light than in Brazil. As studied earlier, the conception of “law” in the Brazilian society is
“for friends everything, for the enemies law” (DaMatta 1979), whereas in Finland there is
one of the most law-abiding, legalistic cultures in the world. In the Brazilian context, when
in its discourses after the encounter with the MST and the indigenous people Veracel
“offers law” to these stakeholders, it immediately creates an in-group out-group
differentiation by this communication. And not only that: by this “Note of Clarification”,
Veracel automatically ended up manifesting an enemy-status in relation to MST.
Importantly, this is an issue which does not “open up” due to cultural differences in
Finland, where law is considered a thing which is given for friends, not for enemies.
project in such a glorious light opens up as arbitrary to anyone who has critically researched its arbitrarily
understood economic impacts on the region.
Importantly, when interviewing Stora Enso for this research, they wanted to highlight that Veracel is not a
“project”, but that Stora Enso has gone to Brazil to stay. Thereafter, it is clear that there exists
communicational differences and challenges in the interplay between Veracel and Stora Enso.
83 In the context of Brazilian governing cultures Positivism, in which hierarchical corporate authority and
“technical skills” are respected over everything, this phrase again seeks to demonstrate how Veracel is totally
in concordance with the governing culture (it is inside the Brazilian power field, so to speak, as came through
the political and financial connections of Veracel to BRACELPA earlier), whereas MST is breaking the
cultural rules (it is within the heterodox discourse, in the sub-power field). Not only cultural rules, however:
also the currently real rules, for which action this shack-dwelling group of invaders and damagers can await a
punishment, as they have “taken away” the “rights” of the regions passive and peaceful, legitimized life-
quality improver, Veracel Celulose, as the actors are framed in this piece of discourse.
84 Once again, the company shows in the end their total denial of anyhow being a direct partner in the
encounter. In the context of Brazilian Positivism, the company immerses here into an evolutionary labelling
of the parties on a hierarchy scale in which “we” is put at the top, and the “other” on the bottom on the ladders
of technical, corporate and legal authority. However, the Transparency International, for example, has studied
that Brazil is one of the world’s most corrupted countries, with political and judicial corruption percentage
rates actually competing fervently for years for the first place in the world. Into which kind of light does this
fact put the trust of the company to the Law & Order? What is demonstrated is the only-discursive, not
practice-connected nature of Veracel’s discourse.
85 The last phrase leaves a taste in the mouth of the reader that at least ”we Veracel” will still trust the Law &
Order, even though some others (MST people), would not obey it. The Positivist differentiation highlights the
impossibility of the two to communicate directly as they are actually two entities of essentially different
nature. The transcendental (Veracel framed as a non-“we” but as something superior to such human
classifications) position taken by the company contributes to a deeper non-existence of communication
between the parties in matters, which affect both of them.
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The lack of “we” usage throughout the text is at the same time a victory proclamation and a
performance of own perceived “transcendental” nature from behalf of Veracel. The
transcendental entity Veracel is telling the pure truth (note: in passive); it does not have to
fall in “human subjectivity” by using “we” form of itself. The last phrase pinpoints the
performed fact, directed to the widest public, that the company is “right” and the “invaders”
are ”wrong”.
The critiques might say that to use this kind of passive form is common in all modern
western-type professional organisations. I agree with them. But when one considers that a
company is under direct attack, in a conflict situation, what in most cases follows is that the
parties – both of them – start to use the rhetoric of “we” and “them” explicitly, in order to
strengthen their group identity in a conflictive situation. For example, the owner of 50% of
Veracel Celulose, Stora Enso, was using the rhetoric of “we” and “them” all the time in
quite similar conflict in Finland’s Lapland in the spring of 2005, when the Greenpeace was
invading / occupying forest lands. In that case, thus, the company feels itself threatened, as
it “falls” to the usage of “we” and “them”. However, in the Veracel’s case, due to the
Brazilian Positivist governing culture, the company’s executives with habitual culture
particular to the Brazilian Positivist management culture, sees itself as superior enough not
to commence a “we” construction. They do not feel themselves threatened – Veracel just
has to wait, not to act, not to be a “we”.
After all, in Brazil social differentiations are real, people are still born to social classes in
Brazil, whereas in Finland to speak of classes would be an erroneous analysis of the social
space. In this, Pierre Bourdieu’s considerations on class and ethnicity from chapter two
have to be remembered. The habitus of Verecel’s executives is creating a discourse in
relation to the lower classes, like MST, in which considerable arrogance is omnipresent –
this attitude is culturally allowed in the macro-cultural context of Brazil. However, when
moving interculturally, the habitual attitude of Veracel’s executives comes under criticism,
as it – to greater extent than in Brazil - arouses condemning there where the social space is
78
not organised via a class structure, for example in Sweden or Germany, as was depicted by
the referenced critical analysis on Positivism by Anthony Mueller earlier.
The response to MST by Veracel was not a discursive exception, as there are various
discourses of Veracel where the same elements are reproduced. These patterns which
emerge in also other similar contexts of encounters with “others” by Veracel support the
findings in the piece of critical discourse analysis above. For example, the “Note regarding
indigenous peoples' demonstration Oct. 19-20 - 10/21/04” 86, reveals these cultural patterns
of Veracel in relation to its significant “others”, such as MST and the indigenous groups.
These are significant “others” not only due to their cultural particular difference in relation
to Veracel, but more significantly because they occupy a different position within the social
space of Brazil: they are of another social class. Some might consider this type of class
analysis as outlived nowadays, but in the case of Brazil – remembering Bourdieu - it would
indeed be an erroneous analysis to use the same sociological tools for it as are currently
used in Europe, because in Brazil there still are visible and strong class differences.
The culture of Veracel is part of a more global political/economic model, and thereafter its
culture is mostly created by the way in which this grander model encounters with its
significant “others”. Next is briefly described, through the comparison of the model into
which Veracel is immersed to an alternative model into which MST is immersed, that
which are the differences between MST and Veracel. Namely, these models are the “Green
Revolution” US-led large-scale profit maximizing model for Veracel and the small-scale
self-sustainable model for MST. The way in which these models relationally see each other,
decisively defines these models themselves also, is the main argument of the relational
approach to culture studies.
A Sustainable Model for Producing Pulp in the South?
Eucalyptus’s ecologic impacts are not worse in comparison to a similar plant to used as a
pulp material, such as pine, according to Ricardo Carrere from the World Rainforest
86 Please see www.veracel.com.br Press Room for this data.
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Movement.87 However, large-scale monocultures have historically been more prone to
promote pests and plagues that destroy themselves (ibid). For example, due to the
cultivation of potato in large-scale monoculture in Ireland, the country experienced the
destruction of its plantations by a potato plague. Concentrating on a single species on vast
connected areas requires, thus, extensive usage of pesticides, which may cause severe
health injuries to the workers spraying the pesticide and causes ecological damage to the
soils, waters and other living species on the eucalyptus plantations (De’Nadai, Overbeek &
Soares 2005). Due to large-scale usage, eucalyptus also uses water in high quantities. Thus,
the critics of eucalyptus plantations are not against the plant in itself, thus, but against the
large-scale model. As its principal caveat the Latin American NGO’s such as the World
Rainforest Movement, FASE or CEPEDES do not see the ecological impact, but the social
exclusion which is caused by the occupation of vast land tracts by a monoculture. From part
of the pulp & paper companies, it is considered as most cost-efficient to concentrate the
production into bigger units.88 However, it would be possible to produce pulp practically
from any material, not only from one species, say the critics of the monoculture- large-scale
model, and wish that the pulp companies would adopt a new type of model for producing
pulp. In this model, firstly, plant size would be small, about 10 times smaller than the
Veracel pulp mill. Thus, plants could be located in separate areas; now when a huge pulp
mill is installed into one location, the impact is that the mill requires huge land tracts in the
50-150 kilometres surrounding it just for eucalyptus plantations. This perimeter would
come down by a smaller plant size.
In the model of the “Green Revolution” whose part also Veracel Celulose is, large-scale is
promoted by the invention and usage of all the time more efficient and less work-force
requiring machinery. When this model is implemented into the social reality of a third
world country, where the biggest problem is unemployment, the result is that in the long
run (after the construction period) even less jobs are available for those that would need
them. Particularly this is caused by the occupation of land by the monocultures, which are
87 Interview with Ricardo Carrere (whose profession is forester, has 30 years of experience on planting
andstudying eucalyptus and tree plantations in all around the world, particularly in SouthAmerica), Helsinki,
14.6.2005.
88 See, for example, the interview with the president of Metsä-Botnia Erkki Varis in OP Metsäraha 3/05.
80
harvested by machines, not by manual labour. This way, most of the people inhabiting the
region of Southern Bahia have no legal western-type economic right (input to production =
share of earnings) to demand a part of the huge production created by the Veracel factory.
The “Green Revolution” type models promote also monocultures, which have damaging
ecologic impacts to biodiversity, due to the fact that they require extensive usage of
pesticides. If a beginning of the 20th century European model of agrarian reform would be
followed instead of the Cold War era US-led “Green Revolution” political and economic
model, as a result there would be several small-scale plantations, which cultivate various
types of plants. As said, a pulp mill can use as material almost anything for producing pulp
(even though the quality of the product declines into some extent, according to the
companies). Thus, the small-scale model would produce material from various sources for
the pulp mill, not just from one species such as eucalyptus; and thus risks would be lower
as all eggs would not be in one basket. The small-scale model would be also more
ecological. This would be a sustainable model of producing pulp; the current model which
Veracel has materialized is not economically or socially sustainable due to the obvious
caveats in the rationality particular to the large-scale model, rationality which tries to get
into the highest profits as soon as possible.
Furthermore, more small plants would create more jobs than a huge one, for example for
those who are displaced from the countryside as a result of the implementation of the large-
scale model. In Brazil, for example, Veracel and Aracruz Celulose have displaced people
who have no western-type legal rights to the lands which they have inhabited for centuries,
such as landless workers, indigenous people and quilombolas, i.e. fugitive slave colonies
members (the latter two examples apply only to Aracruz, not to Veracel) (De’Nadai,
Overbeek & Soares 2005). The large-scale pulp/tree plantation production model causes,
thus, the Latin American countryside to become even more uninhabited and cities,
particularly their poor neighbourhoods, to grow further. It is impacting the economical
activity of the people in the regions where it comes, forcing people living on barter and
self-sustainable family agriculture and fishing – like quilombolas, indigenous, and sem-
terras and other traditional peasants up to some extent - to adopt a wage-based capitalist
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system for the pursuance of their living hood. And, as is well-known that the economic
base of a group is one of the most constitutive elements in shaping the nature of its culture,
the large-scale monoculture pulp production model has indeed great cultural impacts to
those with whom it is in encounter.
***
This chapter has drawn an outline of the elements which can be interpreted to make up the
culture of Veracel in relation to MST. The symbolic system particular to Veracel has been
outlined especially in the last discourse analysis section. In Bourdieu’s terms, the power
topology pertinent to Veracel is strongly skewed to the economic capital aspiration, even
though there is also a considerable amount of symbolic capital particular to the company. In
relation to MST’s topology of Bourdiean capital, Veracel has got more total capital (both
economic and symbolic) in the context of the Brazilian power field.
In the discourse by Veracel after the encounter with MST, it was most clearly shown how
the symbolic system of Veracel in practice encounters with the symbolic system of MST.
The part, which can be observed most easily as “intercultural” in the encounters of Veracel
with MST, is most clearly discursive, symbolic; immaterial. However, the economic and
political, material encounters of Veracel with MST are materializations of the cultural
relation in which theses entities are. The intercultural encountering takes place through the
mediation of the “public”, as cultural pathways towards MST have not been created
through discursive openings by the company. As also the dimensions of Veracel in relation
to Finland and the field of international business have been studied, it can be stated that
within Veracel there is a culture, a symbolic system which gains its particularity in the
space and time where it exists not due to its essentiality, but due to its relation with its
significant “others”, such as MST’s culture and symbolic system.
4. MST: a Brazilian National Movement
In the same way as Veracel was in the last chapter firstly analyzed to have surged within
the global forest industry’s transformations, it is analyzed in this chapter regarding MST’s
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culture, how MST was created within the agrarian reform and politics of Latin America. It
would be impossible to study MST or Veracel without gaining knowledge on the substance
matters of paper & pulp industry and Latin American agrarian reform.
MST is studied as a national Brazilian movement; the challenges facing MST as an entity
in this particular national environment are brought forwards. MST is also criticized, in the
same manner in which Veracel was put under scrutiny in the last chapter. Thirdly, the
symbolic system of MST starts to get its shape through bringing forwards its historical
foundations. In this historical study, Greg Urban’s theories on cultural pathways are used,
as they represent a progressive analysis tool (across time), whereas Bourdieu’s theories are
actually more suitable for studying a particular moment in time. A combination of these
two is required, thus, and to successfully combine these two is the major academic goal of
this study.
It is important to understand the pathways which the cultural elements of an entity’s culture
have traveled, because these greatly impact to the overall nature of its culture currently
(Urban 2001: 1-20). Thereafter, the Brazilian historical pathways, on which MST’s culture
enjoys of and on which it is built on partly, will be analyzed in the historical section. These
pathways are the major resistances to the power field in the area’s history; named also by
the social movement itself as their culture’s great antecessors. Palmares and Canudos are
analyzed, thus.
After these analyses on the symbolic system of MST, Foucault’s and Bourdieu’s theories
on power and culture are applied. An analysis on the surge of a new knowledge – that of
the theology of liberation – into the dispositive of Brazilian land tenure politics is followed
by an analysis of the way in which this knowledge turned itself into a practice through the
creation of MST twenty years ago. Lastly, sexuality as an integral part of MST’s symbolic
system’s functioning is analysed via comparing the sexuality in MST to the “Western”
sexuality, as this has been framed by Michel Foucault.
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As quite a lot of research has already been made on MST, what is needed in here is the
applying of others observations in terms of this research’s theoretical framework. However,
there are some important observations which have been made particularly for this research
by the author whilst on the field studying Brazil and MST’s culture, and these will be
incorporated to the study. This chapter will be more inclined into cultural research and to
the main theoretical framework of this thesis than the one on Veracel, because to use
cultural research on companies like Veracel89 and Stora Enso is not as easy or apt as to use
them for entities like MST, which fulfill to greater extent the characteristics of an ethnic
group.
A National Movement
In 1964 president João Goulart tried to pass an agrarian reform law for Brazil. He had wide
support for his agenda, “only the rich and the generals did not know that Brazil needed an
agrarian reform” to prosper economically, to make a rational, productive use of its unused
lands (the informant in Wright & Wolford 2003: 261). However, a dictatorship was
manoeuvred to Brazil with the help of the US media, which portrayed the peasant
movements of that time in the Northeast of Brazil as if they would had started already a
Marxist revolution, according to Wright & Wolford (ibid.: 1-30). After the 1964 coup that
set a dictatorship in Brazil, there was no socio-political space for a counter-movement like
MST to take part in the land politics.
There was more space for a land reform in the open and democratic atmosphere of the post-
dictatorship 1980’s. The few conflicts, in which the power field’s conception of proper land
politics were disputed, such as Palmares and Canudos, now popped out again. In the
transformation away from dictatorship, MST was a major player as a former of the
heterodox discourse that would make the doxa turn into a conflict between orthodox and
heterodox discourses.
89 As already brought forwards, the study of Veracel’s symbolic system had to rely quite heavily on
economics and business studies, as these are the most critical dimensions in its “symbolic system”.
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MST should be considered as a counter-culture with a specific counter-political goal. It
would not exist if there would not exist historically and politically constructed inequality in
land holding in Latin America. Besides MST there exists many other sem-terra
organisations in Brazil. The number of these totalled a mighty 200 in 2000 (Chaves 2000:
1-15). These all have more or less different methods, social institutions and cultural
particularities in their fight for the agrarian reform. One of these marginalised groups in
comparison to MST is, for example, the "Liga dos Camponeses Pobres" or “The League of
Poor Peasants.” The principal difference between MST and the League is in their methods
and social institutions: the latter one uses “aggressive methods” and has no leaders, in
comparison to MST which uses mediation, reformism and has hierarchical type
institutional relations. The League is much more oppressed in Brazil than MST, 90
particularly due to the two major arbitrary elements in its culture in relation to the Brazilian
power field: it has no leaders and it uses “unsound methods.” MST’s culture is, in any case,
still much more similar to the symbolic power field of Brazil, in many crucial aspects such
as nature of leadership and acceptable methods. The fact that there exists more radical
cultures in the field of agrarian reform gives extra value for MST in the eyes of the power
field.  After years of waiting in camps, if sem-terras see no results in their union with MST,
they have a variety of organizational options from which to choose if they want to try other
methods to further their situation.
Many times it is the hunger and certain future death, in desolate regions where even MST’s
impact does not reach, that makes the people to turn for another road. Sometimes it is the 2
percent tax collected by MST from its settlements (Wright & Wolford 2003: 257), which
makes sem-terras search for alternatives; they may feel that they do not get the tax back in
some way from MST. Whatever be the reasons for the existence of over 200 sem-terra
movements, the members of these marginal groups are much more decentralized than
MST’s. Often they are acting and gathered in groups of only few families. They have got
no such momentum against the State as MST has.
90 See, for example: “LULA CRIMINALIZA LA LUCHA DE LOS CAMPESINOS”
http://www.eldiariointernacional.com/Archivos/EDI%20124/latiBrasil124.htm [12.5.2005]
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A relatively small number of occupiers of land are easily won over in its struggle for land,
where the opposing party is the State with Latifundiarios. For example, in the north of
Minas Gerais, 200 policemen (of Policia Federal do Brazil) were sent to retire three
families of the lands which were officially a property of a latifundista,91 which they were
occupying: a relatively easy task in comparison to retiring 1000 MST members (MST
occupations are almost always massive). It is also difficult to gain knowledge of the smaller
scale sem-terras and their struggles, as they have many times no knowledge or power to call
for the media on the spot.
MST is definitely the most national sem-terra movement – and perhaps, furthermore, the
most national organization of all the sub-organizations inside Brazil. Brazil is made out of
federal states with their own laws and socio-cultural variance, and not many social actors
within Brazil have succeeded ever in creating even a somehow functioning and significant
activity on the level of the whole nation. The religious part of the society is highly divided
and locally marked; even the nationwide religions such as Catholicism are like this
(Pierucci & Prandi 1996). MST’s impact has been to gather together different grass-roots
level movements of the poor and marginalized to fight together against their oppressors
(Wright & Wolford 2003: 250-260). The vision which was omnipresent just some 15 years
ago regarding the conflicts in the Amazon basin, for example, was that landless peasants
were fighting with the indigenous and rubber collector’s unions and as a product of this
conflict, the rainforest was destroyed.
After MST got hold in the state of Para and other states in the Amazon in the middle
1990’s, they not only united these groups together,92 but moreover managed to greatly
impact the general attitude and vision of the world on what was happening in the Amazon.
After MST’s arrival, the different groups have been struggling side-by-side, in a
complementary way, for a more sustainable development of the Amazon basin in all
91 “Liga dos Camponesos Pobres do Norte de Minas”http://216.17.145.88/media/2005/03/310148.pdf
[10.5.2005]
92 Which was not actually a hard task to do as they had a common enemy and the “conflicts” which they
“had”, were mainly a product of the Positivist Brazilian media, a view put on the people so that those who
were really responsible for the destruction would not be blamed but the blame would be put on top of the poor
(Wright & Wolford 2003: 250-260).
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respects. This fight has been a part of the national agrarian reform due to MST and not a
separate struggle, which has given more power to the local struggles for land. (ibid.)
The political parties in Brazil are the closest others that approach the definition of social
actors with a national scale and scope. But even they have remarkable differences inside
themselves, whereas MST has managed in the past 20 years in bringing for the first time
together a segment of the country’s people (sem-terras and to lesser extent other workers,
indigenous, small-scale and family farmers and rubber collectors) nationwide. Not even
trade unions have anymore such importance in Brazil as nationwide movements do – nor as
organizers of workers for their rights – as almost all of these have become parts of political
parties. For example, in Petrópolis, in the former imperial capital near Rio de Janeiro, all
the trade unions are of the Communist Party of Brazil (PC do B), and the trade activists are
acting mainly just for getting votes for the party for which they are tied to, in this case for
PCB.93 MST is, thus, very likely the most national social actor in Brazil currently – and
thereafter an important political power, as anyone who manages to gather the forces from
throughout all Brazil (even if from a relatively impoverished segment of citizens like sem-
terras), has a considerable say on things in there where power is concentrated: in Brasília.
However, there are factors, which have seriously started to divide the unity within MST in
the last few years. One principal corroding effect has been due to the phenomenal surge and
success of religious groups competing against the Theology of Liberation type Brazilian
Catholicism. These include particularly the Protestants, such as evangelist, charismatic and
Pentecostal sects,94 which have gained incredible success lately all around Brazil (Pierucci
& Prandi 1996). Igreja Universal and Assembleia de Deus are the biggest of these religious
movements that have put small churches on the centers of every town, village and street-
corner of a city in Brazil. Particularly, these are strong in the Amazon, where they promote
within the MST settlements that to occupy/invade another’s land without asking that others
permission is a sin: they demonize the whole of MST as sinners (Wright & Wolford 2003:
93 According to conversations with political activists in Petrópolis in 2004.
94 In Finland these groups would not be nominated as Protestants and definitely not as evangelical: so far are
their practices of walking in salt to get the bad spirits out of you (Igreja Universal) and so on from the Finnish
tradition of Lutheranism.
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250-260). A rising number of MST-people are joining these religious sects instead of
holding to MST’s theology of liberation type Catholicism. In every settlement which was
visited for this research, the small new protestant type churches were present: they pose a
very real threat to the integrity of MST.
An explanation for the success of the Pentecostal and Evangelical Christian religious
movements in Brazil and particularly within sem-terras is in the alternative, which they
possess in relation to the Catholicism and particularly the Catholic Church’s Base
Communities. The former ones concentrate on individual conversion and have avoided
community politics and social issues important to Base Communities. However, a swift
diffusion of these religions has taken place by the usage of institutional political power by
the leaders of these new religions (Pierucci & Prandi 1996). These Pentecostal groups, like
Igreja Universal, are dominating several municipal parliaments, their leading priests easily
become not only extremely rich, but elected for majors and senators by their religious
followers (ibid.). These religions do not require literacy and commitment to social action,
as the base communities usually do, and they get members from the ranks of MST
especially after the initial settlement is over. The rise of these religious movements does not
only threaten MST culturally from below; even more serious for the Agrarian Reform may
be the growing political power which their leaders have gained. The biggest socio-political
transformation underway in Brazil might easily be said to be the surge of these new
politically oriented religious sects.
Another serious threat in front of MST within the cultural pathways inside Brazil is the
Brazilian media that is totally controlled by the elite, like O Globo network’s owners that
have actually strong international ties - which gives for the cultural pathway through media
to the whole of Brazil an international dimension. The media has the most symbolic power
to inflict upon Brazilians: the television watching rate in Brazil both in term of per capita
and quantitatively in time is the highest in the world (Gomes 1998). Furthermore, the
impact is fortified as all around the country people watch mainly just one channel every day
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with its famous telenovelas: O Globo. 95 When in 1998 19 MST members were murdered in
El Dorado dos Carajas in the state of Pará, MST gained the favor of the public as the news
portrayed a live video of how the landless were killed cruelly even though they did not
make any provocation as they were walking on a road (Wright & Wolford 2003: 250-260).
After this, O Globo used the opportunity and made a telenovela on MST. Firstly it showed
MST in a positive light – as victims – but soon it made clear a message that MST was
following a wrong path. And soon the public opinion on MST transformed: the power of O
Globo on inflicting beliefs and worldviews on people in Brazil is unbelievable; it is
“Beyond the Citizen Kane”, as the documentary film made with that name by a British
director Simon Hartog (1993) on the phenomenon puts it. However, MST acknowledges
the power of the media, and tries to create ways in which the pathway of national media
would not reach the eyes and ears of its members. MST has created its own radio channel
and newspapers and books, which are internally well used. Nevertheless, people buy
televisions after settling down, and throughout the years after the time in camps where a
creation of a strong new culture was the goal and practice, people tend to be overrun by the
currents of televised truths and worldviews of O Globo. This is also a serious threat for the
cultural integrity of MST and for the whole movement, thus.
Two other current problems observed both when doing field research within MST for this
research and by other researchers like Wright & Wolford (2003: 244-261), are those
surging from the Brazilian cultures weight: the persistence of classic paternalism and
clientilism type interpersonal relations between both the coordinators (leaders) of the
movement and, secondly, between men and women.96
95 O Globo has in Brazil “60 percent of the television audience and as much as 80 percent of broadcast
advertising”, according to Carlos Castilho in: http://www.progressivetrail.org/articles/040405Castilho.shtml.
Its activity O Globo maintains trough extensive foreign loans, which the Brazilian government in the end pays
as the company cannot pay its debts themselves. Thus, the positivist Brazilian power field definitely includes
O Globo into its politics of gathering tax money from the citizens and dividing them to the few favored large-
scale conglomerates.
96 The former one of these is analyzed here and the latter one in the end of this chapter, when the symbolic
system of MST is under assessment. Sexuality and gender issues are so closely related to culture and power
and the functioning dynamics of the symbolic power system of MST that they have to be studied in the same
context with the rest of the symbolic system’s micro-level or specific elements, not here where more strictly
national dimension of MST are studied.
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These two problems are acknowledged by the movement itself, and they say that they are
trying to reform these social patterns of behavior, which has however seemed to be a very
hard task in a country where such patterns of interpersonal relations are historically strong
and accepted as cultural truisms. Not many people in Brazil question the nature of these
relationships as something dubious.
In the same way as workers used to interact with their patrons and overseers before joining
MST, they currently come to see the settlements or camps coordinator, like servants to a
patron. According to the MST leaders this makes people less independent and creative to
find their own solutions to problems. In some cases it already has happened that the
coordinators learn to enjoy the position which is given to them by the clientilist cultural
behavioral pattern, and start to abuse their rights and authority. (ibid.) During the field
research period within MST, I heard of many occasions where, for example, the leader of a
cooperative had stolen all its money and ran away.  Even more frequent were the cases
where the every-day relationship between the normal members of the movement and its
leaders reminded strongly a relation between an overseer and a servant in some respects.
There are also Malthusian concerns focusing on the increase of population within MST:
culturally, MST people regard these concerns as insults and as non-issues, which do not
possess a threat for its integrity, when the leaders were interviewed for this research about
how they understand the Malthusian critics. Some have also seen as their interest to portray
MST as a cause behind the destruction of the rainforests (ibid). However, academic
research has proven that the production of food by the people dwelling in Brazil, or the
activity of poor in general, or the “quantity” of people, have not been reasons behind the
destruction of rainforests, as is portrayed by some. The reason for the destruction of
rainforests has been the introduction of capitalism and export oriented economic model,
and particularly of the way in which these have been implemented by the Brazilian elites.
Neither has the economic usage of the forests and lands been directed for the well-being of
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the locals, as is displayed often to legitimise forests abuse in Brazil.97 (Wright & Wolford
2003: 244-261; Laakkonen 1992: 213.)
As mentioned, the authorities like regional leaders of MST have considerable authority on
the people inhabiting the camps and, to lesser extent, the settlements. In this kind of
situation of not only national but continent-wide clientilism in inter-personality, it is
obvious that the biggest influence, which MST hopes to have, is to make “a complete
revolution in social behavior” (Wright &Wolford 2003: 244-261). Following Paulo Freire’s
pedagogy of the oppressed, the educators within MST that gained wide practical knowledge
on how to help people to become conscious of the social factors around them when
working within the Catholic churches Pastoral’s for Land during the dictatorship, have been
able to support a real transformation inside peoples heads. However, perhaps one of the
internal threats and contradictions hovering over MST in it is the possibility that people do
not get the message of the pedagogy of oppressed, but start to act like machines,
automatically singing the songs of liberation and waving a red flag as someone steps inside
the class room. Nevertheless, many who have done more extensive research within MST
(Harnecker 2002; Wright &Wolford 2003: 244-261) have found that, in general, the
pedagogy of the oppressed has functioned in the desired way.
In the context of Brazilian nation, the transformation which has taken place in terms of
culture is certainly a much greater feat than the achievements of MST in terms of land
reform. Through very practical examples, people start to come together to solve their
problems – a common example which is portrayed to people is to show how one stick
breaks easily, whereas many sticks together do not break (Cerioli & Broilo 2003). Brazil
has had 500 years of searching for maximizing the family and actor specific interests, and
in this process the collective, national sphere – and thus the individual sphere – of life has
been left to derision. In the cultural reform process by MST, Brazilian individuos can
become pessoas, and not only that: they often proclaim how happy they are after becoming
97 Even nowadays the governors of the Amazonian States of Brazil and business enterprises want to portray
that “we also have the right to develop”, addressing to themselves as parties, which would be representing
some sort of general “Brazilian” good. Their discourse uses the symbolic power of the poor in order to justify
the harsh methods of reaping profits for the business and government elite from rainforest and from the
workers input.
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conscious of concepts; aware, hungry for information. MST is certainly a particular
Foucauldian power/knowledge formation inside the social space of Brazil. It is a
nationwide alternative, challenging the power field not only in economic, structural or
political terms, but perhaps even more daringly in the symbolic, cultural provisions it
exhibits.98
MST’s Symbolic System
Next are analyzed the pathways within space and across time that MST’s major cultural
elements have travelled. The history definitely has cleared paths – cultural spaces – on
which MST has been able to construct on – and marked also paths where it has not been
able to construct its culture on. Analysis starts by acknowledging which were the actual
earlier materializations of the elements particular to MST. This is easy, as the movement
itself explicitly proclaims openly these social actors – the pathways in Greg Urban’s (2001)
terms - which it considers as its forerunners. As pathways have to be cut into already
existing space - with something within it already – the encountering of these social actors
with that “something” which already was there in that space, which had to be replaced, is
central to the analysis. In this, the Foucauldian argument that power becomes visible only
when it encounters resistance is tested.
The relationship of man with land has been and continues to be to great extent the source of
human culture. In different cultures, or symbolic systems, this human-land relationship has
been conceptualized in different ways. This conception is methodologically traceable to the
very discourses, to the rhetoric inherent to particular symbolic systems.
Next is analysed the interplay between the colonialist power field’s symbolic system with
the “alternative symbolic systems”, such as Palmares and Canudos. These historical
interplays are predecessors of the encounter between the symbolic systems of Veracel and
98 The research made by anthropologist Christiane Chaves (2000: 122) also support the argument that MST is
possessing a heterodox discourse in relation to the Brazilian power-field, as she says that “from its beginning,
MST expressed the fight for land in terms of conflict, in which its principal antagonist was the State; with it
MST disputed the rights, the access to land.”
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MST, will be argued. This is, because the cultural elements – most importantly the
particular human-land relationships conceptions – of the earlier alternative symbolic
systems in relation to the Brazilian power field, have travelled through time and been
incorporated into the culture of MST. As cultural pathways cut through time, the cultural
elements vital to MST – struggle for land, creation of an alternative life-style, and fight for
the underprivileged – have been possibly present also earlier in the history of Brazil.
***
In the arrival of the Portuguese, private tenure of land was unknown for the Tupi-Guaranis
and other indigenous tribes dwelling in the area currently known as the Brazilian state of
Bahia. In the wake of the 16th Century a new powerhouse arrived to Brazil: captains
“discovering Latin America” were given huge tracts of land by the Portuguese Crown. This
power legitimized the newborn “Brazilian” power field’s authority - in its members own
terms, “ownership” - over the “discovered” lands by the mandate of the Catholic Crown in
Portugal which, moreover, derived its symbolic power from the cultural pathways that
connected it with the Vatican and the Pope.
The coming years saw the death of indigenous tribes, and with them primitive type human-
land relation legitimization practices – in indigenous own terms, their “connection to the
mother earth”. Now, within the new power field’s symbolic system, land became to be
conceptualized, framed essentially as “property” – this term was useful exactly due to that
reason that it highlighted the authority and closer connection of the new powerhouse to the
land in relation to the old indigenous conception. The transformation of the symbolic power
field to conceptualize land in different discursive manner, as “property,” was essential in
legitimizing the new type of relationship between man and land in Brazil.
Moreover, this new symbolic power field wanted to extent its force over all of Brazil – it
had diffusive aspirations. However, it took time before the old symbolic systems vanished
from the mosaic of pathways within the area called “Brazil.” In the early days of
93
colonialism, there was space – geographically99 - for cultural difference in Brazil due to
limitations in the technical skills to diffuse the elements particular to the symbolic power
field’s culture. It has to be added to this, that not only were the techniques of diffusion
undeveloped – neither was there printing machines or televisions. Also the variance in
terms of cultures and ideologies, ethnicities was very high in the early days of colonialism
in Brazil. There were tribes, all types of Europeans, sailors from the seven seas, African
kings and slaves.
Palmares and Canudos as the Historical Pathways of MST
In times of political tumults, also the power field’s symbolic system’s operational
effectiveness weakens and even becomes under threat, as it is by economic, political and
structural means that the symbolic system extends its power over its reign. Due to political
tumults, thereafter, the 17th century in Brazil witnessed the surge, triumph and fall of
dissimilar symbolic systems in comparison to the newborn “Brazilian power field”
described above.
There were, for example, Quilombos, communities found by fugitive slaves; most
important of them was called Palmares. It was founded in the political tumults of the
Hollandaise occupation/invasion of the Brazilian Northeast in the 1630’s. Palmares lasted
for some 60 years and had some 25000 members (Alencar, Carpi & Ribeiro 1994). Its
operational force stood on the practice in which fugitive slaves that had been freed had to
remain some sort of slaves also in Palmares before they had freed another slave from the
plantations. After this, the former slave who had liberated the other gained symbolical
recognition from the Palmares group as a free person: by means of symbolical carrots given
by the new alternative symbolic system, the political operation of Palmares was carried on.
99 Nowadays in the era of globalization there is space for alternative symbolic systems not anymore in terms
of geography – world has become marked by guarded borders - but within the democratic social space – there
where this type of social space exists. Furthermore, new symbolic systems diffuse in virtual space, such as
internet, nowadays.
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Importantly, there where the symbolic power field of Brazil in the 17th century was marked
with rigid moral codes and search of homogeneity, in Palmares the symbolic system was
mainly marked with allowance for cultural variety. No strict moral rules or values were
diffused by the symbolic system of Palmares: prostitutes, alcoholics, criminals and other
people that lived on the outskirts of the predominant moral sphere dwelled side by side in
Palmares; there were also many free and white inhabitants who found this culturally non-
repressive space attractive. (ibid.) As Portugal retrieved its control over Brazil in the end of
the 17th century, a wide-spread search for Palmares finally carried crop, and resulted in the
decapitation and enslavement of its inhabitants (Alencar, Carpi & Ribeiro 1994: 34).
Meanwhile Palmares had become a legend, a paradise lost, that was to be an example in the
coming years for the expressions of heterodox discourses in Brazil. Palmares cut the first
major alternative pathway, the first scar into the flesh of the Brazilian symbolic power field.
Particularly, Palmares represented not only a different human-land relationship conception
within the area of “Brazil” – it represented an assortment of alternatives in its allowing for
cultural internal variety. After Palmares’ 17th century success in keeping up a relatively
triumphant symbolic system within the political system maintained by Portugal, space in
Brazil for fresh alternatives was gradually limited both in terms of effectiveness and
cultural diversity. As the chief cultural pathway that the colonial area had with Europe
gained vigour, the result was enrichment in the acculturation of European cultural elements
into the Brazilian social space.
Enlightenment and liberalism saw and forced firstly the political independence for Brazil in
1822 and later on the end of the political monarchy in 1889 and the introduction of a new
republic, the United States of Brazil. The new liberal style constitution of that year
proclaimed that “every Brazilian has a right to land”, demonstrating that at least on the
level of discourse, something had changed also in the elements which the symbolic power
field was diffusing in relation to its traditional human-land relationship’s conception.
However, these new constitutional rights remained on the paper, as liberal elements were
introduced and acculturated into Brazilian cultural whole in a manner in which the liberal
element turned into Positivism (centralised political power, Comtean order and progress)
and  into traditionalist manners (as the forces on whose hands the liberal political power
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was thrust were traditional latifundiarios). Liberalism was not to be found in the positivist
and traditionalist practices and knowledge into which it was transformed through
acculturation in Brazil.
Latifundiarios had the ultimate word in the new Republic of Brazil, a word which was
legitimized in practice by 400 years accumulated political, economical and symbolic
power. In 1888 slavery was abolished in Brazil by the last emperor Dom Pedro II.
However, the political transformation from Monarchy into Positivist Republicanism served
actually as a strike against the new freedom of slaves. The Republicans commenced to use
their new constitutional rights in a way that was in fact much more oppressive for the poor,
and the situation of the underprivileged was thus worse than during the monarchy. The new
republic created much better possibilities for the latifundiarios to legitimize their relation to
land, and this new position was put to practice before long. Ex-slaves had trouble in finding
a job and, even though their position was no more officially slavery, it continued to be that
in practice, as their state of affairs got worse.
The conception of the human-land relationship remained essentially the same (land is
“property”) in the 19th and 20th centuries, and actually gained even more power. However,
there was one particularly memorable exploration for an alternative symbolic system in the
end of the 19th century, when there were – due to transformation from monarchy to
“republic” – political tumults in Brazil. In the duration of years, the geographic vastness of
Brazil – which to great extent had faltered the diffusion and sustained the rigidity of
Brazilian symbolic power fields cultural elements - was turning politically more federal,
provincial, creating thus more opportunities for direct action against cultural dissidents
there where they tried to voice a heterodox discourse. In other words, the politico-
geographic structures had become more allowing for the symbolic power field of Brazil to
diffuse its messages.
Nevertheless, the end of the 19th century saw, for example, the famous war of Canudos in
1897. Poor Nordestinos, with delimited possibilities to livelihood due to terrible dry-
seasons, accompanied by the severe Republican political climate, established a community
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of some 30000 people called Canudos in 1893 into the interior of the State of Bahia,
following the leadership of Antonio Conselheiro (Levine 1992). This man was a Beato, that
is, a holy man within the Catholic Church, a middle-step on the way to becoming a saint. In
the context of historical Brazil, beato was a charismatic type religious leader typical
especially in the Northeast of Brazil since the beginning of Christendom till nowadays
(Facó 1976). If an alternative cultural pathway was to be created, this had to surge through
the efforts of those who were already occupying the roles of specialists in the creation of
symbolic meanings, following Bourdieu’s theory. In the context of Brazil, the major
potential for the surge of cultural renegades has always in the last 300 years or so been,
thus, within the Catholic Church. People would follow the words of a Beato, as he had
socially constructed, strong, institutionalized authority to function as a specialist creating
and maintaining a symbolic system.
It can be explained why the putting up of Canudos as an alternative symbolic system100
within Brazil took place exactly in Bahia. In the state of Bahia Catholicism has always had
a more charismatic tint, especially due to the Beatos, who do not have the official power
and recognition of the institutionalised church, but nevertheless carry through services and
actions typical to institutional Church’s Padres. Beatos have been historically more popular
than the priests within the plebiscite ranks of the Bahian people, due to the Beatos’
prophetic charisma and canalization of religious sentiments into the actual daily practices of
the people. (Alencar, Carpi & Ribeiro 1994: 261-267.) Conselheiro was the figure, the
prophet who now promulgated the heterodox discourse, by his extremely symbolical
actions and touching speeches within the epochs Catholic reforms, in which he participated
as a Beato. Importantly, in comparison to other regions of Brazil, due to the charismatic
nature of the institutional symbolic authority in Bahia, there was more space for cultural
variance in there. Less-charismatic, more rigid forms of specialist institutions, such as, in
Weberian terms rational-legal and traditional type authority, are less prone to allow for
cultural variety within their reign (Weber 1967).
100 Naturally the history of Brazil has seen various other symbolic systems also, and to study these would be
interesting, but in the context where historical roots for MST’s culture are sought, Palmares and Canudos are
the most important.
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However, even though it was alternative in relation to the symbolic power field, internally
the symbolic system of Canudos was rigid and less allowing for internal cultural variety
when compared to its predecessor Palmares. Beato Conselheiro and his Canudos
proclaimed to be a virtue to follow Christian moral codes like absolutism and strict sexual
codes. Nevertheless, the major cultural element which Canudos shared with Palmares was
its human-land relationship conception; this essential, shared element allows making an
argument that there was a cultural pathway across time between Palmares and Canudos.
The Brazilian power field in both instances was controlled by latifundiarios who had
immense unproductive lands – and whose economy was based on huge private ownership
of lands, in which contracted workers (slaves or ex-slaves) were in key position. (Alencar et
al. 1994: 261-267.)
Situated in Belo Monte, Canudos came to be called “the promised land”. It was a place for
a preparation via an honest and pious life for the Reign of God. It soon became a model and
an object of admiration, and flocks of people started to flow into the ranks of Conselheiro,
arousing fears within the latifundiarios of a domino-effect, of a reduction in the cheap
manpower. (Facó 1976.) It has to be remembered that since slave-economy and the surge of
Adam Smith’s idea that “the richness of one country equals the producing power of its
working force” western and colonial economies relied on low-cost manpower (1904
[1776]). The discourse of Conselheiro was, nevertheless, nothing for the dominant powers
– only the practice, the putting up of a visibly heterodox community practicing its
alternative conception of the human-land relationship, i.e. Canudos, proved to be too much
for the power field. As the economy of the power field was based on a “property” and
slavery type human-land relationship, serious alternatives to this model, like Palmares and
Canudos, were to be destroyed.
With the leadership of Beato Conselheiro, Canudos wanted to demonstrate in all possible
ways its moral superiority: it wanted to diffuse its culture, and was quite successful in this,
becoming soon a destination for pilgrimages from all over the Northeast of Brazil (Facó
1976; Levine 1992). The Catholic church, that was highly sharing the interests of
latifundiarios, did not approve this clear expression of antitrust laid on its institution and
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power by the people following the charisma of some non-official church member, some
Beato. In 1881 the church prohibited Conselheiro to preach, but at that time he was already
followed by large masses. There were also political differences between Canudos and the
rest. The goal of people following Conselheiro was to be separated from the new
Republican State of Brazil; Conselheiro was a Monarchist and gained, thus, the hate of
Republicans on his neck. Conselheiro was totally against tribute; Canudos did not pay
taxes. Their conception of human-land relation was that land belongs to the God, or more
specifically in relation to humans that “land belongs to no one and at the same time to
everyone who wants to work on it.”101 Thus, Canudos was in all possible ways against the
latifundiarios. (Alencar et al. 1994: 261-267.)
The claim to have moral superiority, the maintenance of rigid moral codes different from
the rest - elements fundamental in creating unity and strength within the Canudos
community - were a threat to the symbolic power field of the late 19th Century Brazil.102
Beato Conselheiro was also against the elements which had been lately symbolically103
incorporated into the power field’s culture. For example, he was against the liberal ideas of
civil marriage and secularization of religious activities; he denounced injustices and
prophesized social transformations (ibid). Importantly, there was an internal transformation
under way within the Brazilian symbolic power field during the epoch of Canudos: such
was the case also in the 1980’s when MST surged. Perhaps due to major internal cultural
transformations under way, the power field felt the presence of Canudos so threatening. For
example, Adam Smith’s ideals were very strongly expressed – for the first time in Brazil -
in the Brazilian constitutive Positivism of the early Republicans, one of the major
entrepreneurs acculturating these ideals into Brazil in the Positivist/Traditionalist way being
the military leader Benjamin Constantin.
101 This conception was later directly incorporated into the culture of MST.
102 The horrified attitudes of the dominant power towards the knowledge that gained power through the
creation of Canudos can be observed by analysing the way in which the media of the time framed these
movements in its discourses. These types of religious social movements were named “fanatics”, and were thus
put into the same rank with cangaceiros, who were bands of rural criminals stealing and terrorizing, kind of
19th century versions of modern day drug lords in Brazil.  (Interestingly Cangaceiros became later on
romanticized as “Robin Hood’s” in Brazil, even though this was far from truth: see Facó 1976).
103 Symbolically as they were written into the new constitution
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Besides cultural arbitrariness with the rest, Canudos became a political opponent, as it
proclaimed independence and created a military defence (ibid). All the reasons were there
to crush Canudos for the other partner in the dispositive: it was becoming too strong, as it
succeeded in, for example, producing excess for markets to trade, while directly satisfying
all its own material needs, and all this was achieved only by having a horizontal, primitive
socio-political structure within a community in unfertile land-areas. Horizontal socio-
political structure is a reverse to the ideals of Positivism and Traditionalism, where power
is thrust only on select elite, that is thought in Positivism to be capable and selected to lead
the country into Order and Progress. Thus, all horizontal social actions for transformation
had to be – and still have to be – suppressed by the Brazilian power field, as they can only
lead to “terror and anarchy” in its cultural viewpoint. The Positivist State that was
composed of latifundiarios and the Catholic Church united their forces and launched
several attempts to destroy Canudos that resisted many times, but had to finally bend in
1897 when Canudos was devastated and its members dispersed or were killed (Facó 1976).
Canudos was part of the religious social movements typical in the first decades of the
“Latifundiarios Republic”, and it succeeded in some extent in contesting the social order.
Canudos is reframed as a “mystical movement” in the discourse of MST (see Bogo 2003);
it has become culturally very significant for MST. The cultural pathway across time from
Palmares to Canudos was extended into MST through their relationally alternative
conception of human-land relation. There were naturally significant variance in the very
human-land relationships between Palmares, Canudos and MST’s symbolic systems. The
main cause for their connection to each other was the dispositive in which their symbolic
systems were: the relation in which their cultures were with the symbolic power field of
Brazil. They all expressed a radically different conception of the human-land relationship in
relation to the power field, which was reliant in all senses – economic, political and
symbolic - from the discourse of “land is a property”.
As mentioned promptly, cultural transformation creating the cultures of Canudos and MST
came from the specialist ranks of the Brazilian Catholic Church. The Catholic Church had
in both of these epochs been promoting and practicing reform campaigns for spiritual
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reformation, in order to get closer to the people. Through specialist that provided the efforts
of a cultural entrepreneur, renegades surging from within the Christian system, the idea that
“land is not property of humans” (but that land belongs to the God or to the Mother Earth,
for example), became an issue again in the end of the 19th Century.
Palmares, Canudos and MST have gained their wide-spread reputation due to, firstly, their
demographic size (more than 30000 people). There were various other similar attempts to
put up an alternative symbolic system inside Brazil - like the utopian colonies of the
European immigrants in the turn of the 19th and 20th Century. However, the more radical
and alternative these communities were in relation to the symbolic power field, less they
had members. Secondly, the less populous attempts did not gain acknowledgement due to
the fact that more than often they passed on quietly, due to internal practical or symbolic
hardships.
Even in the cases where it has to be admitted that the power field was the cause for putting
an end to these alternatives, the power field’s triumph over these communities was based
principally on symbolic means. The symbolic power of the power field was able to diffuse
the cultural elements inherent to it inside the alternative small-scale communities and thus
integrate these under its reign. What made particular of Palmares, Canudos and later on of
MST was the fact that the power field found its symbolic system incapable to win over the
hearts that were following these alternative symbolic systems. Thereafter, the power field
had to use physical violence to put an end to these communities.104 However, the Brazilian
symbolic power field never defeated these alternative symbolic systems, and thereafter the
immaterial, cultural sides of these communities remained alive. Palmares and Canudos cut
the cultural pathways into the flesh of the Brazilian symbolic power field, wounds which it
has not managed to heal.
104 Actually, it could be argued and demonstrated by using Greg Urban’s (2001) cultural motion theory that as
physical violence was used to stop the operation of these communities, the physical coercion gave
acceleration for the cultural message which these communities were representing and diffusing.
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The Surge of a New Knowledge: the Theology of Liberation
After Canudos, the Brazil of the 1940’s saw the next phase in the interplay between the
alternative and dominant conceptualizations of human-land relations. Now peasants started,
even though slowly, to recognize the new space for political action that was opened for
them due to substantial transformation in the discourse symbolically manifested via the
constitution. As mentioned, the 1888 constitution said that “every Brazilian has a right to
land” and that “if land is not being put to good use by its owner, then others can make a
competing claim and acquire title to the land for themselves” (Wright & Wolford 2003:
xxi). The political tumults of the era allowed a heterodox discourse to be real in practice
also.  The so-called “Peasant Leagues” gained momentum from 1940 to 1964. They were
created and supported directly by the Communist party of Brazil. However, these struggles
for land never really “caught the wave”, and they ended up being thrust against the shore of
1964 dictatorship. Between 1964 and 1978 all landless peasant activity was named as
communist and suffocated before being born by iron hands. Only the end of dictatorship
transformed the situation, resulting on a time when various currents favouring the surge of
MST were present. (Harnecker 2002.) These currents merged and materialized by giving
birth not only to democracy in Brazil, but moreover to such a wide-spread heterodox
expression of an alternative human-land conception that Brazil had never seen before.
Researchers of MST have identified many of the political, social and cultural currents on
which MST had the possibility to build on in the end of the 1970’s and start of the 80’s. All
of them (Chaves 2000; Fernandes 1996; Stédile 1993; Harnecker 2002; Wright & Wolford
2003) acknowledge that into these currents definitely belonged the Theology of Liberation,
even though they draw differing analysis on how much it impacted MST. Nevertheless,
next in this thesis is argued that to understand the implications of the surge of theology of
liberation from within the Latin American Catholic Church is crucial in assessing the
cultural elements, the knowledge which gave birth to MST.
Theology of Liberation has been studied extensively by theology and other related subjects
(see, for example, Vuola 2002). Thomas Niehaus has found that in the colonial period and
102
until about 1960, the Catholic Church generally promoted the fatalistic view that the poor
would receive their reward in the afterlife, implying that they should not strive for social
change in this life. Liberation theology came to question this status quo, using biblical
themes like the Exodus to teach the poor that God is on the side of the oppressed and
favours their liberation. Thus, liberation theology represents a major change in the way
Christianity approached the social problems of Latin America. (Niehaus 1996: 415-417.)
Theology of Liberation can be hold as a highly Latin American cultural product –
according to Niehaus, for example, it is the only real universally diffused cultural current
that comes from Latin America. There is, for example, theology of liberation in India
nowadays. (ibid.) The changes within the Latin American Catholic Church began in the
1960s with the second Vatican Council and the growth of Christian Base Communities
(CEBs). “A Theology of Liberation” by Gustavo Gutiérrez and Leonardo Boff’s “Church:
power and charisma” (1981) were the first and most important books on the theology of
liberation. Boff’s book caused a severe conflict between him and the Vatican; the book
itself is actually in some respects quite a good piece of academic work also, applying for
example Michel Foucault’s ideas (however, without referencing this: perhaps Boff’s
Foucault-like analysis has been thus a coincidence). These both persons are still key figures
within the Theology of Liberation, finds Niehaus (ibid), which puts them thereafter into the
position of specialists within the symbolic system inherent to the Theology of Liberation.
Particularly, MST acknowledges in various of its discourses Leonardo Boff to be its “great
father” (see for example Bogo 2000, 2003; Stédile 1993). Niehaus continues by describing
Liberation Theology’s “eight basic themes” (ibid), which are so well expressed by him that
they deserve to be analysed next in relation to their diffusion to the religious system of
MST. It is analysed, if these basic themes described by Niehaus on the Liberation Theology
hold true for the Liberation Theology particular to the MST.
“(1) Praxis (our action in the world) is the starting point of theology; (2) history is the locus of
theology (God acts in historical time); (3) the world should be viewed as a whole, favouring the
Hebraic holistic view over Greek dualism; (4) sin is social and systematic, not just individual; (5)
God is on the side of the oppressed; (6) the present world order must be transformed; (7) the purpose
of theology is primarily to act and to change the world, not just to understand it; (8) the kingdom of
God (the reign of God) has begun in this life, and the purpose of humanity is to increase the kingdom
by human actions in the world.”
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Thus, Liberation Theology appears to have some similarities with Martin Luther’s
preaching, as praxis is put on our activity on earth. Secondly, it flirts with Marxist historical
materialism (point 2). These two first elements have been acculturated by MST. Niehaus’s
third point that theology of liberation would like to see the world as a whole, however, does
not hold true for the way in which the Liberation Theology has been incarnated within the
MST, as almost every discourse of MST is extremely dualistic, pointing a finger very
clearly to show “good” and “bad”. Socratic Christianity is thus still well alive within the
MST.
By methodologically analysing the religion school books of MST (like Cerioli & Broilo
2003), it becomes clear that latifundiarios and organizations that work – in the eyes of MST
- for the “goals of profit-making” or produce goods that are “unnecessary”, are sinners, and
God is against them as he is on the side of the MST, “povo de Deus.” The Niehaus’s points
4 and 5 are clearly replicated, in Greg Urban’s terms (2001: 1-20), in the MST schoolbook
by Cerioli & Broilo (2003). Following Urban’s theoretical framework, point 6 is not
replicated within MST; MST has put an accelerative effort into turning this cultural element
- diffused from within the Liberation Theology – into a metaculture for its own national
interests. Although MST has ideas which represent the ideology inherent in point 6 (to
transform the world order), its practice and theoretical discourse focuses almost wholly on
the national Brazilian level. As analyzed earlier, MST is a nationalist movement in many
senses. Nationalism is the framework which MST can use to diffuse its own cultural
elements, a meta-ideology which works as a helpful pathway for whatever culture to
disseminate itself in the modern world where there comes, from all directions, discourses
(like that of realpolitik) promoting the rationality and naturalness of a world divided into
national states (for more about nationalisms, please see Pakkasvirta & Saukkonen 2005).
Point 7 is more related to the Theology of Liberation itself, it is a guideline for theologians,
for those possessing places within this particular symbolic system, and due to this system-
specificity (note the word theology) this point has not been disseminated, in Urban’s terms,
into other systems. Point 7 is a particular, contextually limited cultural element, and does
not allow space thereafter for it to be disseminated or replicated. It identifies problems
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inherent to the field of theology; problems which have not ever been problems for the field
of MST, for example, nor for the field of Buddhism, to give an example of a symbolic
system which is in the same category with theology. MST is acting and changing the world
– but it does not do this because that is the alleged “purpose of theology” – it does this
because that is MST’s purpose. For MST itself, to differentiate themselves from the official
catholic church with its theology has actually been an important step in “growing up” (in
their own terms). Thereafter, point 7 has been metaculturally applied for the purposes of
MST through praxis.
MST had to go through a process of political autonomization, especially from the Catholic
Church: this process was arduous (Chaves 2000: 125). MST has written in its “caderno de
formacão” in 1985, a quarterly bulletin, that: “the Church accustomed to be the mother of
the popular movement [MST]. A mother that does not want to admit that her son turned
adult and left home” (In: ibid.). MST wanted to break politically free from the institutional
church, but retained a religious comprehension of the world: “For Jesus the dialectics is
between life and the forces of death, and all that is on the fight for life is on the road of
Evangelism. And all those who are against the rights to life, are against the project of God,
on the team of death,” continues the same article in the Caderno of 1985. Thus, the analysis
drawn earlier, regarding the relation between the Liberation Theology and MST in respects
of the third point of Niehaus, gets support through bringing forwards this discourse of
MST. The religious cosmology of MST is very binary and polarized, oppositional. This
religious cosmology is the ultimate fundament that legitimates MST’s fight; it is above
other moral, political or economic legitimizations for their action. The religious cosmology
pertinent to MST does not, thereafter, allow either for a non-oppositional culture of
encountering significant “others”, like Veracel (that is put “on the team of death”) for
which it was analysed that similar type of enemy-status creation was particular due to their
positivist management culture. Nevertheless, in spite of these differences between MST’s
religious cosmology and mainstream theology of liberation (as theorized above by
Niehaus), the core of MST’s religious cosmology, political action and symbolic system
owes to the theology of liberation (particular to Leonardo Boff), as is argued next in detail.
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Particularly, the symbolic system of MST owes to the Liberation Theology through praxis
and Místico.
Praxis, which was mentioned in Nieuhaus’ point 1, is a key force in the process of
organizing people socially; it is the work that organizes, forms and makes people to
understand the meaning of resistance (Fernandes 1996: 228-229). In the case of MST,
liberation theology thus defined theology as reflection on praxis (daily experiencing). That
is, theology was to be seen as the work of the corporate community of Christians reflecting
on the happenings in their lives in light of the Scriptures (ibid.). Thus, the poor who are
members of base communities reflected on their economic and political oppression and
came to understand in the light that God liberated his people in the Exodus and elsewhere;
he could do the same for the sem-terras. The Liberation Theology’s follower’s faith in the
Scriptures gives them hope, and their organization into Christian communities gives them
the means. In Bernardo Mançano Fernandes’ words, praxis signifies information, reflection,
and action as interactive activities, with an objective to transform the reality of the involved
subjects by carrying on fight for land in their social relations sphere (ibid). The process, in
which farmworkers turned into activism, was clearly impacted by the theology of
liberation, thus. Also Marta Harnecker (2002: 12) has found this transformation in the
culture and practice of peasants:
“A growing number of peasant families begin to understand that they will conquer the land only
through struggle. Occupation of the land then becomes the main instrument of pressure and the first
school for the political awareness and the socialization of thousands of peasants.”
The construction of knowledge within MST takes place through praxis, a learning process,
where the interpretations of reality are fundamental for the daily experiencing, for the
interplay between reflection and action, action and reflection. This process of
transformation is, essentially, comprehended via the symbolic practices and actions
developed within the sphere of “Místico”(Fernandes 1996: 232), which can be held as the
most important juncture in creating the symbolic system of MST.
Generally, through the usage of symbols, the perceived, felt, emotional mysticism gets a
meaning (see for example Geertz 1973). For the case of MST, it has been argued by many,
however, that mysticism has a much more important role. For example, alongside
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Fernandes, Christiane de Alencar Chaves has found that the mysticism particular within
MST demonstrates the moral force and values that are expected from every sem-terra.
Mysticism is the main creator and locomotive of the movement according to her and also to
the leaders of the movement (see Stédile 1993; Bogo 2000; 2003). Christiane Chaves puts it
in the following way: “instilling a belief that is turned active, it can be said that the mystics
in MST is like Marcel Mauss’s mana or orenda, which are power, mystical power.”
(Chaves 2000: 87; see also Mauss 1990) This leads Chaves also to make a comparison
between Max Weber’s “ethos of capitalism” and “ethos of peasants”. According to her, a
peasant ethos is the principal motivation that leads to the assuming of sem-terra identity;
this ethos is capable to lead the organisation in the fight against the state (2000: 12). If
Veracel’s symbolic was analysed to be function through some sort of ethos of capitalism in
Weberian terms, then the encountering of this system so dependant on that ethos with
another system where an alternative peasant ethos is a principal force, is likely to be of a
nature where direct communication does not take place.
The geographer Fernandes has explained that Místico is a joint of practices that are
developed within the dimensions of the space of political socialization - She aliments the
hope and the dream of the workers of the movement (Fernandes 1996: 232). When asking
from the members of MST for this thesis about Místico, it became clear that this fulfils the
characteristics of a special ritual within an ethnic group. The MST people explained that
there is going to be a Moment of Místico soon, to commemorate the 20 years of MST, by
using the following expression: “a noite está reservada  para o Momento Místico em
comemoração dos 20 anos do MST" [The night is reserved for the Mystic Moment in
commemoration of MST’s 20 years of existence.]
Leonardo Boff (1993: 154) has conceptualized quite early this practice, and after this
conceptualization the practice of Místico could be analyzed to have been replicated by
different MST sects around the country:
“Mystical signifies a joint of deep convictions, of grand visions and strong passions that mobilize the
people and movements in their will for changes, or that inspire practices that are capable to confront
any difficulties, or sustain the hope in front of historical failures. In the socio-political mystical, there
always exists utopia as an action.”
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Anthropologist Christiane de Alencar Chaves has analyses some Moments of Místico in her
ethnography on MST. As part of the ethnography that she was doing on MST while they
were on a National March, she collected the data, which is included here to depict the
discourse typical to MST in a Mystical Moment. It is from a situation where sem-terras are
gathered around their MST flag, reciting fervently the words of the speech to their flag. In
this moment they experience the Místico: as their place in the society becomes clear, the
people fall share a moment of deep understanding and togetherness. It is a construction of
ethnic group identity: people adhered to announcing, for example, that “now the Flag of the
MST speaks for us, for us the Landless Workers” when reciting these words which the Flag
speaks for them:
“I am the flag of MST. The red signifies the blood in our veins, the blood spilt for those companions
that fell in the fight over land; the white signifies the peace we are seeking for, peace that does not
yet exist and for which we are fighting; and the green of the flag signifies production and also all the
latifundiarios, who are unproductive, just cultivating brushes and wasteland. The black signifies the
fight for them who fall for the struggle against this system. The map that I carry signifies that the
MST is a national movement, organised on the level of Brazil. The men and women signify the fight
of a family for land, the fight of a man, the fight of a woman, to conquer their piece of land. The
large knife signifies and symbolizes the working tools, all the tools: the scythe, the hoe we are
representing by the knife in our flag. To compose the flag of the movement, to be all this, this red,
white and black piece of cloth, is so important that I demand respect from those who carry me. My
place is always there where everybody can see me, in the pole, raised up with hands. I cannot and I
must not be carried like any other cloth, tied round the head, waist, used as a towel to sit on. We are
all workers and we are most importantly a Movement, Movimiento Sem Terra, that is represented by
this flag, and for which we will fight to settle in every latifúndio in this country. In every place where
there is injustice, we will fight for that this flag will be all the time higher and higher! MST!”105
This kind of Mystic Moment creates collectivism, magic, new identity, hope and future
within MST. Analysed in the Bourdiean framework, in this utopia-like, mystical socio-
political activity, the moral codes and symbols of the symbolic power field – that represents
a dominant vision of the world in every particular context where a symbolic power field can
be analysed to exist (like in Brazil) - are assessed and reverted. Therefore, in the
development of a cognitive praxis, a new knowledge is constructed based on the creativity
of the subjects in their elaboration of new signification on the codes and symbols.
Following Bourdieu’s account of “objectified symbolic capital”, this happens through a
transformation of codes and symbols into visible and concrete forces, in their unveiling into
greater transparency from their invisible cultural nature. As an example, an important
symbol for the MST became the large knife fação (in their flag) that is used to harvest: it
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became the symbol of fight and land occupation, of a new kind of progress. It is enough for
one sem-terra to raise the fação into air, and all who belong to their symbolic system will
follow the example; and a multitude of meanings related to this manifestation of objectified
symbolic capital will take hold in the minds and hearts of the sem-terra people.
Also Thomas Niehaus has found that the Liberation theology and base communities are a
challenge to the current power structures in both civil society and the Catholic Church, as
they have empowered the poor in many countries (1996). The Vatican fears a laity that sees
power as coming from the crass roots and not just from the hierarchy, in the same way as
the new Brazilian republic of Latifundiarios saw the “fanatical” religious social movements
of its time, like Canudos, as a severe threat and a seed of devastating uprising of the people,
as a dangerous empowerment and socialization of a new kind of knowledge regarding the
human-land relationship.
The Liberation Theology, as well as the MST, has been criticized for being too naive in
their incorporation of Marxist economics and dependency theory (Niehaus: 415-417).
Biblical scholars have criticized them of weaknesses in exegesis (interpretation). Their
cosmology has been criticized, especially in the field of economy, to have a very binary
nature, not having, for example, tolerance for any economical activity that is not producing
food or other goods or services that are “necessary” within their world-view.
It is true that the Liberation theology specific for MST is linked with Marxism, but MST
does not accept all of Marxism and certainly not its atheistic materialism, as a look on the
religion schoolbook of MST by Cerioli & Broilo (2003) quickly reveals. Marta Harnecker
(2002) finds that MST uses, rather, Marxism as a source for their questions on economic
injustice endured by the poor in Brazil, not as their answers. Nevertheless, it can be argued
that also answers are sought from the ideals of socialism in MST. For example, the political
structure of MST could be seen to be taking all the time a more hierarchical, state-like
nature that is typical for Leninism. Furthermore, leadership within MST could fall into a
Leninist nature, if it goes through a Weberian transformation of charismatic authority into
105 Translation from: Chaves 2000: 80-81
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traditional-type (Brazilian) authority (Weber 1967). Quite a few local followers of the
MST’s cause have become disappointed after noticing that their leaders were using them
for their personal aims instead of promoting the shared sem-terra cause, the agrarian
reform. This could be the case also into larger extent, if the symbolic system inherent to
MST could not overcome the pressure of the dominant Brazilian Positivist management
culture: a battle which Veracel, on the other hand, has already lost, as was analysed by
focusing on the discursive practice of Veracel in the last chapter.
A New Practice of Knowing: MST
Now is analysed in the Foucauldian framework, how the knowledge – the theology of
liberation – actually gained socio-political weight so much that it became a practice of
knowing, in this case, MST. There are of course the already studied, very religious means
for this (like praxis), but also political, economic and so forth actions have been important
in the surge of MST.
Along its praxis, a movement can turn known and recognized by other political forces
(Fernandes 1996: 232-233). The praxis of the people in Palmeras and Canudos did not gain
political recognition and power. On the contrary, MST has been politically recognised; it
has even created deep relations with, for example, PT, the political party currently in power
through the government of President Lula Da Silva in Brazil. Therefore, MST’s praxis can
be claimed to have been of a more reflective or action-like nature, or then, the socio-
political climate has been more open for MST than for its predecessors.
The Theology of Liberation served as the midwife, as the knowledge, which made the
practice of knowing typical to the MST culture possible to exist in the Brazilian context.
Before the 1984 official foundation of MST, all the required work for creating a mass
movement had already been done: what was still needed was an open political space, along
with political tumults. And as the dictatorship ended, there indeed existed now in the
1980’s a change in the internal topology of the power field of Brazil, which resulted in the
overall transformation of all of its sub-fields. As the hierarchical relations surging from the
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power field took a different form, the sub-fields also reflected this internal transformation
of the power field’s topology, following Bourdiean logic.
People need not only power, they need also knowledge in order to understand their possible
power, and to be able to use this power (Foucault 1998: 53), as was presented in the second
chapter. The knowledge that could possibly transform the status quo; be it political,
religious or economical, has to be socialized via the usage of power in a political space. In
the case of Canudos, a religious knowledge promulgated by beato Conselheiro was
socialized, understood by masses through the practical action that led into the conquest of
an abandoned farm and into the setting up of a new type of political space. This conquest of
land was, par excellence, the “usage of power in a political space”. It served as a symbolic
activity socializing the knowledge of “land belongs to the peasants” not only within the
ranks of Conselheiro, but also within the greater Brazilian context up to the extent into
which the people within it were touched by the socialization process of this knowledge.
Fernandes has found that in the case of MST a fundamental condition in the formation
process was the construction and conquest of space for political socialization. The
formation process of MST was carried through by the usage of three mediums of political
socialization, through relations with the following institutions: The Catholic Church
(through the Catholic Pastoral on Land (CPT) and Base Communities (CEBs)), political
parties (PT, PMDB, PCB) and Rural Workers Syndicates (affiliates of Fetaesp and/or
CUT). (Fernandes 1996: 226.) This thesis limits itself into focusing on the political
socialization only within Fernandes’ firstly-mentioned political space: the Catholic Church
of Brazil. As analysed earlier, the importance of CEBs or Base Communities of the
progressive wing of the Catholic Church has been constitutive in the socialization of
political space for the formation of MST. As said, CEBs have been preaching the theology
of liberation for more than 40 years now within the farmworkers, by using the notion of
praxis and the pedagogy of subject by Paulo Freire.
Marta Harnecker brings forth also other reasons for the surge of MST. It took place “a few
years after the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua” and due to the fact that “after long years of
military dictatorship, Brazil was enjoying new democratic breezes”. Furthermore, it was a
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spirit of the time that “manifestations of popular dissatisfaction were on the upsurge, in
particular important trade-union struggles on the outskirts of São Paulo”. (Harnecker 2002:
12) Next is applied the field/capital theory of Pierre Bourdieu on this multi-explanatory
birth of MST.
Firstly, here in the case of MST, The Liberation Theology created a new consciousness and
awareness; it created a totally new class, which has become actually later on a real field;
even an ethnogenesis - MST. In the creation of this class, a relatively more important
weight was put on the symbolic capital in comparison with the economic capital: MST
pursues economic capital only till a very limited point, whereas within Veracel’s and Stora
Enso’s “field” the adherence is to pursue for unlimited economic capital and for symbolic
capital only secondarily.106
Secondly, the 1980’s Latin American wave of democracy and rebelliousness transformed
the political symbolic capital distribution between the different actors on the continents
political field into a more favourable situation for the left. This open space was soon filled
by the newly created “classes”, MST being one of them. Thirdly, there were politico-
economic reasons for the surge of MST: these are stressed over all other currents strongly
by Harnecker’s (2002) and Stédile’s (1993) historical materialism and to lesser extent by
Wright & Wolford’s focus on the geographic and environmental consequences of the
“Green Revolution” for Latin America (2003: 286). For example, Harnecker says that there
was an “incipient crisis in the economic model implemented by the military [of Brazil in
dictatorship].” And that as a result of this crisis “the peasants - driven from their lands by
droughts and poverty in both the North and West-Central regions, as well as by capitalist
modernization of the countryside in the central and Southern part of the country - had
increasingly fewer possibilities of finding work in the cities. On the other hand and for
different reasons, emigration to the regions of agricultural colonization had not worked out
as a solution.” (Harnecker 2002: 12.)
106 This became clear in the interviews with Stora Enso where it was said that they go to Brazil to make
business and profit – that is the core of the action –but also take of course into consideration other than
economic factors. The relevance of the rhetoric element “but” is crucial here, depicting and allowing to
analyse, according to discourse analysis, that the thing voiced just before or after the “but” is culturally
significant, that it is an opinion, which the speaker wants to, however, mitigate.
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Explained through Bourdiean framework, the situation on the Brazilian field of economic
capital had become too unbearable for those who did not possess a lot of capital on that
field in Brazil. By must, they had to choose to pursue to win the game by relying on the
gathering of the other types of capital, mainly those of political symbolic capital (as this
was possible in the new 1980’s Latin American democratic breezes) and cultural symbolic
capital (especially religious: it appears to be the case that always when there are hard
economic times in a society, the interest that is laid on the religious or cultural capital,
increases). The symbolical capital and its distribution and the identification of different
social sectors with their own specific symbolic capital in the Brazilian society did not
transform so much; however, the newborn sub-field in Brazil: that of MST - came to have
its very own symbolic system.
Bourdieu argues that the controlled classes are “being served” a specific culture, i.e. a
system of significances: this is wrongly recognized as legitimate by the controlled, as its
artificiality is not perceived. Thus, those who have more symbolic capital in a society are in
a favoured position; this is called symbolic violence, and it is omnipresent in the society; in
language, education and upbringing. (Bourdieu 1991: 160-170; 1998: 10-40.) MST is an
example which shows, how a new field with a heterodox discourse has been born in a
society that has been for ages under a Bourdiean doxa; and still widely continues to be.
Only in the past 20 years there has begun in Brazil a real process where the doxa of
“propriety-type” human-land relation is vanishing and splitting into orthodox and
heterodox. Palmares and Canudos were just attempts to do this: the first of these even
without any national diffusion ambitions. As analysed earlier, contemporary smaller scale
sem-terra movements which do not play by the power field’s rules, are more cruelly
destroyed and attacked against by the power field than MST. The fight of MST can be
claimed to be a dispositive of heterodox against the orthodox, as those in control feel as
necessary to step out to defend the way things are in Brazil.
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Thus, due to its response to MST, even though indirect, the power field ends up
demonstrating MST as an institution that should be granted the privilege of actually
engaging into a discourse. In Foucauldian respects, MST thereafter already has significant
power, as it has encountered orthodox type – not doxic – resistance by the current power
field. However, even though MST is in a heterodox position in relation to the power field,
the game between these two is not played with one set of rules. The struggle of MST is still
a fight for the recognition of MST as an equal player; a struggle for setting the rules of the
game in terms bit more favourable for the agrarian reform. Now MST has been forced to
more or less follow the rules set by the power field: i.e. to have a reformist agenda.
Gender Relations within MST
Lastly in this thesis, MST’s symbolic system is briefly analysed within the Foucauldian
framework for sexuality and power relations. There are transformations underway in MST
regarding sexuality. Many people in MST, especially its female leaders, would like to make
a reform (MST hardly uses the word “revolution” in its discourses) also in the field of
sexual relations and not only in the agrarian power relations. They have expanded the
slogan of MST that “a new society is only possible through the creation of a new man” into
including: “…  and a new woman”. Inside the MST there has blossomed a culture-specific
feminist movement, whose slogan is: “We want to free the women; not in order to free her
from the domestic work, but to be a class fighter.”
One of the most prominent female leaders, Christiane Campos, says that “the Theology of
Liberation within MST, which is under constant transformation, has now lately started to
say that God is both father and mother, not only father as in the original version of the
church”. 107 This discourse is a direct replication coming from top of the symbolic system
of MST, from the ideologist Leonardo Boff. It has been his idea that god is both father and
women (Boff 1979)108.
107 Interview in MST Bahia’s internal magazine: Caderno dos Núcleos. MST-BA. ANO 1. No. 04. FEV-JUN /
2004. Entrevista (por Paulo Andrade Magalhães): Christiane Campos.
108 The cover of the book describes shortly this: “Deus não se revela apenas como Pai de bondade mas
também como Mãe de infinita misericórida. Aqui se estudam as categorias do feminino e como podem ser
aplicadas a Deus.”
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But the transformation of such an issue as sexuality into a totally different characteristic
within the Brazilian cultural context might prove to be a very hard task even for MST’s
feminists. This is due to the function which sexuality plays in power relations and social
systems. Michel Foucault argues that “in power-relations sexuality is not the most
withdrawing factor, but rather one of the most efficient instruments. It can be used to most
manifold manoeuvres and it can function as the mainstay and seam for most varied
strategies” (Foucault 1998: 77).
Christiane Campos continues to explain the situation within MST currently: “I have various
boys who, regardless of all campaigns, do not use condom because they think that they
would stop to be machos. And the girls do not ask from them to use because they are too
ashamed, as they think that such a question would show that they are very liberal.” Even
though she speaks in here of some campaigns, all the leaders of MST camps that were
interviewed for this research said that “this kind of issues” are the responsibility of the
government of Brazil.
The Health Ministry of Brazil made a survey on the health in the camps and settlements of
the Agrarian Reform, of the sem-terras, in 2001. These are results for all sem-terras, not
just for MST, which nevertheless composes the demographic majority in the research. The
results were illustrating many challenges the Ministry has to raise the health-care standards
of the sem-terra into the same level with the rest of the Brazilians. The statistics on the
matters related to sexuality serve as a background in this Foucauldian study of MST’s
sexuality, and are presented in the next paragraph.
80% of the people in agrarian reform settlements or camps never use protection like
condom in their sexual relations, according to the Ministry’s surveys. This is analysed to be
highly influenced by the strong machismo apparent in Brazil, particularly in the rural
settings, which puts all the responsibility on the usage of sexual protection on women.
Within the sem-terra and settled sem-terra, 70% state that a condom is unnecessary in
sexual relations “as they trust in their sex partners”, criticises the report. 62% of 15-19
years old sem-terra girls are already married and have had children. The average
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sterilization age within the agrarian reform for women is 28 years, in which age a woman
has normally had at least five, normally about ten children. (Minísterio da Saúde 2001.)
The leaders of MST utter that in Brazil there is still a lot of land for making more children,
and, besides that it is the wish of God to populate the earth. After a few moments the same
MST leader using this discourse told to me in a conversation that they cannot anymore
accept landless workers from other regions in desperate situation to join their MST, as they
have no land to give for them. Despite of this apparent arbitrage in the arguments, one thing
is sure: that the culture of MST would not be the same without a massive population.
Human bodies are the most important political instrument used by MST.
Campos continues explaining the sexuality within MST in the interview: “We have the
problem that various militants are the first ones to go into settlements and camps to have
sex with the girls”. These militants are also persons who should be responsible for giving
education on health issues. Campos finishes the interview by saying: “the problem is not to
have sex, but to have sexual relations without being careful: the girls get pregnant and the
men disappear.” So not even she actually condemns the activity of the militants: their desire
is acceptable within MST. This implies the positioning of symbolic power within the
movement being worth a closer look in Foucauldian terms.
Ultimately, despite heterodox cultural discourses and practices, MST is still a young
movement, a gathering whose members come from within the Brazilian peasant culture,
which has traditionally been one of the most machista cultures in Brazil. When I asked
about the high number of children in families from the MST leaders, they started to smile,
interpreting my question as a joke related to sex. Following Foucauldian theory, observing
this notion led me to study sexual relations in MST as depicting (perhaps hidden) power
relations. The leaders replied to my question laughing “We Brazilians like a lot to make
kids!” It is notable that in many MST camps there are very young girls that are already
pregnant, as also the statistics of Brazilian Health ministry illustrate – however, many times
the father comes from outside of the camp, being culture-specifically, interestingly a
travelling MST militant, working on many different camps.
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Power is always presented in the body, as Foucault says, in the way body is used and seen
and transformed. Before there exists desire, there always exists power, which gives the
desire a culture-specific character. Particularly, there is a sexual tension between opposite
field’s habituses, for example between bosses and secretaries, or in Brazil, between white
men and black women. In MST those who are in a social position with most of the power,
in Bourdieu’s terms109, are the leaders and militants – there is special sexual tension
between them and those who are most subjected to their power, i.e. young girls in the
camps. Importantly, also the young girls feel this tension, attraction towards the powerful
militants: the tension is a micro-scale Foucauldian dispositive, a relation par excellence.
Within MST, the most important power is symbolic power. The MST leader is like a
talisman when he moves within the camp, this I have seen personally: all people transform
their activity as the leader steps close by. So, perhaps the answer to the problems that
feminists within MST face lays in the structure of MST’s social field.
Michel Foucault has analysed there to have been four big strategies that turned out to be
extremely effective regarding power and extremely productive regarding knowledge in the
history of “West”. Sexuality in the West, since the 18th century, was a focus of power and
knowledge dispositives. Of these, the hysterization of women’s body, pedagogisation of
children’s sexuality, reproduction behaviours socialization and psychiatrization of perverse
pleasure were the four most important strategies. (Foucault 1998: 78.) Now, when
comparing sexuality in the culture of MST to Foucault’s assessment of the so-called
“Western” cultures sexual dispositives, it has to be noted that MST lacks all the “privileged
focuses of knowing” of the West in these respects. In MST, women’s body is not hysterized
as in the Western Barbie/Britney Spears culture of corporal commercialization; children are
not considered as someone who would not have sexuality, as youngsters start to have sex
between 10 and 14 years in general; there is no sign of Malthusianism as a control of
reproduction; and when perverse action is encountered within MST, it is not treated as a
pathological illness that a psychiatrist should treat. Thereafter, there is certainly a border
between the sexual cultural elements of MST and the “Western” culture. On this borderland
109 Not in Foucault’s, to whom no one can possess power as it is impersonally all around the society (1998:77-
78), even though as I interpret the oracle-type text of Foucault, he actually means with this more or less the
same thing as Bourdieu.
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belongs also the relation of MST with Veracel, particularly in the “Malthusian control”
dimension. This difference between the two systems is looked upon lastly.
The importance of introducing some basic elements of the gender relations in MST is to
pinpoint that MST has its own symbolic system, which is relationally different from that
symbolic system into which Veracel belongs to. The abovementioned four dimensions that
Foucault has studied seem to be marking differences between MST’s and Veracel’s
symbolic systems. There are, however, even more important differences in gender relations
between these two. The multiplication of human bodies is the goal of MST; this is a
contradictious goal to the symbolic system into which Veracel belongs to (Western
capitalism), which sees human “masses” as a Malthusian problem.  Masses have to be
given work and have to be managed; people are principally a required human resource for
production in this model. However, a resource that is required by it all the time in lesser
quantities as mechanization and capital intensive reforms outplace the need for a large
work-force.
The power of MST, on the other hand, resides exactly in masses, in the force of manifesting
through a social mass movement in which human bodies are moved from one place to
another and put to work. The symbolic system of MST puts the highest value on work; and
thus sees Veracel as an enemy to itself. Also Veracel sees the sem-terras as an enemy as
was demonstrated in the discourse analysis section: they are an obstacle to the
implementation and smooth functioning of the large-scale pulp production model.
***
This chapter has arrived to the conclusion that, in Pierre Bourdieu’s terms, MST has its
own symbolic system, which gains its particularity from the dispositives in which it is
immersed. In the context of Southern Bahia, MST’s local culture is colored by the relation
of this symbolic system with its significant relational “others”, such as Veracel. Thereafter,
it is expected that the encountering between MST Bahia and Veracel will in the future
affect both of these social actors’ internal symbolic systems.
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Conclusions
This study has aimed to produce a Geertzian “thick description” of the encounter between
MST and Veracel. This was done by applying the theories of Pierre Bourdieu, Greg Urban
and Michel Foucault. In the course of analysis, many vital issues regarding the Veracel
Celulose SA’s and MST’s socioeconomic, political and cultural dimensions in the context
of Brazil and Brazilian Bahia have been scrutinized.
Perhaps it would have been more appropriate to denominate the encounter between MST
and Veracel as a conflict rather than as an intercultural encounter. In the end, the
interculturality of the encounter depends on the defining of “culture”. Does politics or
economic model make part of a social actor’s culture? In this research, yes they do; they are
central parts for the symbolic systems into which these social actors belong to. The concept
of “symbolic system” includes and describes all the spheres of social life, in a better way
than the concept of “culture”, as that concept can be seen as corroded in many respects.
For MST, the occupation/invasion was a response to Veracel’s appearance to the area as a
social actor with considerable power and will to exercise this to fulfill its culture-specific
conception of human-land relationship, to achieve the goals particular to that. The
encounter of MST and Veracel is a power struggle for the control over the Southern Bahian
and Brazilian land – in all the dimensions of the control over land. Pierre Bourdieu’s theory
on symbolic capital has been used in this research to demonstrate the importance of
symbolic systems in maintaining economic and material control over land. In the dimension
of symbolic, this control is exerted through discourses with possible accompanying
practices, both of these seeking to rationalize and legitimize the social actors’ actions in the
eyes of the actors and the wider public. Thus, Michel Foucault’s dispositive was brought
into play to analyze the dynamics between power and knowledge, to be able to
methodologically analyze the symbolic systems in encounter through power and discourse
analysis. Lastly, particular treatises on the Brazilian society, such as Roberto DaMatta’s
Jeito Brasileiro, interpretations on positivism in Brazilian power relationships and
historical accounts on two alternative approaches into controlling land (in comparison to
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the Brazilian power field), were applied to explain more in depth the symbolic and
economic dimensions of the encounter between MST and Veracel.
In this course of applying theories, the hypothesis has been tested. In the end, after analysis,
it can be argued that the hypothesis should be accepted: the MST/Veracel encounter is an
encounter between two different symbolic systems – it is an intercultural encounter. Even
though the parties have some similarities in their interests, there are major differences in the
conceptions of own interests and the other’s interests, of human-land relationship and of
eucalyptus between MST and Veracel.
This thesis has aimed to, besides testing the hypothesis, to present the functioning
mechanics, significant relationships and cultural pathways across space and through time -
in Greg Urban’s terms - that the symbolic systems pertinent to MST and Veracel,
respectively, have. The goal has been to do this in a transdisciplinary way, without
overlooking any of the spheres of the social; the thesis has tried to show that it is crucial to
study a phenomenon such as the encounter between MST and Veracel from cultural,
economic, political, legal, geographic and historical point of views.
The physical encounter of 4/2004 between the parties opened a space for this research, both
in terms of its academic and social justification, and in the sense of making the study of the
encountering cultures relation methodologically easier. A principal material source for the
study of the intercultural encounter between MST/Veracel continues to be this physical
encounter and all the discourses that were voiced in response to it.
This thesis has not created, however, an account of the cultures of MST and Veracel as they
“are”, but it has created an interpretation, a thick description of the direction, movement of
these. More important than to study that what kind of culture “is” now, is to study its
direction. This approach is also methodologically more research-friendly, as culture is
demonstrated particularly through discourses, and discourses are demonstrating the ideal
goals of a social entity rather than its current status.
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Both Veracel and MST demonstrate themselves in their discourses in a favorable light. In
reality, MST is still largely a peasant movement with a typical peasant culture, in which
private property of land and machismo, for example, are in power. The discourse and
current practices of MST, however, demonstrate that MST has a “metaculture of
modernity” type symbolic system, in Greg Urban’s terms, in which culture is created
through acceleration rather than inertia. This is, because MST has to overcome the existing
symbolic system’s cultural diffusion. In Brazil, this means that MST has to pose an
alternative symbolic system to the country’s power field’s symbolic system. Even though
MST is now a peasant culture, in future, even in close future after one or two sem-terra
generations, it is likely to be culturally something quite different from the Brazilian power
field – if it continues successfully along the current it is traveling on now, if it continues to
strengthen its own alternative symbolic system in face of the power fields symbolic system.
It was interpreted that the symbolic system particular to Veracel is marked by the
international business field and by the Brazilian positivist management culture. In Urbanian
terms, the symbolic system’s into which Veracel belongs to, operates within the dynamics
of the metaculture of tradition. This metaculture seeks to work against the corroding
impacts of time and other alternative symbolic systems by focusing on reproducing the
model particular to it. The Brazilian elites want to maintain their centennial, inherited
economic, political and symbolic power. Also the global economic capital possessor group,
the investment banks in the forehead, through its operating stratus i.e. multinational
business enterprises, seeks to fulfill and fortify the cultural goal of profit maximization
imperative for it. Little or no adjustments can be made on this objective due to the
traditional metaculture of this group. Veracel’s culture is under slight transformation due to
the growing pressure to be sustainable and implement the guidelines of the ideology of
quality, however. Mainly this transformation takes place, if it takes place, through the
cultural pathway which Veracel has with Finland, a Nordic welfare state. This can be said,
as the enterprises similar to Veracel in the same area, such as Aracruz Celulose, who lack
the pathway to a welfare state, having pathways only with the Brazilian state and Brazilian
and multinational business elite, has not shown and does not show any significant
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transformations in this respect; rather Aracruz keeps on practicing its culture of seeking
maximized profits on all possible ways.
All conflicts can be resolved. The remediation work starts with finding the common ground
and interests which the conflictive parties share and with avoiding pinpointing differences
in values. However, as this research has focused on creating an academic, cultural research
account on the encounter rather than on the reconciliation of the conflict, there has been
considerable focus on demonstrating the value base differences of the actors. Nevertheless,
there is also common ground between MST and Veracel, common goals; even common
cultural and value elements. If remediation was sought, the focus should be on these shared
elements. Even more importantly, the cultural relational particularities of MST and Veracel
should be understood in the remediation work: to outline these has been the focus in this
paper.
In cultural studies, it should be understood that entities like on MST and Veracel are parts
of greater models for political and economic development. All remediation work would
have to bend these models too, then. Veracel Celulose has gained its birth within the
current neoliberal large-scale, low costs, fast profits model. In the sector-specific dimension
of Veracel - that of pulp industry - this greater neoliberal model has generated a model for
producing pulp which involves large-scale monoculture tree plantations and huge, highly
mechanized pulp plants. This large-scale pulp/tree plantation model has gained currency
within the Finnish paper industry only in the last ten years. MST, on the other hand, would
like to apply in Brazil the rural economic model which gained control over land in Western
Europe in the first half of the 20th century through land reforms, the division of land to
small, family and cooperative based control.
Both MST and Veracel have as discursive objectives to develop the economy of the
countryside in Brazil, to create economic growth and well-being. These two could work
together as well; abovementioned models and actor specific symbolic systems allowing.
Would it suit for Veracel/ Stora Enso or to the specialists within their symbolic system i.e.
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for the “Big Five” investment banks to make less profit in order to allow for space and
financial possibilities for MST to get more attention of its own government?
If the forest cluster could bend on this, they could invest into smaller scale pulp plants in
the Brazilian countryside, which would generate thus more jobs and reduce the negative
impacts of large-scale plantations and mills. MST would also have to bend on their cultural
perception that all foreign investment or all type of capitalism would be an enemy to them.
The small-scale farmers could produce different types of materials for the pulp plants. The
relation between the MST peasants and pulp industry could be one of cooperation.
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Appendices
Veracel’s responses to the encounter with MST can be found from their Press Room,
www.veracel.com.br. Please see also the third chapter for a discourse analysis on the “Note
of Clarification.” Some replies by different members of Veracel and Stora Enso are also
included in the interviews made by the media after the encounter with MST: these can be
obtained from the author by request.
APPENDIX 1: MST’s response to the encounter with Veracel
The MST in Bahia published the following text in its Caderno after the occupation110:
“Occupation of Veracel is victorious for the MST-Bahia.
In the daybreak of the 4th of April, more than 3000 sem-terra (landless workers) occupied an
area of the Multinational Veracel Celulose in the district of Porto Seguro, 810 km from Salvador. In
a night of full moon, at 12 o’clock, from Saturday to Sunday, the sem-terra left from their camp
Euclides Neto, the second biggest in Bahia, with nine busses and two trucks. At 5 a.m. they arrived at
the Camp Sebastião Salgado, where two trucks of Baixo-Sul were concentrated. At 6 am the sem-
terra reached the last stop before ending putting up the Camp Luiz Inácio da Silva, the popular
“Lulão”, located in the BR between Eunápolis and Porto Seguro.
The MST transported the sem-terra for occupation with about 11 busses and dozens of
trucks. In the Lulão there already had assembled more than 2000 sem-terra from the Extreme-South,
South and Baixo-Sul of the State. The concentration of people increased each moment; more people
were on their way; in some busses oil was depleted, others were stopped by the Highway Police.
- Let’s pull out all the eucalyptus plants and plant beans for our people! – said Evanildo
Costa, in the assembly, to speak against Veracel.
The sem-terra left from the camp Lulão to the direction of the area of Veracel Celulose.
They broke close to the propriety and commenced to set aside the land under the eucalyptus
plantation. By the sound of berimbau and music on Veracel composed by the sem-terra, in less than
one hour, the male and female rural workers had laid down hundreds of eucalyptus plants.
In the day 08, the MST gathered together with the representatives of the State Government
and INCRA in the Secretary of Agriculture. With the negotiation made, the families freed the area in
the beginning of night in the same day.
Many were the conquests with the whole occupation process of Veracel: to open the process
of negotiation with the state government, together with the state and national INCRA; set up an
Advanced Unite of INCRA in Itamaraju with four teams run by agronomic engineers to accelerate
the inspections in the state of Bahia; expropriation of 22 areas in Bahia in 17 counties, making
possible the settlement of 1383 families;  the INCRA took on the compromise to expropriate 30
thousand hectares in the Extreme-South, that corresponds to 48 farms (in Eunapólis, Porto Seguro,
Santa Cruz Cabrália, Itamaraju and Itabela); till the end of the year, other 92 proprieties will be
expropriated by INCRA, including the 48 proprieties in the Extreme-South; and in the permanent
camps of MST the Secretary of Poverty will invest in a project to promote chicken, bee and
horticultural production.
The MST of Bahia continued its Journey of Fight, realizing more regional occupations,
mobilizations and marches, paying tribute to the 19 sem-terra companions that died in Eldorado dos
Carajás. The leaders of the movement declared that they continue to fight to reach their goals with
110 Caderno dos núcleos. MST-BA ANO 1 No. 04 FEV-JUN/2004. My translation from the original, see
APPENDIX 1.
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the federal government to settle 115 thousand families this year, from them 6100 in Bahia. Along
with the fences of Veracel, as a great companion said, “Cursed be all the fences”.
And, the next text was sent to me by the MST Bahia’s communication and culture section,
as I inquired their opinion on Veracel:
“In 1992, the Veracel was constructed in the city of Eunapólis with the promise to generate 1200
direct jobs and 4500 during the construction of a factory. For this, it obtained the investment of R$ 4
billions. The company holds an area of 138 thousand hectares that are not yet planted and other 65
thousand with plantation in nine counties of the extreme-south region of the State.
The industry of pulp in Bahia has demonstrated, along its inefficiency in the creation of
jobs, its catastrophic effect on the nature. The forests have been laid down and the eucalyptus is
drying the rivers. Various bird species are almost rare in the region. The Bahia-Sul Celulose that
possesses 148 thousand hectares and the Veracel are greatly responsible for the situation.
According to the data of federal government, in order to settle this year 115 thousand
families will cost R$ 2900 millions. Furthermore in conformance with the data of the same
government, with this investment 500 thousand direct jobs and more than one million indirect jobs
will be created. The Veracel, with an investment of R$ 4000 millions, almost two times bigger, will
create only 4500 jobs, although the major part of these are temporary.
The Journey of Fight in Bahia was decisive in the opening of the debate with society on the
mono-culture of eucalyptus. All these data demonstrate that to give priority to the agrarian reform is
fundamental to the construction of a model of development for the country. The MST in Bahia and in
Brazil continues trusting on that the government of Lula, as the president said, has the agrarian
reform as a priority, understanding that in it lays the hope for the accomplishment of the promise to
create jobs for Brazil.”
APPENDIX 2: The media’s response
I made a research also on the news coverage on the encounter from the 1st of April till the
10th of April from all the major Brazilian, international and Finnish newspapers. These are
not included here, but can be acquired from the author if needed. However, below is one
interview (without analysis) made with one of MST’s leader after the Veracel occupation.
Gilmar Mauro, one of the national coordinators of MST, was interviewed by Reuters
(8.4.2004) after the MST/Veracel encounter:
”Mauro emphasized that it is possible to understand the difficulties and limits of the government [of
Brazil], but that this does not resolve the all-the-time more difficult situation in the landless workers
camps. “Courage for transformation” is needed to break the difficulties that block the reform.
“Somebody has to lose, there is no other way.”
When talking about productive properties, Mauro tried to downplay the invasion and
destruction of eucalyptus in a forestry area of the Veracel Celulose Company. He affirmed that the
action had a more symbolical intention, considering that the company is a multinational – part of the
capital is Brazilian, the other part, European – and served to demonstrate that a modern agriculture
and an enormous misery exist side by side.
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The coordinator admitted, however, the existence of radical actions although he stated that
these were caused by the difficult situation of the landless people. “We are a movement of mass, not
of angel’s. We are a movement of the people.”
To the coordinator, one of the problems faced by the ones who are in favor of the Agrarian
Reform is a cultural problem. “There exist a historic-cultural problem of prejudice and loath against
the poor population”, he said, along with a problem that he classified as “an objective condition of
land concentration”. “The poor people do not fit into the projects of the non-leftist groups.”
Mauro agrees with the president Lula when he says that it is not sufficient to give land to
people; it is needed to offer them infra-structure too. But he disagrees that the government does not
have money and advances to criticize the economic policy. “Money exists, the problem is the order
of priorities (...) it’s hard to think about a development project without investments, and I’m not
talking about the Agrarian Reform only.”
After this the coordinator tried to make his discourse less radical: “We are not turning for
radicalism (...) I think that Lula is not happy with the way this agrarian reform is. Now, he is the
president, he has the responsibility of solving this problem.””
APPENDIX 3: The NGO’s response
NGO’s have responded to Veracel’s impacts to the region also. For example, over 150
NGO’s internationally wrote a letter to the European Investment Bank that invested into the
project, of which here are the most important parts. Here is a copy of that indirect response
to Veracel by these NGO’s:
“The EIB recently placed on its website an information note about the Veracel Celulose pulp mill
project [1] which the Bank is financing in Bahia, Brazil. The note mentions that the EIB has had a
dialogue with NGOs concerning the project.
We are currently writing to officially protest about the EIB describing the one meeting
between the bank and NGOs on October 21, 2003 in Brussels as ‘a dialogue' [2] and misusing NGOs
in that respect. From the NGO perspective, and based on experience with the EIB, in this case there
has been no meaningful dialogue at all. Instead, the Veracel case is a clear example of the EIB's lack
of willingness to engage in a meaningful consultation with impacted communities and NGOs on the
projects it is financing. The Veracel case clearly shows how unwilling the EIB is to listen and
consider environmental and social concerns expressed by local people and NGOs. We would like to
know which measures or activities you are referring to when you state that the EIB “conducted
extensive correspondence on the project with interested NGOs”
To sum up, the EIB did not consider the information, the concerns or the criticism of the
Brazilian local representatives and NGOs there at all. Instead, the EIB has decided to finance the
project without seriously attempting to address these concerns or prove they were wrong. Equally, no
attempt for further consultation has been undertaken. The consequences of this disregard for affected
communities has resulted in huge protests from local people and NGOs, including the recent
occupation of Veracel's plantations by the landless movement (MST) in Bahia”111
Aracruz is already one of the world's largest producers of bleached eucalyptus pulp (2
million tons/year). However, it is well known for causing land rights conflicts, occupying a large
area of fertile agricultural lands, preventing agrarian reform and legitimising large-scale land-holding
in the states of Espírito Santo and Bahia.
Barbara Happe from Urgewald says, "The project will magnify the existing conflicts with
rural communities and the indigenous people in the region. It will also increase the demand for large-
scale monoculture eucalyptus plantations. Promoting such an export- orientated agro-industrial
development model will also further aggravate the existing environmental problems in the region,
e.g. water shortage, soil degradation, loss of biodiversity." “
111 http://www.foei.org/media/2004/0521openletter.html
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Also many Brazilian NGOs have voiced and gathered their opinions on Veracel, as this
letter demonstrates:
“CARTA PÚBLICA em repúdio à CERTIFICAÇÃO CERFLOR DA VERACEL CELULOSE SA NO
EXTREMO SUL DA BAHIA
A REDE ALERTA CONTRA O DESERTO VERDE E REDE LATINO-AMERICANA CONTRA AS
monoculturas de árvores vêm à público repudiar e denunciar o processo de Certificação florestal da empresa
Veracel pela Certificadora BVQI do Brasil Sociedade Certificadora Ltda, conhecida como CERFLOR por
entender que:
?? as monoculturas de árvores em larga escala não são florestas e sim grandes plantações comerciais de
uma ou poucas espécies de árvores e freqüentemente exóticas, plantadas em blocos homogêneos da mesma
idade, sem a presença de comunidades humanas;
?? até hoje não existe em nossa região um zoneamento agro-ecológico, indispensável para ordenar as
atividades econômicas de nosso território;
?? a monocultura de eucalipto, ou qualquer outra árvore, em grande escala como estamos tendo aqui no
extremo sul da Bahia, é insustentável ambientalmente, socialmente e economicamente e portanto nunca
poderia ser certificada;
?? a monocultura de eucalipto em grande escala prejudica as comunidades locais e o meio ambiente e
não traz benefícios econômicos como outras culturas;
?? a monocultura de eucalipto em grande escala expulsa direta e indiretamente o povo do campo,
sobretudo os pequenos produtores comprometendo a produção e o preço dos alimentos;
?? a monocultura de eucalipto em grande escala aumenta o desemprego no campo, enche a periferia das
nossas cidades com dezenas de desempregados e assim aumenta a violência e miséria nestas cidades. Prova
disso são os mais de dez mil trabalhadores rurais “Sem Terra” que estão acampados à beira das estradas da
região.
?? a monocultura de eucalipto em grande escala traz uma redução violenta da biodiversidade,
exterminando a flora e fauna local, diminuindo o volume de água e até esgotando cursos d´água,
contaminando o solo e a água dos rios e córregos pelo uso exagerado de herbicida e outros tóxicos,
provocando um grande desequilíbrio biológico com a infestação de pragas que atingem as residências e as
produções agropecuárias da população vizinha ao eucaliptal;
?? a situação social dos municípios vizinhos à fábrica da Veracel, como Porto Seguro, Eunápolis e
Itapebí, é assustadora. Cresceu vertiginosamente a violência e prostituição com a construção da fábrica,
quando muitas pessoas de diferentes partes do país foram atraídas para a região pelas promessas de emprego.
É gritante a concentração de renda na região, com 64% da população vivendo em situação de miséria, com
muitas crianças abandonadas na rua, cidades sem saneamento básico e registro de muitas epidemias como
hanseníase, tuberculose e verminoses.
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Outro fator agravante para a certificação CERFLOR é que os princípios e critérios adotados pela certificadora
BVQI não são disponibilizados facilmente para a sociedade, tornando obscuro este processo.
Não podemos esquecer ainda que o mesmo governo brasileiro que financia, através do BNDES, grande parte
do projeto Veracel é quem dá o selo CERFLOR, através da certificadora BVQI do Brasil Certificadora Ltda-
CERFLOR, aliados ao setor empresarial de plantações de árvores.
Por todos esses argumentos, entendemos que o CERFLOR não merece o mínimo de credibilidade por
parte das organizações, movimentos, comunidades e cidadãos da sociedade civil.
CDDH – Centro de Defesa dos Direitos Humanos
CEPEDES – Centro de Estudos e Pesquisas para o Desenvolvimento do Extremo Sul/Ba
Espaço Cultural da Paz – Tx de Freitas/Ba. “
